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Michael Oakeshott and the Traditionalists: 






This thesis has two main objectives. The first is to provide a new understanding of 
Michael Oakeshott’s intellectual development, both political and philosophical. The second 
is to assess his place in post-war conservatism through using his works as a framework in 
which to interpret the political thought of various traditionalists associated with the 
Conservative Party. 
 
Part I analyses Oakeshott’s philosophy in its own right without considering whether he 
is a liberal or a conservative. I argue that his political philosophy and general philosophy 
must be treated separately because of their different implications for politics, and because of 
the different purposes and speed of their subsequent transformation. I contend further that 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy is more strictly philosophical in claiming that the political 
philosopher contributes most to society when he remains loyal to his calling and refuses to 
address current affairs. By contrast, Oakeshott’s general philosophy centred on the modes of 
experience was an offshoot from his early political philosophy, though it acquired a life of 
its own, and was for the most part polemical within the wider intellectual and political 
context in which it developed. It is only in Oakeshott’s late works that his general philosophy 
again became sensitive to the needs of his political philosophy, which had already undergone 
repeated revisions. Consequently, it is incorrect to argue, as the leading Oakeshott scholar 
Efraim Podoksik did, that as early as Experience and Its Modes Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy defended plurality and individuality by breaking with the tradition of holism and 
dialecticism in British Idealism, with his political philosophy following suit much later. 
 
Part II then considers three traditionalists, Kenneth Minogue, Roger Scruton, and 
Peregrine Worsthorne, to illustrate the fruitfulness of this framework. 
 
First, it shows that rejecting the interpretation of Oakeshott’s works as predominantly a 
form of liberal individualism does not, pace Andrew Gamble, entail regarding his political 
thought as unambiguously conservative instead. This becomes clear in both Minogue’s and 
Scruton’s versions of conservatism; the tensions between them elucidate the significant 
contrasts between Oakeshott’s late and early political philosophy, respectively. This makes 
it difficult to regard Oakeshott’s thought as straightforwardly conservative, and is less 





Second, Part II evaluates the extent of Oakeshott’s influence on the development of 
conservatism. In keeping with Oakeshott’s late political philosophy, Minogue’s 
conservatism emphasises that the freedom of choice in the moral life of the individual should 
not be confused with impulse but focuses instead on the satisfaction of desires and the 
constitution of one’s moral identity. Though he became more concerned with the permissive 
society in his late years, which goes beyond the influence of the late Oakeshott, Minogue 
never went so far as Scruton who argued that it is social institutions which give freedom its 
meaning and the individual his moral identity. On the other hand, notwithstanding this 
similarity with the early Oakeshott’s Idealist theory of the State, Scruton’s conservatism is 
distinctive not in virtue of its Hegelianism but in its revival of the concept of corporate 
personality for which Oakeshott had no sympathy. In relation to public debates, both 
Minogue’s late and blatantly political works and Scruton’s political pamphlets concerning 
education policy further emphasise the limits of Oakeshott’s political thought. 
 
Finally, Part II shows that Worsthorne’s claim that his defence of the traditional ruling 
class and the notion of noblesse oblige was inspired by Oakeshott’s “Rationalism in Politics” 
and “The Masses in Representative Democracy” represents yet another distinctive reading 
of Oakeshott. This combines Oakeshott’s general and political philosophy, not to defend the 
New Right, whether neo-liberal or neo-conservative, but the aristocracy of One Nation 
Toryism. The example of Worsthorne emphasises that even focusing narrowly on 
Oakeshott’s more politically relevant writings and his later development of political 
philosophy does not result in a uniform sense in which he can be regarded as a conservative. 
 
Against the prominent commentators on Conservatism Mark Garnett and Kevin 
Hickson, the thesis concludes that while Oakeshott’s philosophical works appear aloof from 
practical politics and defy conventional ideological classifications, they are nevertheless 
essential to understanding the diverse forms of political thought associated with the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
I. Studying the Traditionalists in British Conservatism 
 
 In 1978, the historian Maurice Cowling edited Conservative Essays, inviting various 
academics, publicists, and politicians to sharpen the conservative ideology which had been 
“blunted by alliance with antitotalitarian liberalism” in their common combat against 
socialism.1 What makes this renewal of conservatism remarkable is not its direct influence 
on practical politics. Certainly, the thoughts of these conservative intellectuals shaped 
aspects of government policy under Thatcher’s Premiership;2 but for the most part they only 
created an atmosphere where new ideas gradually became acceptable or at least thinkable. 
Rather, the distinctiveness of this renewed conservative ideology consists in the wide range 
of intellectual resources employed in inspiring the conservative imagination. What Cowling, 
and his followers to varying degrees, aimed to achieve was fundamentally to transform the 
nature of the then dominant public doctrine, where a public doctrine is construed as a “loose 
combination of interlocking assumptions about politics, economics, science, scholarship, 
morality, education, aesthetics and religion which constitutes the basis on which decisions 
are made about public matters.”3 This indirect way to influence political practice by shaping 
legitimate forms of public debate exemplifies, no less than direct methods do, the action-
oriented nature of political ideologies identified by Michael Freeden.4 
 The advocates of this branch of conservatism are labelled by Mark Garnett and Kevin 
Hickson as the “traditionalists” in their study of thinkers associated with the Conservative 
 
1 Maurice Cowling, “The Present Position,” in Conservative Essays, ed. Maurice Cowling (London: Cassell, 
1978), 21. 
2 Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson, Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributors to the Political Thought of 
the Modern Conservative Party, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 105. 
3 See n. 1. 




party.5 Aware that many political opinions and decisions are influenced by discussions and 
movements which are not strictly political, the traditionalists attempted to formulate a 
conservatism embracing all fields of intellectual pursuit which are relevant to public affairs. 
Nevertheless, as Cowling admitted, the purely political part of conservatism “can probably 
survive whether it discusses [these wider concerns] or not.”6 Consequently, the academic 
analyses of conservative ideology which have been mainly conducted from the perspective 
of political science or political philosophy, and more narrowly preoccupied with its political 
aspects, are unable to capture more completely the peculiarity of traditionalist conservatism. 
A balance of attention is required to compensate for this neglect of the extra-political 
dimensions of intellectual history.7 
 For instance, in Freeden’s research which is more social scientific, the anti-liberal 
orientation of traditionalist conservatives exemplifies the mirror-image strategy 
characteristic of conservatism’s response to its rival ideologies. Unfortunately, he continues, 
“being alarmed by the rise of the New Right and incapable of distinguishing between left-
liberalism, centrist-liberalism, and libertarianism,” these conservatives’ stance against 
liberalism was based on a misperception of its contemporary significance.8 The actual status 
of post-war liberal ideologies and the traditionalists’ perception of them is a separate set of 
questions beyond the concern of the present thesis. More important to our purpose is that 
Freeden understands this strategy as a general way of developing “substantive antitheses to 
progressive core concepts” and then assigning these antitheses “only adjacent status within 
the conservative morphology.” 9  However, this characterisation does not adequately 
represent the central place Cowling and his fellows accorded to their anti-liberalism, 
especially their contempt for liberalism’s failure to consider any extra-political issue which 
 
5 See n. 2. 
6 Cowling, “The Present Position,” 24. 
7 Stefan Collini, “The Identity of Intellectual History,” in A Companion to Intellectual History, ed. Richard 
Whatmore and Brian Young (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 17. 
8 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 399. 
9 Ibid., 336. 
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“has been dirtied by being handled on the Left.”10 As we shall see in Chapter 6, even the 
more apparently neo-liberal Kenneth Minogue regarded his own position as conservative for 
the reason that liberalism fails to take into account the moral depth involved in the 
individual’s freedom of choice. In a study of the broad patterns of ideological thinking across 
a wide spatiotemporal scope such as Freeden’s, it might be inevitable that sometimes a 
particular case study is pressed into a preconceived mould; and this, despite the analyst’s 
efforts in delineating that mould according to what can be gleaned from a detailed historical 
examination of diverse manifestations of conservatism. Surely Freeden recognises the 
importance of including “major thinkers from all fields that create socially oriented 
discourse.” 11  Nevertheless, it seems that his ambitious pursuit of a general theory of 
ideologies prevents him from embarking on such an enterprise thoroughly to avoid 
oversimplification and overgeneralisation. 
 On the other hand, Noël O'Sullivan’s analysis exhibits the incompleteness of the more 
philosophical approaches. In his outline of the redefinition of conservatism during the 1970s, 
he distinguishes between various versions of the New Right, where Roger Scruton is singled 
out to represent one among these versions. Since Scruton was associated with Cowling in 
relation to the Peterhouse Group at Cambridge, and their link can be further attested by 
Scruton’s contribution to Cowling’s edited volume mentioned earlier, O’Sullivan’s 
interpretation of Scruton as representing the reformulation of the organic version of 
conservatism is merely a partial description of the traditionalists’ ideological activities. As 
Chapter 7 will make clear, the distinctiveness of Scruton’s conservatism does not consist in 
his Hegelian account of freedom, but in his revival of corporate personality against the 
background of English jurisprudence. The partial nature of O’Sullivan’s account reflects his 
own philosophical position, which is strongly influenced by a more liberal understanding of 
Michael Oakeshott’s political philosophy. Consequently, Scruton’s emphasis on the 
 
10 Cowling, “The Present Position,” 23. 
11 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 119. 
14 
 
centrality of national identity attracts O’Sullivan’s attention and criticism most. This leads 
to the evaluative comment that “the Tory version of the New Right creates an unresolved 
tension between the [Oakeshottian] ideal of civil association … and the desire … for an 
organic national identity not only sensitive to the dead and the unborn, but ultimately giving 
meaning to life.” 12  Here Freeden’s call to lay more emphasis on the consumption of 
ideologies as opposed to their production is apposite.13 In this case, what interests an analyst 
of ideologies are not only the questions concerning the actual intention lying behind 
Oakeshott’s published and unpublished works as a whole, but no less importantly the 
reception of Oakeshott’s ideas by his contemporaries and in particular the uses the 
traditionalists made of his political philosophy in renewing the conservative public doctrine. 
Following this advice, Chapter 9 will show how Peregrine Worsthorne, contrary to 
O’Sullivan’s normative judgment, contended that it is precisely Oakeshott’s account of the 
moral life of the individual which provides the foundation for the Tory defence of the 
historical continuity in the social and political life of Britain. 
 Finally, Garnett and Hickson’s account of traditionalist conservatives illustrates the 
vices of confining one’s attention to the more strictly political aspects of their ideological 
endeavours. For example, in this account, Oakeshott occupies a peripheral place, and is 
called into play only occasionally to throw light on some features of other thinkers who are 
more substantially discussed. Garnett and Hickson makes this decision because “Oakeshott’s 
contribution was more to conservatism as a political philosophy, rather than the ideology of 
the Conservative Party.”14 Therefore, it is unsurprising that when their analysis turns to “the 
traditionalists,”15 there are no reference to any of Oakeshott’s writings. However, this thesis 
will demonstrate that Oakeshott’s philosophical works, though primarily academic and aloof 
from current affairs, is an essential context in which to understand not only where the 
 
12 Noël O'Sullivan, “Conservatism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, ed. Michael Freeden, 
Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 302. 
13 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 104. 
14 Garnett and Hickson, Conservative Thinkers, 6. 
15 Ibid., 105-20. 
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traditionalists emulated him, but also where they went beyond his influence. 
In brief, an ideological analysis of the traditionalists’ development of post-war 
conservatism cannot limit its sources of material to the texts concerned with contemporary 
political events. It has to take into consideration the nature of conservative undercurrents in 
other fields, not primarily or necessarily political, since the 1920s. This includes their 
relation to the contemporary ideational and practical contexts, whether this relation is 
intended by the thinker under investigation or is discerned with the help of historical 
hindsight; and, more specifically, their transformation at the hands of the traditionalists to 
deal with the burning political issues of their time. Attention to these matters are important 
to give a more accurate picture of this specific form of conservatism which acquired a 
distinct shape from the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
II. Methodological Considerations 
 
 The above brief survey of existing literature about traditionalist conservatism might 
appear to be a critique of the flaws in other approaches which paves the way for a new 
framework of research. No such pretensions are intended. If the nature of this study differs 
from existing ones, it means not so much that it is superior to them as that the present author 
is interested in a different set of questions. The chief one is how intellectual currents in areas 
not necessarily or directly related to practical politics may nevertheless provide a context in 
which an underflow of ideology took shape, changed itself, and then emerged in a form with 
a more immediate bearing on contemporary political life. Therefore, this section deals with 
a number of considerations about method arising out of this research question. 
 It is perhaps easier to begin with the methods this thesis will not adopt. The first one is 
instantiated by Kieron O’Hara’s efforts in the modernisation of Conservative ideology for 
the sake of tackling issues in contemporary politics. The main thrust of studies of this kind 
is to make conservatism relevant to current affairs such that it can rally electoral support for 
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the party. For example, the appeal to public reason is precisely a strategy to reach a wider 
audience which has not been generally sympathetic to more extreme or ambitious versions 
of conservatism.16 However, this move amounts to the exclusion of what O’Hara called the 
“metaphysically” inspired forms of conservatism from the potentially broader ideological 
family.17 While the demarcation of ideological boundaries and the self-identification with a 
delimited line of ideological tradition are common activities of the ideologue, 18  such 
practical appraisal evidently finds no place in a scholarly analysis. Had we accepted this 
approach, we would not have been able to include Oakeshott’s Idealist philosophy and 
Scruton’s Hegelianism in our analysis of conservatism. 
 Secondly, the sort of philosophical articulation and criticism of conservatism provided 
by Ted Honderich is not adequate for the purpose of this study, either. As Freeden has already 
pointed out, the method of philosophy tend to exhibit the syndromes of imposing a straw 
man, a slippery slope, or a strict dichotomy on the ideology into which it enquires;19 but 
even the most rationally constructed belief-systems inevitably “contain components based 
on extra-rational preferences.”20 It is these preferences that prevent an ideology from falling 
into extremes which are either philosophically indefensible or practically unfeasible; and it 
is the interaction between these preferences and the ideological position at which a thinker 
finally arrives that interests the analyst of ideology. In other words, it is pointless to criticise 
by the criterion of philosophy a political doctrine which does not pretend to be a 
philosophical theory, though such exercise as what Honderich did may have some value of 
its own qua philosophy. 
More importantly, the anachronistic nature of the philosophical method, which often 
consists in relating and comparing different thinkers’ arguments abstracted from the original 
historical context, is overconfident in its efficacy as an “intelligent inquiry of a logical, 
 
16 Kieron O’Hara, Conservatism (London: Reaktion Books, 2011), 18-19. 
17 Ibid., 197-98. 
18 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 110-11. 
19 Ibid., 38. 
20 Ibid., 30. 
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persistent and systematic kind” without the need to rely on a prior historical understanding.21 
For instance, Honderich’s examination of Oakeshott’s attitude to change proceeds by 
understanding at face value a passage from one of his post-war essays, extracting from it 
some propositions, and finally providing a logical critique of their mutual inconsistency and 
a judgment of their insufficiency for a definition of conservatism.22 As such, it bypasses a 
plethora of questions which have to be answered before any sound criticism can be produced: 
Is Oakeshott an ideologist? Is the ideology he advocated a conservative or a liberal one? Are 
there continuities and discontinuities between his early and late writings? What does he 
intend to do in that essay if it is not to provide a clear delineation of conservatism? What is 
the significance of this piece of writing in relation to the then dominant intellectual discourse 
and political events? How is his view interpreted and utilised by his conservative followers? 
and so forth. This illustrates how much is condensed in a judgement or characterisation of a 
thinker or of a body of thoughts, which is beyond the specialist philosopher’s imagination.23 
Nonetheless, this does not preclude the possibility of normative evaluation of an 
ideology under discussion; nor is the result of the historical portrayal of the development of 
an ideology irrelevant to such a philosophical task. As Gerald Gaus comments in relation to 
Freeden’s distinction between ideologising and ideology analysis, sooner or later the second-
level enterprise of interpretation will involve normative engagement with the object of 
interpretation in the first-level exercise of ideology production. What is important is that this 
process should not begin too early in the interpreter’s attempt to understand the ideology in 
question, and that he should employ his normative commitments to make it more intelligible 
rather than reveal its flaws.24 Thus, if with the help of an intellectual historian’s work we 
are informed of the coarseness of the dichotomy between romantics and utilitarians in F. R. 
 
21 Ted Honderich, Conservatism: Burke, Nozick, Bush, Blair?, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto, 2005), 5. 
22 Ibid., 15-18. 
23 Collini, “Identity of Intellectual History,” 14. 
24 Gerald Gaus, “Ideology, Political Philosophy, and the Interpretive Enterprise: A View from the Other Side,” 
in Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden, ed. Ben Jackson and Marc Stears (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 194-95. 
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Leavis’ thought,25 a dichotomy which has been appropriated by Scruton in the battle against 
the liberalism of his time, our priority is not to criticise the inappropriateness of Leavis’ and 
Scruton’s practical history or the invalidity of their theoretical distinctions. Instead, the 
primary task is to describe the extent to which these ideologues succeeded in transforming 
the patterns of political argument at the time, and explain how, in spite of or even because of 
this ideological distortion, this success was achieved.26 
 Further considerations concerning the selection of case studies and the use of source 
materials will throw into clearer relief the methodological nature of this thesis than a mere 
designation of it as a piece of intellectual history of British conservatism. The most 
fundamental question concerns the choice of thinkers who in self-classification either did 
not welcome the label “conservatism” or were ambivalent to it. Obviously, the justification 
of this choice must go beyond the traditionalists’ interpretation of them as a conservative or 
at least as thinkers whose works are suggestive of conservative ideas. The first move towards 
such a justification is offered by Freeden’s loosening of the tight correlations between 
ideologies and political parties in the British context.27 When a thinker under question held 
reservations about the conservative label, the analyst of ideology may appeal to the usage of 
that label common in that time to probe into its meaning, which often carries overtones 
related to party politics. Consequently, the thinker’s denial of membership in conservatism 
as an ideology associated with the Party may after all be compatible with an identification 
of the patterns and forms of his political thinking with conservative ideology proper. 
Freeden’s further contribution consists in his recognition of the non-existence of absolute 
ideological boundaries.28 The most a researcher can hope to achieve is to strike a balance 
between “the self-definition of an individual professing to adhere to an ideological family, 
 
25 Donald Winch, “Mr Gradgrind and Jerusalem,” in Wealth and Life: Essays on the Intellectual History of 
Political Economy in Britain, 1848-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 392. 
26 Unfortunately, Leavis and other thinkers like T. S. Eliot lies beyond the scope of this thesis due to the 
limitation of time and space. 
27 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 24. 
28 Ibid., 87. 
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the understandings of other contemporaries concerning that individual’s place in the family, 
and the interpretation by the scholar both of the concrete evidence and of the diachronic 
tradition currently held to constitute that family.”29 Of course, he must recognise that the 
tradition as it exists in the concrete manifestations of ideologies is far more fragmented than 
its counterpart categories adopted in academic analysis.30 It is in this spirit that Oakeshott’s 
philosophical works are examined in the first part of this research. 
 Secondly, this thesis concurs with Freeden’s view that the main unit of ideology 
analysis is not an individual thinker. However, the present research does not share his anti-
elitist attack on the overemphasis in the past on the “Great Men” at the expense of vernacular 
patterns of ideologies produced and consumed by ordinary people. 31  Rather, the 
“individualist” approach is rejected here because our interest in individual thinkers is more 
focused on “what is shared and disputed with others—assumptions, expressions, 
arguments—not on an idea that can be treated either as self-sufficient or, in any meaningful 
sense, strictly singular.”32 This applies equally whether we are concerned with thinkers and 
philosophers who unquestionably occupy a place in the pantheon of an ideology, or with 
journalists and publicists utilising day-to-day events as opportunities for influencing public 
opinions and sentiments, or finally with those figures lying somewhere between these two 
extremes. In research practice, this means that the configuration of ideas in a single political 
philosopher may tell us more about the way theoretical ideas were put to work than Freeden 
estimates,33 provided that the chosen philosopher can be placed in the relevant context of 
the dissemination and exchange of ideas with other thinkers. As the following chapters will 
illustrate, it is difficult to treat Oakeshott’s philosophical account of the moral life of the 
individual as a “self-sufficient” or “strictly singular” idea if both Minogue and Worsthorne 
were influenced by this idea but developed their own reasonable interpretations thereof 
 
29 Ibid., 103-4. 
30 Ibid., 114-15. 
31 Ibid., 119. 
32 Collini, “Identity of Intellectual History,” 12. 
33 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 107. 
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which are mutually contradictory. In any case, as Freeden also concedes, the analysis of 
ideology is no less agent-based so that in his own study the criteria of selecting thinkers for 
case study consists more in their usefulness for illustration than in the availability of their 
ideas to the general public.34 From this perspective, Garnett and Hickson’s individualist 
approach to the study of conservative ideologies can be legitimated.35 More importantly, it 
is in this way that this research justifiably chooses Oakeshott, Minogue, Scruton, and 
Worsthorne, and places them in the context of the New Right movement and the intellectuals 
of various think-tanks associated with the Conservative party. 
Certainly, it is a commonplace to say that we have to understand a text by invoking its 
relevant context. The crucial point is that how the context is chosen depends on a prior 
understanding of what the text is meant to do and the specific questions the historian asked 
about it. Apart from paying attention to the details of tone, register, implied readership and 
the like, Stefan Collini’s view of the task of intellectual history as one of characterisation is 
very helpful here. To characterise a thinker, a group of intellectuals, or an ideological 
movement, is to observe which ideas and arguments are characteristic or symptomatic of a 
historical period and which are original or anomalous therein. Consequently, the questions 
asked about them will also be different.36 For instance, in his early general philosophy, 
Oakeshott insisted on the logical independence of philosophy, practice, history, and science, 
as well as their irrelevance to one another.37 If put in the context of British Idealism, this 
doctrine appears to be just another metaphysical system typically produced by a philosopher 
reared in that intellectual background. Nevertheless, taking Oakeshott’s development of this 
system in his post-war essays into consideration as well, it becomes clear that these essays 
exhibited the ideological force of his general philosophy unrivalled by similar post-war 
critiques of totalitarianism. 
 
34 Ibid., 106. 
35 Garnett and Hickson, Conservative Thinkers, 5. 
36 Collini, “Identity of Intellectual History,” 14. 
37 Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 5. 
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 The above example raises the question of intentionality in interpretation. Whereas 
Oakeshott did intend his Experience and Its Modes to be a continuation of the Idealist 
tradition in philosophy, it is unclear whether its ideological significance was apparent to him. 
That an interpretation can go beyond the thinker’s recognition is, according to Freeden, 
entirely legitimate so long as the analyst knows what he is doing and does not pretend his 
result to be an interpretation of what the thinker intended to do.38 The main way to warrant 
the legitimacy of such interpretation is the evidence of the circulation and consumption of 
the thinker’s ideas by his contemporaries. Therefore, in this case, if Oakeshott’s 
philosophical views find frequent expression in his reviews of books and other writings that 
are more directly engaged with practical politics, the ideological interpretation proffered 
earlier will acquire some degrees of reasonableness and credibility. 
 A balance between primary and secondary sources is an essential evil. The need to 
cultivate familiarity with a concentrated body of first-hand historical documents makes 
reliance on second-hand accounts inevitable when the historical context being invoked 
contains the intellectual development of other ideologies or the sequence of contemporary 
events which may shed light on the conservative ideology under interpretation. To give a 
final example, in the evaluation of Scruton’s practical support of parental choice in education 
whose apparent neo-liberal overtones diverges from the Hegelian impression of his political 
philosophy, or Worsthorne’s defence of aristocracy on paternalist assumptions, it would be 
beyond the scope and limitation of this thesis to examine all the relevant primary sources in 
liberalism and socialism. The reasonable alternative is to rely on relevant accounts provided 
by other scholars. 
 As this section would have made clear, methodological discussions are vacuous without 
citing concrete examples of pertinent research in support. Therefore, we turn now to the 
substantial arguments and actual findings of this thesis. The first part examines Oakeshott’s 
 
38 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 101-2. 
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political and general philosophy alternately in order to excavate the underlying motivation 
of his at times asymmetric development in these two kinds of philosophical works. This will 
clear away the obstacles posed by liberal or conservative interpretations of Oakeshott’s 
ideological position, and paves the way to a more complete understanding of his thought. 
The second half of this thesis then considers Minogue’s, Scruton’s, and Worsthorne’s 
versions of conservatism in light of this context. Oakeshott’s influences on these thinkers 
will be discussed, and the distinctiveness of their differing interpretations of conservative 
ideology will be highlighted. It is hoped that this study can exemplify the power of 
intellectual history to provide a more balanced portrayal of Oakeshott’s place in post-war 
conservative ideologies against the background of the traditionalists, and vice versa a more 
multi-faceted picture of the traditionalists which deepens their contours with the help of 

















 Unlike his early general philosophy expounded in Experience and Its Modes (1933), 
most of Oakeshott’s early writings on and in political philosophy were unpublished during 
his lifetime. Nevertheless, their importance to a comprehensive picture of his political 
thought cannot be underestimated. Unless put in the context of the development of his early 
political philosophy and the difficulties it encountered, the motivation of Oakeshott’s early 
general philosophy and the subsequent alterations he made to it cannot be adequately 
understood. Thus, this chapter provides a characterisation of the holism and dialecticism in 
his early political philosophy in contradistinction to his early general philosophy. 
 The holism and dialecticism of Oakeshott’s early political philosophy are stronger than 
those of his early general philosophy. While all the intermediary institutions of our social 
life are necessary stages in the logical progression from the individual to the State, the 
various modes of experience are historically contingent and mutually independent such that 
it is not strictly essential to go through all of them in order to arrive at the Absolute. On this 
basis Efraim Podoksik argues that Oakeshott abandoned his early adherence to unity and 
teleology as soon as he published EM, with his political philosophy following suit much later 
in On Human Conduct (1975). I disagree with this interpretation because it fails to take 
Oakeshott’s early political philosophy seriously enough. 
In the following exposition, I shall point out the ambiguities in Oakeshott’s claim that 
political philosophy, as a purely academic pursuit, is irrelevant to practical life. On the one 
hand he insisted that philosophical concepts such as the State have nothing to do with their 
counterparts in everyday politics such as the nation-states; on the other hand, he was 
prepared to use his philosophical analysis to evaluate to extent to which a particular state or 
government approaches to the idea of the State. The neat distinction between political 
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philosophy and practical politics follows from Oakeshott’s application of the modal 
separatism in his general philosophy to his philosophy of politics. However, the price proved 
unaffordable in that the political concepts cease to be political and become purely logical 
once their link with our experience of political life is severed. Oakeshott’s subsequent revival 
of the dialecticism concerning modes of experience in British Idealism thus represents an 
attempt to repair this link. Consequently, contrary to Podoksik’s view, Oakeshott’s 
motivation for developing his general philosophy was not meant to lead his political thought 
towards modernity, but to solve, in different ways, the different problems left behind by his 
political philosophy at successive stages of his intellectual development. 
 During this exposition the substantive conclusions in Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy will also receive detailed examination. This paves the way for our later 
evaluation of the extent to which these propositions are left intact, qualified, or discarded in 
his late political philosophy. Again, contrary to the dominant interpretation, I shall argue that 
the influence of his early political philosophy persisted as late as in OHC. I also consider his 
presentation of these philosophical ideas to the public in ordinary language. This is one of 
the rare occasions on which Oakeshott based his views about the philosopher’s role in society 
on his own philosophical conclusions concerning the place of government and law in the 
State. Just as his delineation of the logical presuppositions of the various modes of 
experience exerts a normative force regarding what an enquiry should be if it is to qualify as 
a certain mode, Oakeshott’s political philosophy is relevant to practical politics in a similar 
way. Nevertheless, his political philosophy is doubly relevant to practical politics. By 
touching upon every institution in our social life, its subject matter naturally includes the 
social function of the philosopher, about which his general philosophy can say nothing 
substantial. From modal separatism the most that one can deduce is that the philosopher’s 
task is the academic pursuit of truth rather than the interference with political affairs. 
However, this does not explain how the philosopher can contribute to our corporate social 
life. With the help of the universal context of the State in his early political philosophy, 
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Oakeshott was able to claim that the philosopher, as part of the social whole, contributes the 
most to its end precisely by being true to his own calling; which is to represent the self-
consciousness of society, and to express in the purest philosophical idiom its spirit without 
losing the anchorage of our common sense understanding thereof. As we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, this conception of philosophy guided Oakeshott’s political thought 
throughout his intellectual journey. 
 
II. An Idealist Theory of the State 
 
 Written in 1924, “The Cambridge School of Political Science” represents the very 
beginning of Oakeshott’s life-long attempt to construct a political philosophy. This article 
provided an energetic and trenchant critique of the Historical Tripos at Cambridge, which 
the young Oakeshott had just endured with contempt. In opposition to the existing course 
design, he suggested that political philosophy should be the proper discipline to be studied 
therein.1 Although he had not yet carried out the actual task of creating such a philosophy, 
certain features of his conception of the nature of political philosophy and the scope of its 
subject matter can already be discerned at this early stage, guiding his subsequent 
construction of political philosophy. 
 Oakeshott contended that, limited to the study of political institutions, the curriculum 
failed to consider what human beings’ most satisfying life is.2 This defect reflected the 
dominant understanding of politics. Too often, he argued, the State was misidentified with 
its government so that the consequent analysis was concentrated on the narrow questions 
concerning different forms of government, to the neglect of other more important aspects in 
our political experience. However, the discussion about the constitution of government 
makes sense only if we know what the ends of government are. The meaning and value of 
 
1 Michael Oakeshott, “The Cambridge School of Political Science,” in What Is History? and Other Essays, ed. 
Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), 50-51. 
2 Ibid., 51-52. 
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government itself, in turn, can only be understood by placing it in the still wider 
philosophical context of the State, or the whole of human beings’ social life.3 Therefore, in 
overemphasising the quantitative and classificatory investigation of governmental 
institutions, the then current Historical Tripos deprived students of the opportunity to study 
political philosophy and made the examination of government pointless.4 
 This wide conception of the scope of political philosophy’s subject matter is based on 
a strong version of holism absent from Oakeshott’s early general philosophy. To be sure, in 
this piece of writing the comments on the nature of philosophy applies equally well to both 
political philosophy and general philosophy. An example is the claim that philosophy is 
concerned with reasons rather than causes, with the grounds of belief rather than its origins.5 
Nonetheless, this equal applicability does not hold in the case of holism. The holism here 
results not only from the relentless attempt to understand everything in its wider context until 
the process reaches the most comprehensive context (the State) which cannot itself be turned 
into a text awaiting something more complete to supersede it; it is much stronger and has a 
different foundation. After all, the sceptical impulse, in the original and ancient sense of the 
term skepsis (investigation), also features in Oakeshott’s early general philosophy. As we 
will see in Chapter 3, in EM each of the modes of experience has to be understood from the 
perspective of philosophy which, being experience without arrest, modification, or 
presupposition, is ultimately identified with the Absolute. By contrast, in his early political 
philosophy Oakeshott made another claim in addition to the essential reference to the whole: 
whether one begins from the individual or from the State, the political philosophy resulting 
therefrom will be the same.6 In this intellectual journey the political philosopher will have 
to take account not only of “the institutions which are called governmental, but will attend 
also to those, of far greater importance in our social life, such as the family, the school, 
 
3 Ibid., 53-54. 
4 Ibid., 54-56. 
5 Ibid., 56-59. 
6 Ibid., 59. 
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marriage, war, property and the rest.” 7  The starting point of one’s philosophical 
investigation does not matter because all these social institutions are indispensable steps in 
a complete political philosophy. By comparison, in the general philosophy of EM the 
emergence of the various intermediary modes of experience is historically contingent. This 
means that they, unlike the various institutions in social life, are not logically necessary to 
the Absolute. Oakeshott could have directly arrived at the unqualified experience of 
philosophy without being bothered to say anything about its imperfect modes, in a way 
which is ruled out by his early political philosophy. 
 This difference between the strong and weak versions of holism in Oakeshott’s early 
political and general philosophy might at first sight appear scholastic in the negative sense 
of the term. However, as later chapters will make clearer, these minute details are not 
distinctions without significance. In Chapter 5, we will observe how different readings of 
Oakeshott’s changing conceptions of political philosophy entail incompatible 
understandings of the manners in which his political philosophy is relevant to practical life. 
Here it suffices to note that one of the dominant interpretation of Oakeshott’s works, by 
Podoksik, as a liberal defence of modernity which gradually eschews unity and teleology 
will be seriously qualified if the fortunes of holism and dialecticism (to be discussed further 
below) in Oakeshott’s general philosophy are significantly different from those in his 
political philosophy. 
Oakeshott’s complaints about the Cambridge curriculum also contain another important 
view about the nature of philosophical enquiry concerning its relation to political practice. 
Towards the end of the article in question, he stated that “it is not the aim of a philosophical 
study to guide the practice of men.”8 Again, this insistence on the separation of political 
philosophy from practical politics might seem to be the same in Oakeshott’s early general 
philosophy. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that the manner his political philosophy, 
 
7 Ibid., 59-60. 
8 Ibid., 66. 
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though categorially independent from political practice, can still be practically relevant, is 
more complicated than the way in which his general philosophy discloses its practical 
overtones. 
Certainly, there is a pattern of prescriptive implications common to both Oakeshott’s 
early general philosophy and political philosophy. In the former case, it will be noted in 
Chapter 3 that his philosophical examination of the postulates of the various modes of 
experience, contrary to his own disclaimers, does have normative consequences about how 
the actual enquiry in each of the modes ought to proceed (provided that the enquiry in 
question is to qualify as properly belonging to that mode). A similar relation also holds in 
his early political philosophy, between the philosophical examination of a specific political 
concept and how the actual political institution ought to behave if it is to fall under that 
concept adequately (to be developed in more detail later). 
However, the practical consequences which follow from Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy is more complex because political philosophy is relevant to practical life in an 
additional and more subtle way of which no comparison can be found in his general 
philosophy. In concluding his critique of the Cambridge curriculum, he rhetorically asked 
“‘whether an early habit of reflection, although obtained by speculative sciences, may not 
have its use in practical affairs,’” and answered: “were such a school built up as I have 
indicated a wiser generation of citizens and leaders would issue from our walls.”9 It is easy 
to underestimate the significance of these apparently youthful and zealous remarks and 
conclude that Oakeshott in the main still adheres to the separation of political philosophy 
from practical politics. It is equally erroneous, as Paul Franco is, to take this belief in the 
practical relevance of political philosophy as an immature expression of the early Oakeshott, 
from which he shifted away within just a few years and to which he henceforth never 
returned.10 The next section will show that as late as in 1939 Oakeshott still believed firmly 
 
9 Ibid., 66. 
10 Paul Franco, Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 32-35. 
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in the valuable contribution made by the study of political philosophy to the whole society. 
At this stage, suffice it to note that the argument there builds on the conclusions reached in 
his early political philosophy. In particular, the political philosopher maintains and renews 
the society’s self-consciousness precisely by remaining loyal to his occupation in the social 
whole, which means to refrain from applying his philosophical conclusions to political 
practice. Oakeshott’s general philosophy cannot provide a parallel with this form of 
argument not only because its subject matter is the nature of the various modes of experience 
instead of the political or social life of human beings (which is not a mode). It is also because, 
as will become clear in Chapter 3, Oakeshott’s general philosophy eventually fails to provide 
any substantive conclusion about the Absolute, and thereby provides nothing on the basis of 
which the practical role of the philosopher in the broader social context could be positively 
said. 
 In order to understand more thoroughly the relation between political philosophy and 
practical politics as Oakeshott conceived it, we have to leave his brief sketch of what a 
complete political philosophy should look like and proceed to observe how in his subsequent 
works he actually performed the task he had earlier appointed to political philosophy. 
The first brief attempt appeared in a 1925 essay entitled “Some Remarks on the Nature 
and Meaning of Sociality.” What makes this piece belong to Oakeshott’s writings on political 
philosophy is, as its title suggests, the specific concern with the subject matter of political 
philosophy. “Sociality” is but another name for the essential characteristics of the State, or 
statehood. This essay is noticeable because it contains some statements which exemplify 
very well the ambiguous relation between philosophy and practice in Oakeshott. For instance, 
he stated that if “a society be what I have contended that it is, and if patriotism may be taken 
as a complete devotion to the ends of our society, our state, then to me patriotism is the 
motive which should guide us in all our actions. And not only this, but that it is the motive 
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which does rule in our minds insofar as we are truly members of our state.”11 What is the 
meaning of these statements? What is the logical status of the modality of “should” here? 
Do these statements express a purely philosophical view or a normative judgment of 
practical life? Commentators who focus their interpretation of Oakeshott on his cultural 
identity and political orientation tend to regard passages like this one as providing 
information about his personal attitudes in practical life. George Feaver, for example, 
understands this passage to be a passionate expression of the young Oakeshott’s love of 
England,12 as opposed to a detached exposition of the logical relation among the concepts 
of society, state, patriotism, individual, action, and so forth. However, if we consider 
Oakeshott’s later clarification of what he was doing in making statements of this kind, the 
answer may not be a simple either-or. 
The most significant writing in this regard is A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary 
to the Study of Political Philosophy. According to Luke O’Sullivan, it was written in 1925 
as Oakeshott’s Fellowship dissertation at Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge.13 This 
book-length treatise contains some of Oakeshott’s boldest and clearest statements about the 
form which a complete political philosophy should take and his actual exposition of its 
themes in detail. By way of argument, he reiterated many claims about the general nature of 
philosophy which we have already examined above. For example, the holistic nature of 
philosophy is formulated here in terms of the incessant pursuit of the true definition of things 
rather than of words. In this process, to arrive at a better classification of the characteristics 
of a thing under investigation means to achieve a more satisfactory understanding of the 
whole of that thing, which will finally reach the climax of a comprehensive understanding 
of the whole universe.14 Again, although practice was yet to be systemised in his general 
 
11 Oakeshott, “Some Remarks on the Nature and Meaning of Sociality,” in Religion, Politics and the Moral 
Life, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 60-61. 
12 George Feaver, “Being English: The Conservative Witness of Michael Oakeshott,” in The Meanings of 
Michael Oakeshott’s Conservatism, ed. Corey Abel (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), 228. 
13 Luke O’Sullivan, preface to Early Political Writings, 1925-30 (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), vii. 
14 Oakeshott, A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary to the Study of Political Philosophy, in O’Sullivan, 
Early Political Writings, 47. 
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philosophy as a mode of experience logically separated from philosophy, it is repeatedly 
stressed that “the philosopher never desires to change things, but to understand them.”15 
 More importantly, the features which distinguish Oakeshott’s political philosophy from 
his general philosophy at this stage received a sharper expression here. First, the delineation 
of the scope of political philosophy’s subject matter is spelt out in plainer terms than the 
mere reference to the State as the most complete philosophical context. In particular, after 
rehearsing the view that the proper concern of political philosophy is the real and essential 
nature of the State,16 he further explained in a Hobbesian fashion that the State refers to the 
political life which “involves the permanent cessation of this struggle, either for life or luxury, 
which enables us to enter into a moral relation with men.”17 Secondly, the holism peculiar 
to his early political philosophy is made evident less by the comprehensiveness of its 
attention to all forms of social institutions than by its philosophical necessity. In his own 
words, not only does the attempt to theorise the political life have to “avoid the elementary 
errors of those who look for its truest and most characteristic expression in government 
rather than in friendship, in law rather than in moral sensibility, in ownership and rule rather 
than in religion and culture.”18 More crucially, “[n]ot until every element of our social life 
receives a like treatment shall we have a political philosophy worth the name.”19 
 From this point onwards, Oakeshott ventured into unexplored territories in political 
philosophy. He offered a specific account of the State and the self as well as the theoretical 
identity between the two. On this basis he then considered the place of government in such 
a comprehensive philosophical context. This is where a further distinctive feature of 
Oakeshott’s early political philosophy can be discerned, namely its dialecticism. 
In the chapter on the State, for example, the argument proceeds in an Hegelian manner 
in the sense that it begins with the elementary grounds of statehood latent in all human 
 
15 Ibid., 68. 
16 Ibid., 49. 
17 Ibid., 59. 
18 Ibid., 60. 
19 Ibid., 68. 
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associations, namely the universal will of human beings to live the “good life.”20 The next 
step is to overcome the incomplete, partial or abstract nature of these intermediary 
associations. The supersession of one social institution by another does not cease until it 
finally arrives at the most complete, comprehensive or concrete conception of this principle 
of human association, that is, the State as the whole and the most satisfactory of social 
experience which human beings are capable of living.21 This dialecticism strengthens the 
holism peculiar to Oakeshott’s early political philosophy even further. That all the 
intermediary social institutions are necessary to the State is no longer a brute fact about a 
truly complete political philosophy; the necessity is explained by the logical unfolding of 
the State, beginning from those forms of social life where the principle of statehood is the 
most dormant and proceeding to those more manifestly expressive of this principle. In 
addition, as Chapter 3 will show, this dialecticism is absent in or even denied by Oakeshott’s 
early general philosophy. This observation, again, does not merely grow out of a scholastic 
interest in unimportant details, but will significantly influence our understanding of why 
Oakeshott later altered his conception of political philosophy. Here it is sufficient to point 
out that, contrary to most commentators’ interpretation, what is notable is not that Oakeshott 
qualified this dialecticism of social institutions in his late political philosophy, but that he 
replaced it by the dialecticism of modes of experience which had been rejected from the 
outset in his early general philosophy. The motivation for this move was to clarify the 
relation between our practical experience of political life and the philosophical investigation 
of politics in terms more than their mutual separation in logic. 
In this regard, the chapter on the State also provides passages of argument which are 
susceptible of the misunderstandings typical of the case of patriotism mentioned above. 
Examining these arguments will help us understand the ambiguities in Oakeshott’s view that 
political philosophy is irrelevant to practical politics. For instance, in elucidating the 
 
20 Ibid., 79. 
21 Ibid., 81. 
35 
 
characteristics of the State, he asserted that “a state is not only a cultural association, but a 
cultural unit, … it possesses more than a mere unity of action; it must have some degree of 
unity of purpose.”22 Here, as elsewhere, he was very careful to add a disclaimer whenever 
the foregoing argument appears to suggest political recommendations, lest they should easily 
invite misdirected moral objections. Regarding our attitude towards actual human 
associations (a particular state as opposed to the State), he said that “it is the object of a 
theorist to discover the truth about this relationship, and not to give guidance for a practical 
attitude.” 23  The relationship here refers to the logical fact that the idea of the State 
incorporates not only unity of action but also unity of purpose. Therefore, when confronted 
with the kind of mixed society advocated by T. S. Eliot and other members of the Moot 
meetings during the 1930s, where the aim was not to cultivate a shared belief but merely to 
promote common action by both Christians and non-Christians alike, the philosopher would 
in this instance judge that this kind of association falls short of the idea of the State. In other 
words, the degree of statehood embodied by this mixed society is not the most satisfactory 
form of life which human beings can enjoy. The philosopher would further add that in 
making this judgment there is no intention to improve or alter the existing conditions of 
association. Nevertheless, one may justifiably doubt whether saying that it is not the most 
satisfactory experience to live in a mixed society does not by itself amount to a normative 
judgment. The doubt would be even more reasonable if no disclaimer of practical intentions 
were provided and the context of the argument were not straightforwardly philosophical (see 
the next section). 
This ambiguity in the relation between political philosophy and practical life 
characterises the chapter on the self as well. Here the argument embodies the strong holism 
in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy, and can more easily invite grave 
misunderstandings and misguided moral objections. He began the discussion by rehearsing 
 
22 Ibid., 78. 
23 Ibid., 79. 
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the contention that, wherever we begin our enquiry, a comprehensive view must finally lead 
us to what is ultimately real in experience.24 After developing his arguments about the 
abstract nature of what is apparently individual (i.e. the everyday selves including you and 
I) and overcoming its contradictions, Oakeshott concluded that “we have arrived at the 
conception of self as a unity of characteristic experience; those experiences, its ‘concrete 
filling,’ are none other than its society; and its society is its State. The self is the State; the 
State is the self.”25 Again, he was aware of the kind of criticism coming from writers 
preoccupied with practical politics. Thus, he immediately denied that there is any degree of 
the enslavement of the individual by the state implied in the previous philosophical 
conclusion. 
 Unfortunately, Oakeshott’s reason for rejecting this sort of misunderstanding is not very 
persuasive. He argued that the usual criticism concerning the totalitarian states uses the 
concept of the state (in lower case) in a legal and practical sense which has nothing to do 
with the subject matter of political philosophy, namely the State (in upper case). 
Consequently, this kind of criticism in effect falls outside the philosopher’s proper concern.26 
Although this defence takes advantage of philosophy and practice’s mutual irrelevance to 
each other borrowed from Oakeshott’s early general philosophy, here it seems to be 
ineffective in the face of the holism and dialecticism peculiar to his early political philosophy. 
One could in principle clarify that the complaint is about the oppression of the individual by 
government, and that the practical reformer is interested in what insight political philosophy 
could provide in this matter. Although Oakeshott’s political philosophy is mainly concerned 
with the State, it does not thereby neglect questions about government. On the contrary, in 
accordance with his own conception of political philosophy, it must deal with those questions 
and demonstrate how the government gives place to the State and is thus understood in the 
 
24 Ibid., 85. 
25 Ibid., 108. 
26 Ibid., 110-11. 
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total context of the State.27 
 This is not the end of the matter. For, Oakeshott could counter that, even in this new 
formulation of the practical reformer’s question, the subject matter is still a particular 
government in practical and legal issues, not the idea of government in philosophical 
investigation. What is wrong with the common misidentification of the State with its 
government consists not only in the conflation of two distinct concepts, but also an additional 
conflation of two logically mutually independent forms of enquiry. As such, it is confounding 
to notice that Oakeshott himself in the end allows his political philosophy to make judgments 
about a particular government in the same way our hypothetical philosopher above judges 
the mixed society to be falling short of the idea of the State: “[i]n so far as a government 
commits blunders, denies its own essential nature, it becomes so much less than 
government.”28 Ironically, this could have been a satisfactory response to our hypothetical 
practical reformer’s queries. 
 What are we to make of this internal discrepancy of Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy? I think that the way in which he insisted on the irrelevance of political 
philosophy to practical life was immature. This doctrine is directly borrowed from his early 
general philosophy. When it is transplanted to his early political philosophy, the result seems 
unacceptable. If political philosophy cannot say anything relevant to our actual political life, 
then it is difficult to understand the motivation for pursuing such an academic investigation. 
In other words, it is no longer clear whether the concepts like the individual and the State 
dealt with in this political philosophy is political rather than purely logical. As we will see 
in Chapter 3, this doctrine eventually led Oakeshott to subsume political philosophy under 
his early general philosophy in Experience and Its Modes. On the other hand, as Chapter 5 
will explain more fully, the difficulties of this doctrine may be the main reason why 
Oakeshott later renewed his account of the nature of political philosophy. There he put more 
 
27 Ibid., 116-17. 
28 Ibid., 122. 
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emphasis on the importance of showing how the conclusions reached in political philosophy 
are based on the gradual supersession of our pre-theoretical understanding of political life. 
In this manner he avoided severing the link between political philosophy and our actual 
political experience and restored the original rationale for studying political philosophy, 
which does have something to say about contemporary politics without qualifying its own 
academic independence from practical concerns. More importantly, this revival of the 
philosophical progression between modes of experience in British Idealism in Oakeshott’s 
late political philosophy runs counter to the current interpretation of his works as a move 
away from holism and dialecticism in which his political philosophy followed the footsteps 
of his general philosophy. It also paves the way for our interpretation where the main purpose 
of Oakeshott’s exercise in general philosophy was to deal with the problems left unsolved 
by his earlier political philosophy. 
 Before concluding this section, it is worthwhile examining how Oakeshott utilised the 
substantive conclusions in his early political philosophy to understand the nature of 
government and law. This will be useful to our later comparison between the propositions 
preserved in his late political philosophy, and those subsequently discarded or significantly 
revised. Moreover, his philosophical view on government and law is also essential to our 
attempt, in the next section, to understand the additional, peculiar way his political 
philosophy becomes practically relevant by implying a social role for the philosopher. 
The chapter on government and law begins with a logical deduction of the nature of all 
actions from what has been said on the philosophical ideas of the State and the self. Since 
the State is the social whole, it follows that the action of the State is the action of the social 
whole. Furthermore, since the State is the self and vice versa, all individual action is State 
action in so far as it contributes to the end of the State or the unity of purpose in the whole 
of social life. Consequently, “[a] father bringing his son up to appreciate poetry is thereby 
performing an action of the State, while a nation waging an unnecessary war is working 
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against the ends of the State;”29 or, more generally, with J. S. Mill’s terminologies adapted 
for Oakeshott’s own purpose, “there is no action so intimate or so personal that it can be 
called a self-regarding activity in contradistinction to a State-regarding activity.”30 
 With the idea of action clarified in relation to the State and the self, the discussion then 
proceeds to understand government and its action, law, in this philosophical context of the 
whole. With regard to the question of government’s intervention in social problems, 
Oakeshott argued that “[i]t is just because government is interested in these things, just 
because in its universal will it desires their accomplishment, that it leaves untouched that 
which its touch would mar.”31 The meaning of this statement becomes clearer in the account 
of law as the government’s means to contribute to the end of the State. After distinguishing 
between direct command and permissive legislation, 32  he asserted that “[a] law 
commanding us to ‘be moral’ (that is, realize in our lives the moral standard roughly accepted 
by our society) would be one contradicting the very principles of legislation.”33 Taking 
sexual morality as an example, he made the observation that the maintenance of its high 
standard was made more difficult by overcrowding. While it is beyond the province of law 
to raise its citizens’ moral standards (which belongs to the role of other social institutions 
and ultimately to the State), it does not follow that law, as no less a part of the State, is not 
concerned with this activity of the social whole. Rather, in contributing to the end of the 
social whole, the commands issued by law has to fall under the logical scope of what law 
can do. Consequently, “it is because government has this problem so nearly at heart that it 
refuses to interfere in this manner. Yet it is no passive spectator, but a hinderer of hindrances, 
a creator of conditions. Its commands, with regard to sexual morality, take the form of, ‘be 
sufficiently housed.’”34 
 
29 Ibid., 119. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 121. 
32 Ibid., 120. 
33 Ibid., 123-24. 
34 Ibid., 124. 
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 The Bosanquetian phrase of “the hinderer of hindrances” marks the philosophical 
nature of Oakeshott’s approach here. This implicit emphasis on the philosophical (as 
opposed to practical) meaning of the terms he was employing helps him to clear away 
tempting misinterpretation of the philosophical conclusions he reached, that is, the 
identification of might with right. If the scope of what law can do were vulgarised in the 
sense of the ability of law to enforce its command by sheer power, then the proposition that 
“might is right” would appear scarcely different from a support of the then rising totalitarian 
regimes in practical politics. This is why here the scope of law should be strictly understood 
in the logical sense. Nevertheless, as should have been obvious by now, in demarcating 
sharply the boundary between philosophy and practice, these philosophical propositions are 
not thereby prevented from playing a normative role in judging the extent to which actual 
governments and legal institutions approximate to their ideational counterparts in philosophy. 
 It might seem ill-justified to take Oakeshott’s early unpublished writings so seriously. 
As Podoksik remarks, the philosophical views expounded in SPP is rather unoriginal as well 
as unOakeshottian in the sense that the mature position established in Oakeshott’s later works 
departs from almost all of these holistic and teleological conclusions in his early political 
philosophy.35 However, the degree to which Oakeshott abandoned his early conclusions in 
political philosophy is exaggerated. As Chapter 5 will explain further, it is true that in OHC 
law is no longer understood in terms of a specific order or command; instead it is defined as 
a set of conditions or general rules to which the individuals subscribe in pursuing their own 
chosen substantive ends. Nonetheless, even if the detailed analysis of law is different, the 
philosophical conclusion that might is right, and the holistic tendency of reconciling 
apparently distinct concepts, remain. The scope of what law, as the agent of government, can 
do is still logically defined by the role of government, though the latter is now understood 
differently after the universal context of the State recedes from the vision of Oakeshott’s late 
 
35 Efraim Podoksik, In Defence of Modernity: Vision and Philosophy in Michael Oakeshott (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2003), 47. 
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political philosophy. Similarly, the theoretical identification of the State with the self is also 
preserved in OHC, although in the absence of the State this proposition now holds between 
civitas and cives; and, since civitas and cives is arrived at by dialectically progressing from 
the connection between civil association and the individual in political history, this 
proposition presumably also holds between the unelaborated theoretical counterparts of 
enterprise association and the individual manqué (transformed into the anti-individual). 
 If the holism and dialecticism in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy persist, (albeit 
in a somewhat diluted and deflated form) in his later writings, then the disappearance of the 
all-encompassing background of the State cannot be appropriately interpreted as a defence 
of modernity’s departure from unity and teleology. As I shall argue in Chapter 5, what 
disappeared in Oakeshott’s revised account of the nature of political philosophy is not firstly 
the State, but the Absolute in his early general philosophy. Although the Absolute fades away, 
the dialecticism of modes of experience is revived. Political philosophy now progresses from 
the practical or historical experience of modern political life to a philosophical examination 
of their postulated presuppositions. The motivation for this move was to repair the link 
between political philosophy and practical politics severed by his early general philosophy. 
Nevertheless, if political philosophy reaches its conclusion not from some concepts which 
(though less concrete and complete than the State) are already released from their original 
connection with the spatiotemporal context, but from a pre-theoretical understanding of our 
social life and political experience, then it is even more difficult to avoid inviting 
misunderstanding and moral objection when the philosophical conclusions are couched in 
the terms of the State with a unity of action and purpose. Yet there is nothing wrong about 
the content of these conclusions so long as they are understood in a strictly philosophical 
sense. (In OHC, even the non-purposeful civitas can be said to have an end such that, in 
subscribing to its formal rules but pursuing their own chosen substantive goals, the cives 
contribute no less to the end of civitas than, philosophically speaking, the anti-individuals 
contribute to the end of enterprise association in pursuing its collectively shared purpose.) 
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Consequently, it is more probable that Oakeshott refrained from talking about the State 
because he became more aware of the necessity to speak to one’s contemporary audience 
and to move with the time. Not incidentally, this is precisely the role his early political 
philosophy reserves for the philosopher. 
 In particular, it is intriguing to know that such a rather complete philosophical system 
as expounded in SPP seldom reached formal publication during Oakeshott’s lifetime. When 
it did appear publicly, it either forsook any pretensions of being a political philosophy, as in 
“The Claims of Politics” to be discussed in the next section; or disclosed some of its 
conclusions only when the occasion called upon them, as in one or two book reviews to be 
dealt with in Chapter 5. The only exception happened in 1929. In “The Authority of the State” 
almost every point made by Oakeshott reflects the thoughts expressed in his earlier 
unpublished writings of political philosophy which we have just examined.36 As Steven 
Gerencser correctly points out, as early as in this 1929 article, “[t]he genesis of the concerns 
that mark Oakeshott’s later work is here (e.g. the interest in authority, caution about 
democracy, dislike of contract theory), but the basis of those concerns is not a quiet reflection 
on English tradition, but once again philosophical idealism.” 37  However, Oakeshott’s 
unreserved style of Idealism could not expect to get a sympathetic hearing. In the 
correspondences between Oakeshott and a critic, George Catlin, we can see that they were 
simply talking past each other. 38  A new framework was required to address the old 
philosophical questions in a way which can engage with the contemporary intellectual 
context. This better explains why Oakeshott chose not to publish the majority of his early 
political writings. After all, to say that they are immature presupposes the perspective of his 
later writings unavailable to him at this stage; and to suppose that the young Oakeshott 
viewed them as immature cannot do justice to the confident and resolute tone found in some 
 
36 Oakeshott, “The Authority of the State,” in Fuller, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, 74-90. First 
published in Modern Churchman 19 (1929): 313-27. 
37 Steven Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 53. 
38 George E. G. Catlin, Correspondence, in Fuller, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, 87-88. First published 
in Modern Churchman 19 (1929): 614. 
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of his best early writings of political philosophy. 
 
III. The Philosopher’s Role in Society 
 
 After Oakeshott published “The Authority of the State” in 1929, one searches in vain 
for any significant piece of writing which revisits his earlier conception of political 
philosophy or carries out its construction. Paul Franco considers “The Concept of a 
Philosophical Jurisprudence” (1938) to be the representative essay in Oakeshott’s early 
writings of political philosophy.39 However, compared with SPP, both what it says about 
the specific nature of political philosophy (as opposed to what is generally applicable to all 
branches of philosophy), and the conclusions it actually establishes in such a political 
philosophy, approximate to the minimal. The large part of this essay is concerned with 
explaining why the study of politics in other modes of enquiry falls short of a philosophical 
investigation. This is a theme belonging more properly to Oakeshott’s early general 
philosophy about the various modes of experience. 
 “The Claims of Politics” stands out against this background. This article appeared in 
the special issue of F. R Leavis’ journal Scrutiny in 1939, a medium of literary criticism 
where one usually does not expect to find academic philosophical contributions. As such, in 
this article Oakeshott formulated many conclusions in his early political philosophy in a 
language so ordinary that at first sight it does not seem to be situated in a philosophical 
context. For example, we may be reminded of the earlier claim that every action of the self 
is at the same time an action of the State. Here it was turned into a statement capable of being 
understood by layperson: “no activity is private in the sense of being without its place or 
context in the corporate social life, and no man who feels it his duty to take a part in the 
promotion of the communal interests of his society needs consider himself to have failed 
 




merely because he has not entered the world of politics.”40 Terms which may easily invite 
misunderstanding, like the “State,” were deliberately replaced by equivalent expressions in 
common sense like “the corporate social life;” and the “political” life, which was used 
interchangeably with the whole of “social” life in his early political philosophy, is here used 
in a narrower sense such that their meanings become distinct. Again, Oakeshott argued that 
participation in politics “is not self-explanatory; its end and meaning lie beyond itself in the 
social whole to which it belongs, a social whole already determined by law and custom and 
tradition, none of which is the creation of political activity.”41 Readers of “The Cambridge 
School of Political Science” will readily discern the distinction between “government” and 
“the State,” even though it is disguised in the vernacular vocabularies of “political activities” 
and “the social whole.” 
This is not an innocent paraphrase. The propositions here are more likely to be put in 
informal language deliberately since Oakeshott knew very well how to communicate his 
philosophical ideas to the public. Participating in a social science conference held in 1936, 
he explained the views of his general philosophy thus: “[t]here is a past for every way of 
thinking: there is neither one pre-eminent past, nor is there any past at all except for some 
way of thinking. That, of course, is philosophy, and therefore introduces unnecessary 
complications; it is better, perhaps, to keep to the falsity of common sense and say that 
history is a certain way of thinking about the past.”42 However, in “The Claims of Politics” 
Oakeshott’s expression of his political philosophy in ordinary terms is more special. First is 
the ease with which he bases his condemnation of the political fanaticism about participating 
in “public affairs” upon his political philosophy, as if there were no danger of fallaciously 
conflating philosophy with practical life. Here the way philosophical conclusions may issue 
 
40 Oakeshott, “The Claims of Politics,” in Fuller, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, 92. First published in 
Scrutiny 8 (1939-40): 146-51. 
41 Ibid., 93. 
42 Oakeshott, “History and the Social Sciences,” in The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and 
Reviews, 1926-51, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007), 130. First published in The Social 
Sciences: Their Relations in Theory and Teaching, ed. J. E. Dugdale (London: Le Play House, 1936), 71-81. 
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in normative judgments of political practice is the same as the measurement of the degree to 
which actual human associations approximate to their corresponding philosophical concepts. 
As already discussed in the previous section, this does not contradict Oakeshott’s logical 
separation of philosophy from practice; though, probably due to the imminent war, this is 
one of the rare occasions on which he was so active in engaging with practical issues from 
his own philosophical perspective. 
 Nevertheless, this pattern of normative prescriptions is not unique to Oakeshott’s 
political philosophy, but also features in his general philosophy, as the previous example 
about the historical mode of experience illustrates. “The Claims of Politics” was 
unprecedented because for the first time Oakeshott applied the substantive conclusions from 
his political philosophy to deal with the relation between philosophy and practice. In his 
earlier political philosophy, the reasons he adduced to support the logical separation between 
philosophy and practice are those about the distinct nature of different types of enquiry, 
which were to be systemised by his general philosophy in EM. “The Claims of Politics,” in 
contrast, tackles this question not in terms of the logic of different modes of experience, but 
from the viewpoint of the role played by the philosopher in our practical life. 
 With regard to this feature, Paul Franco comments that “The Claims of Politics” seems 
to make the relationship between philosophy and practical life closer than what Oakeshott 
established in Experience and Its Modes. 43  Andrew Sullivan makes the even stronger 
accusation that the practical nature of philosophy implied in this article is explicitly denied 
in Oakeshott’s general philosophy.44 These comments are not quite correct. When Oakeshott 
took up the question about the way philosophers can contribute to society without directly 
participating in politics, he in effect incorporated the position maintained in his early general 
philosophy. In particular, he asserted that the philosopher is at no advantage over other 
people in participating in politics because his “integrity and insight cannot be introduced into 
 
43 Franco, Michael Oakeshott, 78-79. 
44 Andrew Sullivan, Intimations Pursued: The Voice of Practice in the Conversation of Michael Oakeshott 
(Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007), 134. 
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that world without changing their character; and to attempt to introduce them makes a chaos 
of what is otherwise a restricted but nevertheless ordered view”.45 As will become clear in 
Chapter 3, this argument expresses very well Oakeshott’s warnings against the logical fallacy 
of ignoratio elenchi in EM. Consequently, the question is how he was able to assign a 
practical role to the philosopher against the background of his early general philosophy. The 
philosopher is not expected “to come out of a retreat, bringing with them some superior 
wisdom, and enter the world of political activity, but to stay where they are, remain true to 
their genius, which is to mitigate a little their society’s ignorance of itself.”46 As Chapter 3 
will also explain, it is difficult to see how the philosophical attitude towards practical life, 
being an escape from it, can be the symbol of a society’s self-consciousness. This is 
unsurprising, for we noted earlier that the conclusions from Oakeshott’s general philosophy 
by themselves are impotent to establish any positive account of the function of philosopher 
in society. 
It is here that Oakeshott’s early political philosophy completes the argument. 
Government and law, in the context of the State and as parts of it, reject certain ways to 
interfere with people’s lives because they must confine their activities within the defined 
scope of what they can do. But, instead of qualifying their concern with the end of the State, 
this logically-imposed restraint precisely expresses their contribution to the whole of social 
life. In a similar vein, the philosopher rightly refuses to become a politician in disguise “not 
because they have no part in the promotion of the communal interests of mankind, but 
because to be free from the world is the condition of their contribution.”47 This is not an 
isolated conclusion in Oakeshott’s political philosophy. As we have noted in the previous 
section, Oakeshott was to strengthen the link between political philosophy and our pre-
theoretical understanding of political life in his modified conception of the nature of political 
philosophy. As such, in assigning the role of recreating the values of society and sustaining 
 
45 Oakeshott, “Claims of Politics,” 95. 
46 Ibid., 95-96. 
47 Ibid., 96. 
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its self-awareness to the philosopher, “The Claims of Politics” marks the point of departure 




 This chapter has provided a detailed characterisation of Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy, and outlined the arguments to be completed by the subsequent three chapters in 
the first part of this thesis. We must note that in undermining Podoksik’s interpretation of 
Oakeshott as a defender of liberal individuality in modernity I do not thereby regard him as 
a representative of conservatism. Certainly, Chapter 7 on Roger Scruton will make 
Oakeshott’s early Hegelianism appear profoundly conservative. Oakeshott’s aversion to 
contractarianism is a case in point, expressed in the claim that the meaning of politics must 
be understood in the wider context of the social whole or the State, the institutions of which 
such as law and custom are not produced by government or state. So will his proposition 
find an echo in Scruton’s works that the individual is the State because it is complete only if 
its meaning and value are successively enriched through property, family, marriage and so 
forth, as opposed to an abstract individual. 
However, I shall argue that what makes Scruton’s political thought distinctively 
conservative is not primarily his Hegelianism in the sense of denigrating the ideas of social 
contract or unencumbered individual. Rather, the hallmark of Scruton’s conservatism is a 
reworked concept of corporate personality. This concept is rooted as much in nineteenth 
century German intellectual tradition as the Hegelianism in British Idealism was. Yet it is 
also one which Oakeshott, despite sharing with Scruton a recognition of the crucial 
importance of the various intermediary social institutions in political philosophy, was 
unwilling to take seriously from the very beginning to the end of his academic career. 
Consequently, the task started by this chapter is the provision of a clean British intellectual 
background against which the political thought of the various conservatives examined in the 
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second part of this thesis can be more objectively evaluated. Whether the early Oakeshott by 









 In the previous chapter, we have repeatedly contrasted Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy with his early general philosophy. Yet how he came to a settled position in 
general philosophy has not been accounted for in detail. This is essential to our interpretation. 
An overall picture of Oakeshott’s general philosophy not only serves as the background 
against which the peculiar nature of his political philosophy manifests itself. It also enables 
us to understand how his general philosophy plays a role both in satisfying the theoretical 
needs of his earlier conception of political philosophy, and in supporting his still earlier 
ideological criticisms of the contemporary intellectual climate concerning science, religion, 
morality, and politics. 
In the next section we begin from Oakeshott’s earliest writings where both the form and 
content of his general philosophy were still unstable. His position acquired a more definite 
shape in the more systematic investigation of The Philosophical Approach to Politics (1928). 
In this set of lectures, he found the direction for his general philosophy from a gap in his 
earlier conception of political philosophy, namely the need to justify the logical separation 
between philosophy and practical politics. However, PAP also contains significant 
departures from his earlier political philosophy. Here the subject matter is different, the 
holism qualified, and the dialecticism rejected from the outset. The consequences of 
combining Oakeshott’s political and general philosophy, which are drastically different from 
each other, are complicated and contradictory. Concerning his general philosophy, this 
combination results in a new strong holism which incorporates all branches of philosophy 
including political philosophy into its own sovereignty. Political philosophy can no longer 
be truly philosophical if it is specifically about politics. On the other hand, the general 
philosophy in PAP implicitly leaves open the possibility of a dialectical progression between 
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kinds of thinking, which become again indispensable to the concrete knowledge of 
philosophy. This internal inconsistency motivated Oakeshott’s later renewal of his 
conception of political philosophy which resuscitates the possibility of a political philosophy 
denied in the subsumption of it by his early general philosophy. 
We then analyse Experience and Its Modes in this context. Despite his qualification of 
holism and rejection of dialecticism in general philosophy, Oakeshott did not abandon the 
Absolute. This abandonment occurred much later after he reconceived the nature of political 
philosophy and adjusted his general philosophy in accordance with the changes he earlier 
made to political philosophy. Only this interpretation can explain why Oakeshott made the 
detour of delineating the logical structure of the various modes of experience even though 
they are not necessary to our arrival at the most concrete knowledge of philosophy in EM. 
His general philosophy was meant to solve the theoretical problems left by his political 
philosophy. Although as in EM it may sometimes acquire a life of its own, its conclusions 
are at best provisional. Moreover, they are subject to alteration once they are found to stand 
in the way of his life-long endeavour to construct a political philosophy which is both truly 
philosophical and at the same time specifically about our practical experience of political 
life. 
 The third section deals with another, more ideological, motivation behind Oakeshott’s 
systematic treatment of his general philosophy. Logically speaking, his general philosophy 
possesses a far greater potential for intervening with practical discourse than his political 
philosophy does. Furthermore, in the context of his earliest religious writings and other book 
reviews, his general philosophy appears more as a polemic against current intellectual 
tendencies than a serene reflection in the armchair. The fact that this practical undertaking 
happened even earlier than his exposition of general philosophy for the sake of his earlier 





II. A Philosophy of Modes of Experience 
 
 Compared to his early political philosophy, it took Oakeshott longer to give his general 
philosophy a definite shape. The earliest writings of his general philosophy betray a variety 
of shortcomings which are absent in those of his political philosophy. He may be dimly 
aware of the subject matter of his general philosophy, which the first attempts in philosophy 
of history illustrate very well. In addition, at times the tone is more polemical than 
meticulous, as in his holistic identification of a complete political philosophy with the whole 
of philosophy. Finally, some of his judgements were provisional, only to be retracted in later 
works. The claim that it is poetry rather than philosophy which can lead us to the knowledge 
of ultimate reality is a case in point. Therefore, in the following intellectual portrait of 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy, we must pay more attention to the continuities which 
persist in his various subsequent writings. His changes of opinion will be examined in more 
detail only if they are relevant to our task of constructing a coherent interpretation. 
 Delivered in 1923, the talk “History Is a Fable” is the first occasion on which Oakeshott 
put forward his views in general philosophy. The objective was to distinguish history from 
both science and art.1 The logical separation of different kinds of enquiry was to be the main 
theme in Oakeshott’s general philosophy. However, the subject matter of such a philosophy 
had not yet been clearly defined in this talk. Not until 1928 did he make clear that the task 
of philosophy of history is neither to discover general laws nor to uncover a plot in past 
events, but to examine the presuppositions of the historical mode of enquiry itself from the 
philosophical viewpoint.2 Oakeshott’s conclusions about the logical status of these kinds of 
enquiry are also unstable at this stage. For example, art was construed as an autonomous 
mode of enquiry. But it soon gave its place to the world of practice in the lectures on PAP 
disseminated during the late 1920s, before being finally assimilated to the practical mode of 
 
1 Michael Oakeshott, “History Is a Fable,” in What Is History? and Other Essays, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2004), 40-41. 
2 Oakeshott, “The Philosophy of History,” in O’Sullivan, What Is History?, 127-29. 
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experience by EM in 1933.3 Indeed, the conclusions established in Oakeshott’s earliest 
writings of general philosophy are mostly tentative, with his philosophy of history being the 
glaring exception. The characterisation of historical knowledge as, in Idealist fashion, a 
knowledge of the past “seen through the spectacles of the present,”4 is a position to which 
Oakeshott was to remain loyal in all his subsequent works. 
 In “An Essay on the Relations of Philosophy, Poetry and Reality,”5 this tentativeness 
infects the logical status of philosophy itself. Philosophy and art, named poetry here, are 
equally subjected to a logical examination concerning their separate claims to arrive at the 
knowledge of ultimate reality. However, like the logical status of art in “History Is a Fable,” 
the conclusions about the nature of philosophy reached in this essay were quickly reversed 
in Oakeshott’s later writings. In particular, the argument begins by considering the properties 
possessed by ultimate reality. Then, by reference to these properties, the claims of philosophy 
and poetry to acquire knowledge of such a reality are evaluated. Throughout the discussion 
Oakeshott referred to philosophy and poetry as two distinct faculties of the mind, but this 
talk of mental faculties was to be emphatically rejected in EM.6 Besides, he contrasted 
philosophy and poetry with each other by a series of dichotomies (disassociation and 
association, analysis and synthesis, doubt and faith, expression and creation, intellect and 
intuition, etc.).7 Yet it is typical of Idealists to reconcile a thesis with its antithesis and 
supersede their opposition by a more concrete concept. Finally, he concluded that the place 
of philosophy is secondary to poetry in so far as understanding reality is concerned, although 
it is assigned two tasks of providing assistance to poetry.8 The first is to distinguish fancy 
from imagination, which is reminiscent of S. T. Coleridge’s distinction; and the other is to 
 
3 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 297. 
4 Oakeshott, “History Is a Fable,” 42. 
5 According to Luke O’Sullivan’s editorial note, this essay was probably written between September 1924 and 
July 1925 for the application for a fellowship of Gonville and Caius College at Cambridge. Oakeshott, “An 
Essay on the Relations of Philosophy, Poetry and Reality,” in O’Sullivan, What Is History?, 115n1. This is 
roughly the same time when Oakeshott provides us with a settled conception of political philosophy and a more 
or less complete construction of such a philosophy. See Chapter 2. 
6 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, 21-26. 
7 Oakeshott, “Philosophy, Poetry and Reality,” 98-106. 
8 Ibid., 107-8. 
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realise the limitation of philosophy itself and recognise what is beyond the reach of 
philosophy, which reminds us of Immanuel Kant’s critique of pure reason. By contrast, in 
PAP and later in EM, philosophy is no longer the handmaiden of any other modes of 
experience, but the ultimate perspective superseding all of them. 
 If this essay differs from Oakeshott’s other writings in so many respects, it seems 
difficult to understand the place it occupies in his early general philosophy. Nonetheless, if 
we focus on the underlying philosophical project instead of the details of the argument or 
the specific conclusions reached, continuities are still discernible. In particular, if the logical 
examination of philosophy and poetry is indeed philosophical by nature, and if the fact about 
philosophy’s or poetry’s capability to arrive at the ultimate truth can only be ascertained from 
this philosophical perspective, then it paradoxically turns out that eventually it is philosophy 
which can reach the truth about ultimate reality regardless of the results of this logical 
investigation. Consequently, that philosophy is deemed secondary to poetry in this essay 
does not make this piece of writing so dissonant with Oakeshott’s other writings. As Efraim 
Podoksik points out quite correctly, this essay shares with other Oakeshott’s early works in 
general philosophy the pursuit and affirmation of the Absolute.9 
However, I do not agree with Podoksik’s judgment that by the time of EM Oakeshott 
had already abandoned this pursuit.10 As we shall see in chapters 4 and 5, this happened 
much later at the end of the 1940s in his political philosophy, and still later in the 1950s in 
his general philosophy. Again, this interpretive disagreement concerning when Oakeshott 
revised his conception of general philosophy is not merely a scholastic controversy. As I 
shall argue below and in subsequent chapters, Oakeshott’s political philosophy is not an 
outgrowth of his general philosophy such that changes in his political philosophy reflect 
earlier changes in his general philosophy. Quite the contrary. One of Oakeshott’s main 
motivations for investigating general philosophy is precisely to overcome the philosophical 
 
9 Efraim Podoksik, In Defence of Modernity: Vision and Philosophy in Michael Oakeshott (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2003), 47. 
10 Ibid., 45. 
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difficulties encountered earlier in his political philosophy. 
 This point is well exemplified by PAP. According to Luke O’Sullivan, this is a series 
of lectures Oakeshott gave between 1928 and 1930; 11  hence it was written after he 
composed A Discussion of Some Matters Preliminary to the Study of Political Philosophy in 
1925, already discussed in the previous chapter. There, as we have noted, he rejected possible 
misunderstandings of the conclusions in his political philosophy by arguing that the concept 
of a state as it appears in practical discourse about politics has nothing to do with the 
philosophical idea of the State. This argument depends on a prior account of the logical 
separation between philosophy and practice. However, the examination of the logical status 
of various forms of enquiry belongs to the task of general philosophy rather than political 
philosophy. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Oakeshott’s motivation for composing 
PAP was the need to fill the gap of his argument in political philosophy. As it turns out, 
setting aside its misleading title, this book-length essay spends much more space on the 
difference between the scientific, historical, practical, and philosophical ways of thinking 
about political topics than on the characteristics and the substance of such a philosophy of 
politics, which had already been elaborated in his earlier writings of political philosophy. 
 In the process of this philosophical reinforcement, Oakeshott’s early general philosophy 
gradually reveals its difference from his early political philosophy regarding the range of its 
subject matter and the nature of its holism and dialecticism. First, in Oakeshott’s early 
political philosophy, the nature of philosophy in general is taken as settled so that the primary 
focus is on the substance of a philosophy specifically concerned with politics. To be sure, in 
the first chapter of PAP, the title also made clear that the motivation of the whole lecture is 
to understand what political philosophy is. Nevertheless, here the general features of 
philosophy become the main issue under discussion. In contrast, the delineation of the 
specific contents of political philosophy now appears to be more a matter of course, readily 
 
11 Luke O’Sullivan, preface to Early Political Writings, 1925-30 (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), vii. 
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derivable from the characteristics of philosophy in general without further ado. 12 This 
constitutes the first difference between Oakeshott’s early political philosophy and his early 
general philosophy. Whilst the former is heavily concerned with the substance of the 
conclusions in a philosophical analysis of politics, the latter shifts its attention away from 
any set of philosophical conclusions to philosophy itself as a way of thinking amongst others. 
As a consequence, if it still makes sense to talk about the subject matter of such a general 
philosophy, then it is no longer the political concepts such as the individual and the State 
together with all the intermediary social institutions, but the various ways of thinking which 
compete with philosophy for the claim to ultimate knowledge. 
 Secondly, the sceptical impulse in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy is the driving 
force behind the relentless criticism and supersession of abstract concepts against the 
background of the concrete idea of the State. In PAP, this motivation of philosophical 
investigation takes the form of exhibiting the partialness of each way of thinking as opposed 
to the philosophical way. After explaining in ordinary language what abstractness and 
concreteness mean in philosophy in contradistinction to what they mean in ordinary 
discourse,13 the subsequent chapters argue that science, history, and practice are all abstract 
modes of thinking.14 In particular, knowledge in these modes could be possible only by 
making presuppositions which render the knowledge thus acquired short of capturing all 
aspects of our concrete experience. Furthermore, the logical status of this philosophical 
critique is also subjected to examination. Oakeshott argued that the only valid critique of 
these abstract modes of experience philosophy can provide is a critique of their partialness 
compared to the comprehensiveness of philosophy. Nevertheless, philosophy cannot criticise 
the content of particular statements made in each mode of experience because philosophical 
knowledge is essentially irrelevant to science, history, or practical life. Philosophy is not a 
 
12 Oakeshott, The Philosophical Approach to Politics, in O’Sullivan, Early Political Writings, 148-49. 
13 Ibid., 154-58. 
14 Ibid., 182, 192, 203-4. 
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guide to the practical world,15 and logically the same applied to scientific and historical 
knowledge. Thus, while the scepticism (in the sense of incessant investigation) in 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy takes a different form than his early political 
philosophy does because of the difference in their subject matters, it fills the gap left open 
in his political philosophy’s insistence on the mutual irrelevance between philosophical 
enquiry and practical politics. 
 In the third place, the holism in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy is stronger than 
that in his early general philosophy. The examination of every intermediary social institution 
is necessary to a complete theory of the State. By contrast, in PAP if a way of thinking is 
found to be abstract, then “that thinking is not philosophical …. And if it is not 
philosophical, … it cannot properly contribute to or criticize any way of thinking which deals 
with the concrete.” 16  This logical separation is unique to Oakeshott’s early general 
philosophy. In his early political philosophy, the abstract concepts already contain the seeds 
of statehood which, far from being logically separate, are preserved and elevated to a higher 
level of comprehensiveness when those concepts are superseded by more concrete ones. In 
contrast, when a logical separation obtains between every kind of thinking, it is difficult to 
see that there is anything from the abstract ways of thinking which philosophy could retain 
in overcoming their abstractions (save the hollow suggestion that the abstract kinds of 
thinking also attempt to reach a comprehensive knowledge of concrete reality). This is not a 
surprising consequence. After all, if the aim of PAP is to secure a distinctive place for the 
philosophy of politics from the other competing kinds of thinking about political issues, then 
contamination of philosophy by other modes of enquiry should be avoided at all costs. The 
abstract modes of enquiry are by no means essential to philosophy, and there is no motivation 
to continue the investigation of any abstract modes should one begin directly from the 
philosophical way of thinking. 
 
15 Ibid, 226. 
16 Ibid., 160. 
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 Finally, the dialecticism which characterises Oakeshott’s early political philosophy 
finds no place in his early general philosophy. The necessity of all intermediary social 
institutions to the idea of the State is not a brute fact, but is well explained by the dialectical 
progression from the most abstract idea where statehood is the most latent to more concrete 
ideas, until this successive argument reaches the most concrete idea of the State. In PAP, 
however, Oakeshott finds it both difficult and unnecessary to share his Idealist predecessors’ 
ambition to construct a hierarchy in which the various modes of thinking are arranged in 
accordance with either the temporal order of their emergence in human history or their 
degrees of concreteness.17 Similar to the dilution of holism in his early general philosophy, 
the rejection of dialecticism is quite understandable. If the ultimate objective is to 
characterise the logical properties of political philosophy or other concrete ways of thinking, 
it is hardly worth the effort to go through all the abstract modes of enquiry in the order of 
their historical emergence or degree of concreteness. Since their differing degrees of 
abstractness appear insignificant before the concrete nature of philosophy, a consideration 
of some of them is enough for heuristic purposes. 
 These, then, are the differences between Oakeshott’s early political philosophy and his 
early general philosophy. Given these differences, one may wonder how he can satisfactorily 
answer the question “What is philosophical about a philosophy of politics?” based on the 
general philosophy expounded in PAP. After examining the various abstract ways of thinking 
about politics, Oakeshott turned his attention back to the nature of political philosophy which 
is supposed to be the main topic of this lecture. However, the holism and dialecticism which 
he attributed to political philosophy are inherited from his earlier writings on political 
philosophy; that is, they are not deduced from the nature of general philosophy substantially 
discussed in this lecture. In specifying political philosophy’s scope of subject matter, 
Oakeshott rehearsed that the “first principle was that it does not matter where we start; all 
 
17 Ibid., 159-60. 
58 
 
starting points are equally good for the search for the real thing.”18 This holism is further 
explained by the reference to the list of topics such a political philosophy should include: 
the State and the individual, the plurality of wills and desires, rights and duties, and law and 
morality.19  As we have seen, this is the holism peculiar to Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy. Moreover, these concepts are regarded as contradictions to be reconciled and 
superseded, which again exemplifies a dialectical tendency of argument absent in his early 
general philosophy. Therefore, his brief discussion of the nature of political philosophy 
leaves the impression that whatever he says about general philosophy need not apply to 
political philosophy as well. After all, this is logically consistent since these two kinds of 
philosophy are concerned with different subject matters. 
 Nevertheless, towards the end of the lecture, Oakeshott did attempt to apply the newly 
established conception of philosophy in general to political philosophy. Paradoxically, this 
results in a new form of holism in his general philosophy because it subsumes political 
philosophy under its territory. In particular, he argued that a “complete political philosophy 
does not merely involve a complete philosophy in general, but is it.”20 What this proposition 
means is not that a political philosophy, in order to be complete, has to contain within itself 
an examination of all other forms of thinking about politics from the perspective of 
philosophy. In any case, Oakeshott’s general philosophy in the first place no longer exhibits 
the strong holism, where the various abstract kinds of thinking are necessary parts of the 
philosophical mode of enquiry. Instead, he immediately clarified that all the historically 
separated branches of philosophy such as ethics, metaphysics, logic, aesthetic, and politics, 
are not parts of philosophy but are all involved in concrete philosophical knowledge as a 
whole. However, this amounts to less an enrichment of the substance of political philosophy 
than a criticism of its limitation of scope. As Oakeshott explained further, “[p]olitical 
philosophy in so far as it is political, in the end … fails to be concrete thinking;” for, “in so 
 
18 Ibid., 212. 
19 Ibid., 212-14. 
20 Ibid., 224; italics original. 
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far as it is political philosophy, in so far as it is willing to view things merely in relation to 
this social whole, it fails to be philosophy.”21 As has been indicated in the previous chapter, 
the application of Oakeshott’s early general philosophy to his early political philosophy 
severs the link between political philosophy and practical politics. No matter what 
conclusions are reached in political philosophy it is difficult to see their relevance to political 
practice. Here it is put more bluntly that political philosophy should not be political at all. A 
fortiori, the concepts like the State or the individual can no longer be understood as political 
concepts but purely logical ones; and the motivation for engaging in the study of such a 
philosophy can no longer be the desire to understand our experience of political life but the 
unconditional pursuit of concrete knowledge whatever it is about. Consequently, although 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy grows out of the needs of his earlier political 
philosophy, once established it acquires a life of its own and even supersedes that political 
philosophy. As we shall see shortly below, this is one of the contexts in which we should 
understand his publication of EM. 
 On the other hand, suppose that we ignore Oakeshott’s grandiose and rather careless 
holism about a complete political philosophy which incorporates all other branches of 
philosophy and becomes the whole of philosophy itself. Moreover, suppose that we 
transplant the dilution and rejection of the holism and dialecticism about kinds of thinking 
in his early general philosophy to his early political philosophy. It is interesting to observe 
that the possibility is then left open of repairing the connection between political philosophy 
and practical life. With regard to holism, we have seen that the examination of the various 
modes of enquiry is neither necessary nor contributory to concrete thinking or the knowledge 
of the Absolute. Nonetheless, in discussing the nature of philosophical facts, Oakeshott 
argued that “[t]he real facts of social life are not the apparent, isolated ‘facts’ which meet in 
our ordinary practical experience of social life; the real facts are these abstract facts of 
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ordinary, abstract experience, transformed, seen as they really are and always have been.”22 
Why choose practical experience as the starting point from which the philosophical 
investigation proceeds to more concrete facts? Why not the science of politics or political 
history? If the holism about various kinds of thinking holds in Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy, then there will be no need to answer this question. Wherever one begins, the 
destination will be the same concrete knowledge such that the choice can in principle be 
arbitrary. However, if this holism does not obtain, the choice of our experience of political 
life as the point of departure demands an explanation to the effect that it is essential to the 
comprehensive philosophical thinking about politics. 
 Similarly, concerning dialecticism, we have also shown that there is no connection 
between the various kinds of thinking such that one can arrive at a concrete fact by logically 
progressing from one mode of enquiry to another, and finally to the philosophical mode of 
thinking. However, in further elucidating what is concrete reality, Oakeshott claimed that “it 
is simply recognizing reality, the reality which is always there, but is usually rejected in 
favour of some abstract ‘fact,’ which, though useful, is yet false and unreal.” 23  If the 
dialecticism about kinds of thinking no longer exists, why emphasise that somehow reality 
has already been latent in the abstract facts of practical experience? In addition, is not the 
transformation of these abstract experience of practical life into concrete philosophical 
reality itself an exemplification of dialecticism? As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, these 
internal inconsistencies between Oakeshott’s general philosophy and his earlier political 
philosophy were to become the motivation underlying his revision of the conception of 
political philosophy. In that revision, political philosophy’s connection with and progression 
from practical experience is specifically highlighted. More importantly, this change occurred 
to his political philosophy first, and it is only after the new needs of his political philosophy 
had become clear that Oakeshott came to renew his conception of general philosophy 
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 In the previous chapter we noted that one of the possible explanations for Oakeshott’s 
not publishing his early writings in political philosophy is not his lack of confidence in the 
conclusions he reached in political philosophy, but the unsympathetic reception of the 
Idealist style of his philosophy by his contemporaries. Here is another possible explanation. 
Oakeshott may be aware that it is much more difficult to get his conception of political 
philosophy thoroughly right than to provide a settled account of his general philosophy. As 
a result, though within the context of his early writings his general philosophy arose from an 
attempt to respond to the needs of his earlier political philosophy, it is the substance of PAP 
that first reached publication rather than that of SPP. 
This, then, is the background of EM published in 1933. The continuities between this 
book and PAP cannot be more obvious. The claim that philosophy cannot provide moral 
guidance has by now been familiar enough.24 The definition of philosophical experience as 
“experience without presupposition, reservation, arrest or modification” also conforms to 
Oakeshott’s earlier conception of philosophy as the most concrete and comprehensive kind 
of knowledge.25 Furthermore, in case a mode of experience attempts to make a statement 
and pretends to belong to another mode or philosophy, then the result is a logical fallacy of 
ignoratio elenchi. 26  This characterisation of the mutual irrelevance among modes of 
experience, and between philosophy and all other modes, is also consistent with what was 
said in PAP. 
 The important difference is that in EM there is no longer the apparent concern with 
political philosophy. To be sure, the modes of experience examined are the same as before, 
including the historical, scientific and practical kinds of thinking. However, here Oakeshott 
did not consider them as possible candidates for the concrete thinking about politics, but 
examined them generally as modes of experience for their own sake. This is explicitly 
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confirmed by the assertion that the investigation of the relative abstractness of different 
forms of enquiry from the viewpoint of the absolute concreteness of philosophy, and the 
logical relationships among them, is the task of philosophy in general.27 
As such, one may reasonably wonder where political philosophy fits into this 
conception of general philosophy in EM. It is straightforward that the philosophy of history, 
the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of practice belong properly to the business of 
general philosophy. Each of them sets out to excavate the necessary postulates of a certain 
form of enquiry; that is, to understand the concepts which must be presupposed in every 
judgment made in that kind of thinking. Since only philosophical experience need not 
presuppose these concepts and thus be limited by them, the presuppositions of other modes 
of experience can be recognised only from the philosophical perspective. By contrast, the 
object of analysis in a political philosophy does not seem to be a specific mode of experience. 
Indeed, as PAP has already made clear, it is a kind of subject matter which can be subjected 
to all other modes of enquiry, historical, scientific, or practical. In other words, whereas it is 
unproblematic to talk of the history of the Conservative Party in the twentieth century or the 
science of economics, to attempt something like a politics of democracy or a politics of free 
market simply does not make sense. Unlike history, science, and practice, politics is not a 
sui generis world of experience.28 Consequently, if the task of philosophy is to understand 
the postulates of these worlds of experience, then it seems that there can be no such thing as 
a philosophy of politics. 
It is unsurprising that this should be an implication of the general philosophy in EM 
since it exactly reflects the ultimate subsumption of political philosophy under general 
philosophy in PAP already mentioned above. In EM, Oakeshott first classified the historical, 
scientific, and practical modes of thinking as determinate arrests in experience. He then 
 
27 Ibid., 4. 
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explored the question concerning whether there are indeterminate arrests as well. Two 
factors make ethics an indeterminate arrest in experience and thereby fall short of the 
experience of philosophy which is without any presupposition or limitation. The first one is 
that ethics has too often been confused with the enterprise of telling us “what we ought to 
do and to furnish us with a practical criterion of right action.”29 However, this enterprise 
properly belongs to the world of practical experience. For ethics to acquire a philosophical 
status, it has to eschew this undertaking and concentrate on questions about the meaning of 
the concepts such as “value,” “good,” “right,” and “ought” which must be presupposed in 
every moral judgment.30 Unfortunately, even if ethics can confine itself to the philosophical 
task of clarifying the postulates of our moral judgments, it is still doomed to be less 
satisfactory than philosophy. For, ethics is limited in its concern with a subset of 
presuppositions in practical experience alone, and thereby fails to deal with other aspects of 
the practical world, let alone all other modes of experience. As a consequence, “[a] complete 
ethics would fall short of the concrete totality of experience” which is the domain of 
philosophy in general.31 It can be a concrete kind of thinking, but fails to be comprehensive. 
The logical status of ethics is thus caught between the various abstract modes of experience 
and the experience of philosophy; hence the nature of its arrest is called “indeterminate.” 
Although the example used in this argument is ethics, Oakeshott added in a footnote that 
political philosophy is on a par with ethics in this matter. 32  It follows that political 
philosophy faces the same fate. Like ethics, it cannot be specifically concerned with our 
experience of political life only and remain truly philosophical at the same time. 
 This conception of the subject matter of general philosophy eventually becomes so 
general that it seems impossible for it to be specifically about anything. As a matter of 
elementary logic, to express a tautologous truth about everything is to say nothing particular 
 
29 Ibid., 337. 
30 Ibid., 339-40. 
31 Ibid., 345. 
32 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, 335n. 
64 
 
about anything. Consequently, Oakeshott’s construal of philosophical experience invites 
much scholarly attention to the question concerning whether the scepticism in EM is no 
longer (or not merely) directed towards the abstract modes of experience, but (also) turned 
to the Absolute itself. For there is no longer anything which can be said about philosophical 
experience. It is also worth asking whether the lack of substantial conclusions about the 
Absolute means the abandonment of it, and whether this supposed abandonment constitutes 
a departure on Oakeshott’s part from his Idealist predecessors. 
In the vast array of secondary literature, it is a minority view to take what Oakeshott 
proclaims about the Absolute in EM literally. Paul Franco, for instance, maintains that 
“Oakeshott … is more Hegelian than Bradleian in this regard. Philosophy as experience 
without reservation or presupposition is ultimately identified with the absolute.”33 The 
positive reference to Hegel and the negative reference to Bradley imply that in Oakeshott’s 
works philosophy does arrive at some substantial conclusions. As such, there is no question 
of Oakeshott’s scepticism towards the Absolute or his departure from Idealism. By contrast, 
most interpreters reject the view that Oakeshott provides any particular conclusion in his 
general philosophy. As Robert Grant comments, “[e]xperience becomes superfluous, even 
effectively ‘transcendent.’ It is at best something whose existence is optionally to be deduced 
or extrapolated from the empirical, self-subsistent fact of modal relativity.”34 
Podoksik similarly thinks that Oakeshott’s sketches about the nature of philosophy 
“falls short of a comprehensive treatment. No metaphysical doctrine, no table of categories, 
no thorough analysis of consciousness are found.”35 Nevertheless, he further argued that 
this is related to Oakeshott’s underlying project of defending the plurality of modes of 
experience against the unity of philosophy itself; for “[t]he excursions into pure philosophy 
appear more as an introduction, a convenient platform to explore the variety of worldviews, 
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and not as an independent philosophical statement.” 36  Consequently, the discontinuity 
between Oakeshott’s early and late writings on philosophy appeared as early as in EM where 
he parted company with his Idealist predecessors.37 
To make matters more complicated, in the majority camp there is a large group of 
commentators who maintain that, like most philosophers in British Idealism, Oakeshott’s 
philosophy as experience without presupposition is from beginning to end merely a criterion 
of concreteness by which other modes of experience is examined. For example, W. H. 
Greenleaf argues that “[p]hilosophy is not … the construction of a complete system of 
knowledge on the architectural analogy. It is more like a methodology or way of thinking … 
it makes no positive contribution to knowledge itself, being content with the examination of 
what already exists in experience.”38 Moreover, it is added that Oakeshott does not claim 
that such a criterion is ever actually satisfied by arriving at a set of infallible conclusions in 
philosophy. In Greenleaf’s words, “[i]t is not … that this absolute coherence of concrete 
ideas is ever actually accomplished (though it must be the criterion of whatever is done).”39 
As a result, as David Boucher argues, the lack of substantial conclusions about the Absolute 
does not mean that Oakeshott suddenly turned sceptical towards the claim of philosophy to 
reach knowledge that is universal and certain. Rather, the scepticism in the sense of relentless 
investigation is always present in Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy as a critical activity, 
with absolute coherence as its aim rather than its already proven accomplishment. Therefore, 
even if he does not reach any definite conclusions in his general philosophy, Oakeshott 
cannot be adequately said to have abandoned the Absolute or the school of Idealism from 
EM onwards.40 Finally, there are those like Steven Gerencser who does not make a final 
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judgment on this matter, but simply observes that “[a]t times Oakeshott writes as if 
philosophy can and does achieve this concrete experience, at others as if it were its exclusive 
goal.”41 
What are we to make of this mess of controversies? First, the question concerning the 
extent to which Oakeshott moved away from Idealist principles from EM to his late 
philosophical writings is one that need not detain us any further. For one thing, like the 
question about the degree to which Oakeshott’s political opinions could be said to be 
conservative, the answer depends more upon what we regard as the essential characteristics 
of Idealism or conservatism than on our understanding of the position Oakeshott in effect 
holds in his writings. For another, how far Oakeshott remained generally an Idealist is less 
relevant to our interpretative task in this thesis than his specific attitudes towards the 
Absolute. 
This brings us to the second point, concerning whether the lack of substantial 
conclusions about the Absolute means its abandonment, and whether there really is such an 
absence of philosophical conclusions in the first place. I think that the distinction between 
philosophy as an incessant critical activity (or a criterion of the absolute coherence of ideas) 
and philosophy as a set of conclusions (or a body of concrete knowledge arrived at in 
accordance with its own criterion) is a distinction without difference. It is true that already 
in PAP philosophy is regarded more as a kind of thinking than a form of knowledge.42 
Nevertheless, in that context the aim is to discover the distinctive features of philosophical 
thinking so that the question of “What is the philosophical thinking about politics?” can be 
satisfactorily answered. This aim is achieved in part by illustrating the properties of other 
kinds of thinking, and pointing out where they fall short of being concrete. Thus, the 
differences among various kinds of thinking naturally become the subject matter of 
Oakeshott’s general philosophy. The essential characteristics of philosophy, and the 
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characterisation of the postulates presupposed by the historical, scientific, and practical 
modes of experience, are exactly the substantive conclusions reached in his general 
philosophy. 
In EM the situation is different because the context of providing a basis for an adequate 
conception of political philosophy in PAP is absent. However, it is not difficult to see that 
the subject matter of general philosophy is still the same. Concerning the historical mode of 
experience, for example, Oakeshott argued that only from the philosophical viewpoint, 
namely from without the historical mode itself, can we ascertain the presuppositions of every 
judgement made in that mode of experience.43 If one insists that the conclusions thus 
reached from the perspective of philosophy are not philosophical knowledge, then there is 
nothing further to be said. Similarly, the philosophical kind of thinking itself is also subjected 
to an examination by philosophy in order to figure out its logical features, as we have already 
seen in Oakeshott’s 1925 essay on “the Relations of Philosophy, Poetry and Reality.” If one 
persists in arguing that this exercise of philosophical thinking about philosophy itself does 
not yield any philosophical conclusions, this response arouses the suspicion that here we are 
dealing with words rather than with the real thing. In short, whenever there is philosophical, 
concrete thinking, the conclusions it reaches must satisfy its criterion of absolute coherence; 
otherwise it is merely a kind of pseudo-philosophical thinking in the very beginning. 
 Therefore, in the third place, the real issue that matters to our interpretation is whether 
in EM Oakeshott did abandon philosophical experience or the Absolute. We have discussed 
the dilution of holism and the rejection of dialecticism in the case of PAP. With regard to 
EM, these topics have already attracted many scholarly comments. Franco, for instance, 
recognises that Oakeshott does not follow R. G. Collingwood’s footsteps in the hierarchical 
arrangement of various forms of experience in an order of increasing coherence and 
concreteness. It does not interest Oakeshott to show how each mode of experience arises 
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from reconciling the self-contradiction involved in the previous one.44 Franco also notes 
that the modes of experience themselves are neither necessary nor contributory to the 
concrete knowledge in philosophy.45 More sharply, asks Podoksik, if there is no hierarchy 
among different modes and, unlike Bradley’s system, these modes are not essential to the 
totality of experience, then why should Oakeshott take the trouble of considering these 
modes of experience if a shortcut to philosophical knowledge is made available by the 
dilution and rejection of holism and dialecticism?46 Moreover, in his updated account, 
Franco also asks rhetorically: “[t]he ‘main business’ of philosophy is precisely to carry out 
this critical task of rejection [of the various modes’ claim to concrete knowledge] and thus 
clear the way for … what?”47 The implied answer is that in the course of Oakeshott’s 
philosophical investigation concrete experience disappears with its importance giving place 
to those abstract modes instead. To support this interpretation, Podoksik suggests that this 
departure from the Absolute is illustrated by the pattern of Oakeshott’s subsequent 
philosophical writings: 
 
After the publication of Experience and Its Modes two different paths were open to 
Oakeshott: the philosophical pursuit of the totality of experience, or an exploration of 
different abstract modes. In the beginning, Oakeshott tended to choose the former. In a 
long essay ‘The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence’ (1938), and in two drafts 
about the philosophy of politics written during the thirties and forties, he tried to reflect 
on the character of the philosophy of law and politics from the standpoint of concrete 
experience. He diverged somewhat from his radical statement in Experience and Its 
Modes, that an attempt to elucidate ethics or politics from the philosophical point of 
view would lead to the creation of a pseudo-mode. Yet it was still an explicit attempt to 
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analyse these different aspects of reality from the philosophical point of view. Later, 
however, Oakeshott abandoned these attempts.48 
 
This, however, gets all the patterns of Oakeshott’s thinking wrong. As we noted earlier in 
relation to PAP, the dilution and rejection of holism and dialecticism does not make the 
discussions about those abstract kinds of thinking about politics superfluous. On the contrary, 
because the underlying motivation of Oakeshott’s general philosophy is to reserve a place 
for the philosophy of politics from the competing claims made by other modes of enquiry 
into politics, it is necessary to demonstrate that all the other kinds of thinking fall short of 
achieving the concrete knowledge which belongs to philosophy’s privileged occupation. It 
is due to the failure to understand EM against this context of Oakeshott’s earlier political 
philosophy, the failure to see that his general philosophy arises out of his profound concerns 
in political philosophy, that the aforementioned interpreters misunderstand his motivation 
for investigating the various modes of experience which are logically speaking unnecessary 
after the holism is diluted and dialecticism rejected in his general philosophy. 
Furthermore, no matter what is said about the significance Oakeshott attributed to the 
Absolute, insofar as these modes of experience are still regarded as abstract, incomplete, 
partial and not totally satisfactory in the logical sense, then he had not abandoned the 
Absolute by the time of writing EM. Its abandonment happened quite later, after he had 
revised his earlier conception of political philosophy during the late 1930s and 1940s. In 
other words, changes in Oakeshott’s general philosophy in the 1950s again reflect the 
renewed demands made by his updated account of what a political philosophy should be. 
This is also a better explanation for the divergencies between these later writings on political 
philosophy and EM. The next chapter will give more discussion about this theme by 
considering Oakeshott’s late general philosophy. In the next section, we examine the 
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practical messages of Oakeshott’s early general philosophy, not, as in this section, in the 
context of his earlier political philosophy, but in his own contemporary ideological contexts. 
 
III. General Philosophy in Its Ideological Contexts 
 
 In the previous chapter we noted that, despite his disclaimers, Oakeshott’s early 
political philosophy does provide us with a normative criterion by which we can measure 
the extent to which actual social institutions approximate to their corresponding concrete 
concepts in philosophy. To recapitulate by the example of government: if the actions of a 
specific government violate its own essential nature, it thereby falls short of the 
philosophical idea of government and is accordingly less satisfactory than it could have been 
in our experience of political life. The normative nature of this judgement is not qualified 
even if it is beyond the concern of philosophy to determine the direction towards which an 
improvement should be sought in the current government under criticism. This, as Oakeshott 
would say, is located within the territory of practical reason. 
 A similar pattern of prescriptive implications is also present in Oakeshott’s early general 
philosophy about the various modes of enquiry. Take the philosophy of history as an instance. 
Before embarking on the discussion of the essential character of historical statements, 
Oakeshott unequivocally declared that what follows does not offer any advice as to how 
history should be written.49 What does this declaration mean? The only valid critique of the 
historical mode of enquiry which philosophy can provide is to discover the necessary 
presuppositions of all historical judgments and find them limiting and partial compared to 
the all-encompassing and complete experience of philosophy. Besides, it is not the business 
of philosophy to make or revise particular historical judgments about, for example, how the 
Holy Roman Empire came into existence and what its fortunes were in the following 
 
49 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, 88. 
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centuries. Nevertheless, if philosophy claims that a particular statement, say, of practical 
history, is in fact not a historical statement at all because it defies the postulates of the 
historical mode of experience, then undeniably philosophy does have universal implications 
about the manner in which all genuinely historical statements should and should not be 
made.50 The same can be said about science51 and all other modes of experience including 
practice. 
 Consequently, Oakeshott’s general philosophy possesses more potential to exercise 
pervasive judgements about practical life than his political philosophy does. If his political 
philosophy is suspected of issuing prescriptive judgments, they are at most specific; they 
will at most claim that a particular government is not so much government as it is something 
else. In addition, short of providing immediate ends or means to be carried out in political 
practice, this suspicion is harmless. By contrast, if Oakeshott’s general philosophy betrays 
signs of prescribing how judgments in, say, practical experience, should be made, then the 
ideological effects are potentially very far-reaching. For a wide variety of current moral, 
religious, and political arguments will be excluded as confused and self-defeating. As one 
reviewer of EM commented, “it is a rhetorician, not a philosopher,” who could write that the 
historical element of Christianity is a practical past rather than genuine history, and that 
religion as the highest form of practical life, unlike philosophy, has no claim to ultimate truth 
and reality.52 
This difference between general philosophy and political philosophy explains very well 
the ideological impressions left by most of Oakeshott’s essays written immediately after the 
Second World War. However, this issue must be postponed until Chapter 5 because at this 
stage of Oakeshott’s general philosophy the place of his critique of rationalism was still 
unclear. To be sure, as early as in 1932, a year before the publication of EM, Oakeshott 
 
50 This point has been widely acknowledged in secondary literature. For an example, see Podoksik, In Defence 
of Modernity, 96. 
51 Ibid., 71. 




published “The New Bentham” in Scrutiny, which betrays a tinge of sarcasm about the 
rationalist genius for “making life and the business of life rational rather than for seeing the 
reason for it, for inculcating precise order, no matter at what expense, rather than for 
apprehending the existence of a subtle order in what appears to be chaotic.” 53  This 
anticipated the main theme to be elaborated in the post-war essay “On Rational Conduct.” 
Yet one may search vainly for any treatment of this or other related topics in EM. Presumably, 
rationalism in politics is a perverted form of practical reasoning. The nearest Oakeshott came 
to deal with this is his discussions about the intrusion of science and history into the world 
of practice,54 which parallels the equally fallacious invasion into science and history by the 
other two modes of experience in each case. However, as Chapter 5 will explain, these are 
still different from the critique of rationalism in politics because rationalism in politics is not 
necessarily formulated in scientific or historical terms but at times in (pseudo-)philosophical 
terms instead; nor is it a distinct mode of experience even though it may be apparently 
couched in terms of other modes of experience than practice. 
 On the other hand, EM and some of his other writings around this period had already 
disclosed its practical relevance if they are put in the context of his contemporary intellectual 
climate. I am not referring to the question concerning the task left to philosophy itself in an 
age when the nascent natural and social sciences claimed their territory from their 
philosophical coloniser, which Franco regards as the motivational background of 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy.55 Neither am I talking about the defence of radical 
plurality in modernity in central European debates, on the basis of which Podoksik argues 
that Oakeshott is actually a German philosopher.56 These academic contexts are important 
in themselves, but not closely relevant to our concern in this thesis. Nor, again, do I have in 
 
53 Oakeshott, “The New Bentham,” review of Bentham’s Comments on the Commentaries, edited by C. W. 
Everett, The Education of Jeremy Bentham, by C. W. Everett, and Bentham’s Theory of Legislation, by C. K. 
Ogden, in Rationalism in Politics, 139. First published in Scrutiny 1 (1932): 114-31. 
54 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, 311-16. 
55 Franco, Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, 14. 
56 Podoksik, In Defence of Modernity, 19. 
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mind the way Oakeshott applied conclusions in his early political philosophy to the 
characterisation of the philosopher’s role in society, which we discussed in the previous 
chapter. For his general philosophy is about the various modes of experience, not about the 
whole of social life or the State. What’s worse, if “instead of a gospel, the most philosophy 
can offer us (in respect of practical life) is an escape,”57 then it is difficult to see how such 
a philosophy can play any role in the recreation of the values of society or in raising the 
society’s consciousness of itself. 
 The relevant context here can be identified from some of Oakeshott’s early book 
reviews. For instance, in 1926, he said that there are some things which can be mechanically 
described, but that does not mean they can be defined in terms of mechanism.58 Underlying 
this view is the distinction, in his general philosophy, between the mode of scientific 
experience and concrete experience itself. As it should now be understandable, this statement 
implies an interference with what scientists should and should not say. It is of no use to argue 
that Oakeshott would certainly prefer to explain that he was merely characterising the form 
of scientific speech regardless of what the scientists themselves think about their own 
undertaking. As Maurice Cowling points out, contrary to the appearance of defending 
scientific experience’s own credentials, Oakeshott’s writings on science are meant to liberate 
other modes of experience from its increasing intrusion and domination.59  
Similarly, in 1927, Oakeshott asserted in a published pamphlet that religion is 
essentially practical in nature because it is the completion of the moral life.60 With the help 
of hindsight, we know that this is an attempt to locate the logical status of religion in the 
world of practical experience. But, as clarified by several Oakeshott scholars more recently, 
 
57 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes, 3. 
58 Oakeshott, review of Science, Religion, and Reality, edited by Joseph Needham, in The Concept of a 
Philosophical Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews, 1926-51, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 
2007), 38. First published in Journal of Theological Studies 27, no.107 (April 1926): 317-19. 
59 Maurice Cowling, Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), 261. 
60 Oakeshott, Religion and the Moral Life, in Timothy Fuller, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, 44-45. 
First published 1927 by Bowes & Bowes. 
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it is Oakeshott’s early interests in theological debates that motivate his subsequent EM. Ian 
Tregenza, for example, illustrates how, before receiving any systematic treatment, the modal 
separatism had already been at work in Oakeshott’s attempt to dissociate the historical 
element from modern Christianity in his earliest religious writings.61 Corey Abel also argues 
that Oakeshott’s logical separation of the various modes of experience is actually the basis 
of the practical defence of his own theological position.62 Furthermore, as Andrew Sullivan 
contends, already in Oakeshott’s early writings on religion we can find implicit clues 
anticipating his later criticism of rationalism in politics.63 All of this indicates that, in terms 
of Oakeshott’s contemporary ideological contexts, his general philosophy exerts a much 
more practical influence than his political philosophy does. In contrast, before he 
reconceived the nature of his political philosophy, its most relevant context had been the 
whole history of political philosophy rather than the more parochial concern with the present 
intellectual fashion. 
 Writing in 1980, Cowling discerned the practical context of Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy more clearly than any other commentator: 
 
Oakeshott began to write Experience and Its Modes in 1925 at a point at which there 
had been extensive proliferation of areas of academic study and of undergraduate 
examinations-subjects in Cambridge during the previous fifty years. In discussing the 
status of subjects that were being taught, Experience and Its Modes provided a felicitous 
conjunction of moment and man. It was written from inside a new subject. Its 
combination of explicit philosophy and polemical enmity made it a characteristic 
manifestation of the climate in which it was conceived.64 
 
61  Ian Tregenza, “Skepticism and Tradition: The Religious Imagination of Michael Oakeshott,” in The 
Meanings of Michael Oakeshott’s Conservatism, ed. Corey Abel (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), 3. 
62 Corey Abel, “Oakeshott’s Wise Defense: Christianity as a Civilization,” in Corey Abel, Meanings of Michael 
Oakeshott’s Conservatism, 19-20. 
63 Sullivan, Intimations Pursued, 188. See also Tregenza, “Skepticism and Tradition,” 15; Abel, “Oakeshott’s 
Wise Defense,” 31. 




And, enlarging the context even further: 
 
Separation of the modes of experience was the foundation of the book. It was important 
not just because it had special reference to errors in England in the present. These errors 
were explained in Oakeshott’s articles between 1925 and 1933, in Experience and Its 
Modes itself, and in many of his subsequent writings. It was not until the middle 
fifties—and in a sense not even then—that Oakeshott outgrew the need to emphasize 
his rejection of that combination of naturalism, positivism, rationalism and liberalism 
of which Experience and Its Modes provided a more systematic criticism than is to be 
found anywhere else among the non-Marxists of the generation to which he belonged.65 
 
As we will see in Chapter 5, in the post-war essays Oakeshott shifted attention from his 
modal separatism to the critique of rationalism in politics. This transition is more closely 
connected with his perception of the difference between the new intellectual context of the 
post-war era and the old one of the inter-war years, rather than a theoretical development 
internal to his general philosophy. In addition, like his early works, this practical impulse in 
Oakeshott’s late general philosophy precedes his more academic attempt to satisfy the 
theoretical demands of his updated political philosophy via a renewal of his early general 
philosophy. As such, the pattern of development in Oakeshott’s writings further reinforces 
his place in the history of British political ideologies besides his more widely acknowledged 
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 This chapter has emphasised the asymmetry between Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy and his early general philosophy. In his political philosophy the subject matter is 
the whole array of social institutions, and the necessity of investigating all of them is 
explained by their holistic nature and the dialectical progression between them. By contrast, 
his general philosophy deals with the various modes of experience instead, with their 
associated holism qualified and dialecticism rejected. The attempted combination of this 
general philosophy with his earlier political philosophy in PAP leads to divergent 
developments in Oakeshott’s subsequent writings. In EM, his general philosophy acquired a 
life of its own and subsumes political philosophy under its scope. Consequently, political 
philosophy, to become genuinely philosophical, can no longer be political but purely logical. 
However, Oakeshott’s general philosophy did not so much outgrow the context of his earlier 
political philosophy, as end up being no more than a temporary offshoot from it. As the next 
chapter will show, when he reconceived the nature of his political philosophy, he highlighted 
again the connection between political philosophy and our practical experience of politics. 
His general philosophy at this stage paradoxically contributes to its own subsequent revision 
in light of the new demands of the resuscitated possibility of a political philosophy which is 
both philosophical and political. The qualification of the holism about modes of experience 
makes it possible to single out practical experience as the beginning from which the 
philosophical investigation of politics moves, though the specific reason for this choice was 
yet to be clarified. Similarly, the rejection of dialecticism about modes of experience was 
qualified by considering practical life to be the world of experience in which philosophical 
truth is already latent, though what is latent was still taken more as something to be 
superseded than preserved. 
 This consequence has significant implications for our analysis of EM. By placing its 
origins in the context of Oakeshott’s earlier conception of political philosophy, we can 
understand why, despite having qualified the holism and rejected the dialecticism in his 
general philosophy, he has to take the trouble of examining the various modes of experience 
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rather than simply taking a shortcut to the concrete world of philosophical experience. This, 
in turn, refutes the interpretation which regards EM as the point of departure from which 
Oakeshott abandoned the Absolute in favour of the radical plurality of modes of experience. 
As we will see in the next chapter, similar to the patterns of development in Oakeshott’s 
early writings, this abandonment arose later first as an adjustment necessitated by the new 
emphasis on the connection between political philosophy and our experience of political life, 
before being assimilated back to his late general philosophy. 
 This chapter has also demonstrated that, apart from the theoretical context of his earlier 
political philosophy, Oakeshott’s early general philosophy must be understood in the context 
of its contemporary intellectual debates. As Chapter 5 will illustrate, Oakeshott’s post-war 
essays on rationalism in politics primarily reflect his sensitiveness to the changing political 
milieu which differed from that of the inter-war years. They are only secondarily an internal 
theoretical development within his earlier general philosophy. This motivation of practical 
engagement had long been lurking behind Oakeshott’s early general philosophy before it 
received a more systematic formulation in EM. In contrast, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, even after Oakeshott’s late political philosophy strengthened its connection 
with our experience of political life, and even in those post-war essays which are more 
overtly concerned with the British tradition of politics, the relevant context of his political 









 Oakeshott’s early general philosophy sharpened the philosophical character of his early 
political philosophy, at the expense of severing its connection with politics and obliterating 
its difference from philosophy in general. However, his general philosophy soon acquired a 
life of its own in Experience and Its Modes and left the needs of his political philosophy 
behind. On the other hand, his conception of political philosophy had not been thoroughly 
qualified by the hyperbolic claim of his general philosophy to subsume it. Rather, several 
passages in The Philosophical Approach to Politics disclose that the possibility was still left 
open of making closer the connection between political philosophy and political life. This 
can be done through reviving the holism and dialecticism about modes of experience rejected 
in his early general philosophy. 
 Against this background, this chapter considers Oakeshott’s subsequent revision of his 
earlier conception about the nature of political philosophy. We will examine in chronological 
order “The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence” (1938), “The Concept of a Philosophy 
of Politics” (1946), and “Political Philosophy” (1950). The aim is to show how the rise and 
fall of holism and dialecticism reflect Oakeshott’s continual attempts to rescue his political 
philosophy’s relevance to political activity. Within this context, I argue that his subsequent 
“political” essays in the mid-1950s are not primarily ideological polemics, but initial 
preparations for his later construction of political philosophy. 
Oakeshott’s attempts at a new conception of political philosophy increasingly narrowed 
the definition of the “political” and limited the scope of political philosophy’s subject matter. 
This is reflected in the “political” essays by the shift of focus from the State or the social 
whole to the government, and specifically its office and engagement rather than its 
constitution. This delimitation culminates in the abandonment of the State in On Human 
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Conduct. Understanding the reason underlying this move will render inadequate those 
interpretations which exaggerate the extent to which Oakeshott departed from his early 
Idealist positions in political philosophy, and thus regard his late political philosophy as a 
defence of liberalism. I shall demonstrate that the conclusions of his early political 
philosophy are preserved in new formulations in his late political philosophy. Evidences 
include the logical identification of the individual with the State, the existence of the end of 
the State, and the relationship between law and morality. 
This paves the way for my interpretation of the way Oakeshott’s political philosophy is 
relevant to practical life. His affinity to the moral life of individuality is not expressed 
through his theoretical analysis of civil association. Rather, it is conveyed primarily in his 
deliberate decision to analyse civil association alone, to leave enterprise association as it is, 
and to resist the temptation to reconcile their tensions or supersede them by another higher, 
more concrete concept of the State. The bipolar scheme of civil and enterprise associations 
does not go beyond the mixture of societas and universitas in actual states of modern Europe, 
but in the end faithfully reflect its ambivalences in purified forms. Consequently, the 
connection between political philosophy and our experience of political activity becomes 
still closer than before, in a way already presented in “The Claims of Politics.” 
 
II. Changing Conceptions of Political Philosophy 
 
1. “The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence” 
 
 It is customary among interpreters to understand Oakeshott’s political philosophy as a 
reflection of his general philosophy. In approaching Oakeshott’s early works as a whole, for 
example, W. H. Greenleaf comments that “Oakeshott’s political ideas are very definitely the 
reflection of a philosophical standpoint, the outcome of a coherent attitude to the world of 
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knowledge and experience as a whole.” 1  Similarly, Steven Gerencser understands the 
changes in Oakeshott’s political philosophy as resulting from the rejection of absolute 
idealism in his general philosophy.2 Efraim Podoksik argues further that Oakeshott had 
already given up holism and teleology in his early general philosophy before revising his 
political philosophy accordingly in subsequent writings.3 It is a logical fact that a conception 
of the nature of political philosophy has to be grounded on a conception of the nature of 
philosophy in general. Nevertheless, as the previous two chapters have illustrated, it is more 
adequate to regard Oakeshott’s early general philosophy as something tailor-made for his 
earlier political philosophy, rather than the other way around. This section aims to 
demonstrate that this is also the case concerning the alterations Oakeshott made to his late 
political philosophy and subsequently his late general philosophy. 
 Not long after the publication of EM, Oakeshott began to revisit his earlier conception 
of political philosophy. The first notable attempt was “The Concept of a Philosophical 
Jurisprudence.” Published in 1938, this article closely resembles PAP both in structure and 
content. The former half focuses on the historical, scientific, and practical approaches to the 
study of law and refutes their philosophical pretensions.4 The latter part then gives an 
exposition of the characteristics peculiar to philosophical jurisprudence, where Oakeshott’s 
earlier general philosophy is still clearly visible. He declared philosophical thought to be 
“knowledge without reservation or presupposition,” and its aim “to define and establish 
concepts so fully and so completely that nothing remains to be added.”5 Its pursuit is 
“governed by a radical scepticism with regard to every stopping place … every attempt to 
limit the enquiry,”6 so that the task of philosophical explanation is “the relation of its subject 
 
1 W. H. Greenleaf, Oakeshott’s Philosophical Politics (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), 2. 
2 Steven Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 65. 
3 Efraim Podoksik, “Without Purpose or Unity: Moral and Social Life in the Thought of Michael Oakeshott,” 
in The Moral, Social and Political Philosophy of the British Idealists, ed. William Sweet (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2009), 253. 
4 Michael Oakeshott, “The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” in The Concept of a Philosophical 
Jurisprudence: Essays and Reviews, 1926-51, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007), 154-70. 
First published in Politica 3 (1938): 203-22, 345-60. 
5 Ibid., 170. 
6 Ibid., 172. 
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to … the totality of experience because this alone is a self-complete context, a context which 
criticism cannot turn into a text itself requiring a context.”7 Therefore, in terms of subject 
matter and the sceptical impulse, the conception of general philosophy here is apparently 
continuous to Oakeshott’s earlier writings. 
 However, when examined more closely, there are several places which represent the 
beginning of Oakeshott’s gradual movement away from the position held in PAP and EM. In 
particular, there is a new attempt to reflect on the nature of political philosophy as distinct 
from general philosophy. In his earlier writings political philosophy had already been 
subsumed under general philosophy in the sense that it cannot confine its concern to the 
State and other associated political concepts if it is to be thoroughly philosophical. 
Consequently, there was no longer any motivation to investigate the nature of political 
philosophy save as a mere illustration of the characteristics of philosophy in general. 
Nevertheless, after CPJ Oakeshott increasingly narrowed the scope of subject matter in his 
political philosophy. The focus on law and civil society in this article reflects the deliberate 
avoidance of the term “political,” which he had been using interchangeably with “social,” 
but which he now sharply distinguished from it. Certainly, he continued to talk loosely about 
“political” philosophy or the philosophy of “politics” in the next few decades; yet what this 
term means became ever more precise and limited, before political philosophy finally gave 
its name and place to civil philosophy in OHC.8 If we take Oakeshott’s position in PAP and 
EM as already firmly established, then his subsequent changing conceptions of the “political” 
cannot be properly understood. Consequently, we should regard the writings from CPJ 
onwards as his repeated attempt to revive the possibility of a political philosophy which is 
both political and philosophical at the same time, and distinct from philosophy in general. 
This will enable us to see that the later modifications of his general philosophy were 
 
7 Ibid., 175. 
8 Oakeshott, “The Vocabulary of a Modern European State,” in The Vocabulary of a Modern European State: 
Essays and Reviews, 1952-88, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008), 263. First published in 
Political Studies 23, no.107 (1975): 319-41, 409-14. 
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implicitly entailed by the changes he had made to political philosophy. 
 In CPJ, apart from disparaging the philosophical pretensions of the various approaches 
to jurisprudence, Oakeshott also examined several accounts of the philosophical nature of 
political philosophy. Considering the view that the conclusions in political philosophy are a 
special instance of those in ethics, metaphysics, or philosophy in general which are 
established beforehand, Oakeshott argued that in this conception “philosophical 
jurisprudence is philosophical only in a derivative sense, and if it became itself genuinely 
philosophical it would defeat its own ends, it would return into the general philosophical 
theory of which it was an illustration and cease to have any evident connection with law.”9 
This argument not only reflects his aim to justify political philosophy as a sui generis 
discipline rather than something deducible from general philosophy. It also brings out the 
difficult dilemma, ignored in his early general philosophy, between a political philosophy 
remaining genuinely philosophical but irrelevant to politics, and preserving the relevance to 
its specific subject matter but no longer truly philosophical. That Oakeshott wanted to grasp 
both horns of this dilemma is shown by his repudiation of another account which construed 
philosophical jurisprudence as an a priori enterprise. He denied that there is any kind of 
knowledge which is purely a priori or does not begin from some experience already 
understood, no matter how partially and abstractly.10 The progression between different 
modes of enquiry implied in this argument again challenges the qualification of holism and 
the rejection of dialecticism in his early general philosophy. In PAP, for example, 
“[p]hilosophy … needs for its pursuit neither profound knowledge of human nature nor the 
superficial acquaintance with things in general which is called ‘knowledge of the world.’11 
CPJ can thus be regarded as a work of self-critique which characterises most of Oakeshott’s 
writings, especially those unpublished during his life-time. 
 
9 Oakeshott, “Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” 165. 
10 Ibid., 166. 
11  Oakeshott, The Philosophical Approach to Politics, in Early Political Writings, 1925-30, ed. Luke 
O’Sullivan (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2010), 226. 
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 Making the connection closer between political philosophy and the pre-philosophical 
understanding of political life through the progression from the latter to the former, does not 
mean that political philosophy becomes itself a practical endeavour. Oakeshott remained 
committed to the belief that political philosophy should not be put in service of current affairs. 
Distinguishing theory of law from theory of legislation, he maintained as before that “to 
determine the goodness and badness of a law involves a moral judgment which the 
philosopher as such is in no better position to give than any other member of society.”12 
Likewise, the study of law by the sociology of knowledge is deemed unphilosophical; for 
the criterion of sociological judgment turns out to be the extent to which legal institutions 
serve their social functions in the wider spatiotemporal context, which lies outside the 
appropriate concern of philosophy. More generally, Oakeshott repeated, the conclusions of 
any other mode of enquiry should not be taken as they are and accepted as philosophical. In 
his own words, “the notion that it is the business of philosophy to accept the conclusions of 
special enquiries—history, jurisprudence, physics, etc.—and relate them, unchanged, to 
‘general philosophical principles’” unjustly plays down the critical role of philosophy.13 
These comments reaffirmed the essential importance of the philosophical transformation of 
and movement away from those non-philosophical experiences. 
 The emphasis on this logical progression is the main contribution of CPJ to Oakeshott’s 
programme of revising his earlier conception of political philosophy. When he talked about 
relating the subject matter of political philosophy to the totality of experience, he did not 
have in mind the attempt to understand political concepts in the comprehensive context of 
the State. Rather, he was referring to the procedure whereby “the concepts of science, or 
common-sense, or practical life are subjected to the revolutionary and dissolving criticism 
of being related to a universal context,”14 such that the resulting “philosophical concept … 
 
12 Oakeshott, “Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” 167. 
13 Ibid., 168-69. 
14 Ibid., 170. 
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at once comprehends and supersedes the concept given to philosophical enquiry.”15 In 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy, the various modes of experience have nothing to 
contribute to philosophy. By contrast, when the connection between political philosophy and 
the experience of political life is strengthened, the modes provide as the starting point for 
investigation some truth, no matter how abstract or latent, which is later realised more fully 
in philosophy. 
Moreover, although it is the task of philosophy to subvert the abstract concepts given 
to it, “it is incumbent upon the philosopher to show as fully as he can how his redefinition is 
connected with and arises out of the less comprehensive definition with which he began.”16 
In other words, because of the strengthened connection with political life, these modes also 
become necessary stages in the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. In this regard 
Oakeshott even mentioned a hierarchy of different kinds of explanations, and attributes to 
philosophy “the authority inherent in its character to judge the relative completeness of all 
explanations and so make of all explanations a related whole or world.”17 Consequently, 
both the dialecticism and holism about modes of experience, once rejected or qualified in 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy, are now revived to cater to the new demands of his 
political philosophy. 
 This departure from his early general philosophy sometimes led Oakeshott to abandon 
talks about the various modes of experience altogether. In previous quotations, the several 
references to common sense and pre-philosophical experience are a case in point. They do 
not seem to have a place in the logical scheme of EM. Indeed, in the definition of philosophy 
in CPJ, Oakeshott expressly set aside history, science, and even practice, stating that it 
“begins with the concepts of ordinary, every-day knowledge; and it consists in an extended, 
detailed and complete exposition of those concepts, an exposition which is itself a 
 
15 Ibid., 171. 
16 Ibid., 173. 
17 Ibid., 176. 
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definition.”18 At this stage it was still unclear whether in Oakeshott’s view only the pre-
philosophical understanding of politics possessed by ordinary men is the basis for philosophy, 
or whether the starting point of philosophical investigation also includes the historical, 
scientific, or practical understanding of politics as well. Being the first step in the direction 
away from EM, the conclusions of CPJ were soon to be elucidated further and revised again. 
Later it was to became clear that the starting point of philosophy consists primarily in the 
common sense understanding of political life, with references to other modes of thinking 
about politics being no more than a flattering lip service paid to his early general philosophy. 
The holism about modes of experience is thus quickly qualified again. For it does not seem 
to be necessary to Oakeshott’s political philosophy if the connection to be stressed is with 
ordinary knowledge only, rather than history, science, or practice. Similarly, the dialecticism 
about modes of experience, as we will also witness at the end of this section, will be 
significantly qualified when the reference to the totality of experience without 
presupposition is dropped in favour of an even closer connection between political 
philosophy and the experience of political life, from which political philosophy begins but 
which it no longer outrightly contradicts. 
 
2. “The Concept of a Philosophy of Politics” 
 
 “The Concept of a Philosophy of Politics” bears a structurally similar title to “The 
Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” but its date of composition is disputed among 
Oakeshott scholars. The editor of the volume of Oakeshott’s unpublished writings where 
CPP is included, Timothy Fuller, judges that it was written around 1946. On the other hand, 
based on several pages of identical content it shares with CPJ, Gerencser argues that it was 
written in the 1930s.19 Without further external evidence, the interpreter can only form his 
 
18 Ibid., 171. 
19 Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott, 68-69. 
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judgment by scrutinising the texts. If we focus more attention on the differences between 
these two pieces instead of their similarities, it is more plausible to judge that CPP was 
written after CPJ was published in 1938. 
First, in CPJ there is merely the general reference to law and civil society. In contrast, 
in CPP the subject matter is much more precise and specified. This fits better with the pattern 
in which Oakeshott gradually narrowed the scope of concern in his political philosophy. In 
particular, in CPP Oakeshott regarded political philosophy as “a general explanation of the 
character of political life and activity from the standpoint of its purpose and end, as distinct 
from merely social life and activity.” 20  We may recall that in his published writings 
Oakeshott did not distinguish between the “political” and the “social” until the 1939 article 
“The Claims of Politics.” In that article the conclusions of his early political philosophy were 
translated into ordinary language without modification of content, so that the “political” 
activities and the corporate “social” life corresponds perfectly to the philosophical concept 
of government and the State respectively. By contrast, in CPP the distinction between the 
“political” and the “social” are meant to highlight a difference which CPJ avoided to make 
explicit by the general reference to law. Consequently, this comparison favours the case that 
CPP was written after 1939. 
Secondly, in light of Oakeshott’s early general philosophy, what was new in CPJ is the 
examination of a large number of pseudo-philosophical modes of enquiry into law. The 
refutation of the philosophical pretensions of historical, scientific, and practical 
jurisprudence had already been established in EM. Compared to CPJ, CPP does not mention 
any of the various autonomous modes of experience, and only those pseudo-philosophical 
approaches to politics are selected for discussion which more directly exemplify the dilemma 
between being genuinely philosophical and remaining connected to political life. The 
purpose of this shift of emphasis is explicitly expressed in Oakeshott’s summary of the 
 
20 Oakeshott, “The Concept of a Philosophy of Politics,” in Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, ed. Timothy 
Fuller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 120; italics original. 
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defects common to the various pseudo-philosophical approaches to politics: “[i]t is a 
philosophy which, for more than one reason, is not philosophical, and one which, if it became 
genuinely philosophical would cease to have anything to do with politics.”21 As such, this 
difference from CPJ also matches better Oakeshott’s movement away from his early general 
philosophy for the sake of the new demands in his late political philosophy. 
 However, it is insufficient to show that CPP was written after 1938. An upper limit is 
also required. As the next subsection will show, in another unpublished piece of writing 
entitled “Political Philosophy” (ca. 1949), Oakeshott made many significant alterations to 
his earlier conception of political philosophy in CPJ and CPP. If we take this into 
consideration as well, discount the years of the Second World War 1939-45 during which 
Oakeshott served in the army, and allow some time for these drastic changes of opinions to 
occur, then Fuller’s judgment of 1946 is very reasonable. 
Indeed, we can go even further. In CPP’s discussion of three pseudo-philosophical 
approaches to politics, the second is characterised initially as a rationalisation of political 
life. At this time Oakeshott regarded it as a kind of explanatory enterprise and had not 
subjected it to his famous critique of rationalism in politics. He began to talk about the 
rationalisation of political life after he edited the anthology on The Social and Political 
Doctrines of Contemporary Europe in 1939, and did not examine their philosophical defects 
until he published “Rationalism in Politics” in 1947. Therefore, 1946 is perhaps the only 
remaining choice of a reasonable date of composition for CPP. 
 Getting the date of this article right is not only a scholarly point of interest, but also 
enables us to understand the motivation for the continuous changes Oakeshott made to his 
conception of political philosophy. First, the delineation of political philosophy’s scope of 
subject matter gives us some clues to the fortunes of the holism and dialecticism about 
political concepts. In Oakeshott’s own words, the purpose of singling out the political from 
 
21 Ibid., 126. 
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the social is “not to separate political life and activity from everything else in human 
experience and to treat them as if they were sui generis and belonged to a world of their 
own.”22 Rather, it is meant “to distinguish political life and activity within the totality of 
experience; and … to relate them to the totality so that they are seen in their place in the 
totality.”23 Obviously, the holism about political concepts is qualified in this new conception 
of political philosophy’s subject matter. Whereas previously every social institution is under 
its scope of examination, here the social whole or the State appears merely as the contextual 
background against which the true subject matter of political philosophy, now distinguished 
from all other social activities, is to be understood. Thus, even if other fields of human 
activity still have a place in political philosophy, the focus has been shifted to a specific field 
called the “political,” though what this term denotes must await further clarification in 
Oakeshott’s subsequent writings. 
The dialecticism about political concepts is more seriously weakened. In taking all other 
social institutions as a whole instead of examining them individually, it is no longer clear 
whether the political philosopher’s task remains to be the progression from the less concrete 
concepts to the more concrete ones. Besides, after distinguishing political life from social 
life, it is harder to see how the principle of political life, called “sociality” in Oakeshott’s 
early political writings, are already latent in the various forms of social life such that the 
political life is their logical consummation. 
 Secondly, that Oakeshott’s criticism of the various pseudo-philosophical approaches to 
politics highlights their common difficulty of being both philosophical and related to politics 
at the same time, also offers some clues to the way the holism and dialecticism about modes 
of experience are watered down. The first pseudo-philosophical approach is the same as 
discussed in CPJ, where political philosophy is regarded as derivative from general 
philosophy. Oakeshott’s criticism of it is also identical, except that in CPP politics is 
 
22 Ibid., 126-27; italics original. 
23 Ibid., 127; italics original. 
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substituted for law: “it would return into the general philosophical theory from which it was, 
in fact, derived, and cease to have any evident connection with political life and activity.”24 
The second one is more noteworthy. In CPJ the pseudo-philosophical approach to law 
maintains that the conclusions reached in the historical, scientific, or practical thinking about 
law are themselves philosophical conclusions, or at least can serve as the data which 
philosophy must accept as they are. By contrast, the approach to politics criticised in CPP 
insists that the facts of political life to which political philosophy must remain loyal are our 
pre-theoretical understanding of politics. In particular, “by the ‘facts of political life’ is meant 
the character of political life as it is conceived by the ordinary, commonsense observer, the 
observer whose mind is yet unlocked by philosophical speculation.” 25  To be sure, 
Oakeshott’s criticism of approaches of this kind remains the same emphasis on the 
importance of the philosophical transformation of what is given in experience. Nevertheless, 
the difference between what is singled out as given has implications for the attempt to 
overcome the dilemma between being genuinely philosophical and being true to the facts of 
political life. In CPP it follows that that which political philosophy has to keep connected 
with is the common- sensical understanding of political experience, not any autonomous 
modes of enquiry into politics. 
This point is indirectly confirmed by Oakeshott’s criticism of the third approach to 
politics, which is essentially our practical reasoning in political activity. In his own words, 
“philosophical theory does not, in practice, arise from discontent with the present 
organization of society, or dislike of the ends which a particular society seems to be setting 
for itself.26 Therefore, when Oakeshott emphasises the importance of political philosophy 
being related to political life, it is not to be understood as a move which renders his 
conception of political philosophy any the more practical. It is the connection with our 
ordinary understanding of politics that political philosophy must establish or restore. 
 
24 Ibid., 122. 
25 Ibid., 123. 
26 Ibid., 125. 
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 It is useful to recall that granting a privileged status to the practical understanding of 
politics as the starting point of political philosophy requires an explanation if the holism and 
dialecticism about modes of experience had already been rejected in Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy. The temporary revival of this holism and dialecticism in CPJ, in turn, was 
accompanied by an ambiguous but harmless definition concerning the kind of understanding 
which provides the starting point for political philosophy. It is harmless because, provided 
that all modes of explanation are made a related whole or a world, the philosopher will arrive 
at the philosophical understanding wherever he commences his investigation. Similarly, if 
the relative abstractness of each mode of experience can be specified and ordered in a 
hierarchy from the philosophical viewpoint, then the philosopher can know how to proceed 
from whichever mode, and the exact mode to which he is to proceed. Consequently, when 
the holism and dialecticism about modes of experience hold, it does not matter whether the 
starting point of political philosophy is located in any particular mode of experience. In 
contrast, CPP sets all these problems aside. There is no mention of the various modes of 
experience, let alone the holism which makes all of them a related whole. Accordingly, the 
point from which political philosophy departs is neither practical reasoning nor any other 
mode of experience, but simply pre-theoretical common sense about political life. Therefore, 
the dialecticism is remarkably watered down which supersedes the abstractions of one mode 
of experience after another without a definite direction or order, though the reference to the 
Absolute or the totality of experience still makes philosophy subversive of abstract modes 
of understanding. 
 Some early commentators on Oakeshott’s works do not discern that this gradual 
transformation of his views about the nature of political philosophy has consequences for 
his general philosophy as well. Greenleaf, for instance, argues straightforwardly that 
Idealism in general, and Oakeshott’s version in particular, “does not proceed a priori. A 
merely closed system of logically connected elements having no contact with or reference 
to empirical reality will not do at all, for it would be abstract. …. The system of ideas … 
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must be concrete, that is, take account of the facts of experience, none of which can be 
conjured away from the universe.”27 However, as we have seen earlier, it is precisely the 
overemphasis on the concrete whole that leads to the subsumption of political philosophy by 
general philosophy, hence severing the link between political philosophy and its specific 
subject matter, political life. Others are more sensitive to Oakeshott’s implicit worries about 
the lack of connection with ordinary knowledge in his early works. Robert Grant, for 
example, points out that “[w]hat still needs to be explained, and not by reference to some 
transcendent reality or quasi-transcendent Absolute, but in its own, local terms, is the 
everyday, intermediate world of experience. … some such suspicion, while there from the 
start, seems increasingly to have come to the fore in Oakeshott’s thinking …. He has not, 
however, ceased to be an Idealist; he has merely jettisoned the Absolute.”28 Unfortunately, 
how this concern about keeping philosophy related to common sense leads to changes in 
Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy has not been correctly clarified in more recent 
interpretive efforts made by Oakeshott scholars. 
 In particular, as Paul Franco misleadingly claims, in Oakeshott’s early works “[p]lace 
and time are irrelevant to philosophy.”29  However, this spatiotemporal irrelevance has 
nothing to do with Oakeshott’s insistence that philosophy is independent of practical life. To 
see this point, consider contemporary political philosophy in the analytic tradition. Its 
method of research is strictly speaking independent of the spatiotemporal context, and its 
conclusions are mostly meant to be universally valid. Yet it is highly motivated by normative 
issues in practical politics and the potentiality of improving them through the application of 
those conclusions. By contrast, what Oakeshott strived to do in his renewed conceptions of 
political philosophy is to find a way in which political philosophy arises out of its particular 
social and political contexts, but nevertheless remains logically separated from practical 
reasoning in politics. It is therefore a mistake, as made by David Orsi, to think that the 
 
27 Greenleaf, Oakeshott’s Philosophical Politics, 8. 
28 Robert Grant, Oakeshott (London: Claridge, 1990), 27. 
29 Paul Franco, Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 50. 
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ahistorical nature of Oakeshott’s early philosophy prevents it from being practically tied to 
a specific space and time.30 
On the other hand, though Franco correctly points out that Oakeshott “eventually 
abandoned the ahistorical view that time and place are completely irrelevant to political 
philosophy,”31 it is no less confusing to think that political philosophy was made more 
practical after Oakeshott appointed the task of recreating the values of his society to the 
philosopher in “The Claims of Politics.”32 According to Oakeshott’s view in that article, it 
is not the job of the political philosopher to come out of a retreat and apply his philosophical 
insights to the practical reasonings in political life; but to remain where he is, keep being 
true to his own profession, and maintain the self-consciousness of the society to which he 
belongs. Oakeshott’s subsequent writings on the conceptions of political philosophy are 
precisely the attempts to show how it could be possible for political philosophy to arise from 
its spatiotemporal context, and simultaneously guard its genuinely philosophical nature 
against the pollution by the temptation to misunderstand and misapply it to practical politics. 
It is useful to summarise our argument so far. CPJ’s attempt to restore the connection 
between political philosophy and political life results in an overemphasis on the holism and 
dialecticism in general philosophy. The problem inherent in this overemphasis is passed over 
by the more general reference to law. CPP’s main contribution is a more specified scope of 
the subject matter of political philosophy. Once the definition of the “political” is narrowed, 
the holism and dialecticism about political concepts is significantly weakened. In hindsight, 
the disappearance of the State or the social whole makes Oakeshott’s political philosophy 
more closely linked with political experience, for the dialectical progression stops at the 
tensions between the ideal types of civil association and enterprise association which are in 
turn extrapolated from the political history of modern Europe. To explain this refusal to go 
 
30 Davide Orsi, Michael Oakeshott’s Political Philosophy of International Relations: Civil Association and 
International Society (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 29-34. 
31 Franco, Michael Oakeshott, 50. 
32 Ibid., 79-80. 
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further in the philosophical investigation requires a parallel modification of the holism and 
dialecticism in his general philosophy. In CPP, the importance of the various modes of 
experience is replaced by the common sense, ordinary understanding of politics in order to 
make even closer the connection between political philosophy and political experience. 
Nevertheless, there is still the reference to the Absolute or the totality of experience. This 
cannot do justice to the fact that the philosophical character of political philosophy now 
consists more in the movement away from pre-theoretical understanding about politics than 
in the arrival at a comprehensive context of the State. Therefore, the next step is to remove 
the Absolute in his general philosophy for the sake of the changes in his political philosophy 
brought about by the attempt to delimit the definition of “politics.” 
 
3. “Political Philosophy” 
 
How these changes in political philosophy finally led Oakeshott to jettison the Absolute 
in his general philosophy can be observed in the unpublished piece entitled “Political 
Philosophy,” which Fuller dates between 1946 and 1950. If we compare the content of this 
essay with Oakeshott’s book reviews around this time, especially the metaphorical figure of 
ascending a tower,33 it is reasonable to judge that this piece was written after he read J. D. 
Mabbott’s The State and the Citizen and reviewed that book in 1949.34 More importantly, 
taking into consideration the patterns of Oakeshott’s writings in the late 1940s, it is evident 
that the role of PP is to take stock of his earlier attempts to revise his general philosophy for 
the sake of the new demands made in his new conception of political philosophy. 
We have seen that Oakeshott’s emphasis on the connection between political 
philosophy and our common sense understanding of political life became increasingly 
highlighted in CPJ and CPP. However, the tensions between this emphasis and the position 
 
33 Oakeshott, “Political Philosophy,” in Timothy Fuller, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, 142. 
34 Oakeshott, “The State and the Citizen,” review of The State and the Citizen, by J. D. Mabbott, in Luke 
O’Sullivan, Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence, 256. First published in Mind 58 (1949): 378-89. 
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he held in his earlier general philosophy had not been made explicit. In PP the purpose is 
unequivocally to rebut his earlier claim in general philosophy: in order to be thoroughly 
philosophical, political philosophy has to go beyond its confined attention to the State or the 
social whole, investigate all other questions of philosophy the answers to which it has to 
presuppose, and finally become submerged by philosophy in general. The following passage 
is an important evidence of this rebuttal that deserves a fuller quotation: 
 
The enterprise in philosophy is to spread one’s sails to the reflective impulse; in political 
philosophy it is to do this starting from a mooring-place of political experience. But if 
this were all, the thread which attaches political philosophy to political activity would 
be tenuous and soon broken—indeed, it would be the avowed purpose of political 
philosophy to break it. And the thread once broken, and the mooring-place soon out of 
sight and out of mind, political philosophy on the high seas of reflection would be 
indistinguishable from philosophical enterprises emanating from other ports of origin—
from religious, from scientific or from artistic experience. But this is not quite all that 
is to be said. If to break the thread that attaches it to its mooring, if to remain 
unencumbered by our allegiance to what was first perceived or to what was perceived 
at a lower level, is the first task of philosophical reflection, there is a second and not 
less significant task—to explore and to record that process of mediation by which the 
scene at one level passes into the scene at another and higher level. … Political 
philosophy, then, may be said to be the genuine, unhindered impulse of reflection, 
setting out from a political experience, and keeping faith with the original experience, 
not by continuous conformity to it, but by reason of an unbroken descent.35 
 
It may be noticed that here in PP philosophy is no longer associated with the most concrete 
 
35 Oakeshott, “Political Philosophy,” 153. 
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definition of things, the totality of experience, or the comprehensive context which cannot 
be turned into a text itself requiring yet another context to comprehend its meaning. In 
contrast, in CPJ and CPP references to a related whole or the universal context are fairly 
frequently made, with several pages devoted to explaining that philosophical concepts or 
definitions are characteristically new, categorical, affirmative and indicative.36 
The new development of general philosophy in PP follows quite naturally from the new 
conception of political philosophy. We have seen that political philosophy is political not in 
virtue of being identified with a set of political conclusions or accepting them as they are, 
but in virtue of a connection with political experience from which it dialectically springs. 
Likewise, neither is political philosophy philosophical in virtue of being identified with a set 
of philosophical conclusions, but in virtue of the dialectical impulse to depart from whatever 
is temporarily arrived at and accepted. Therefore, the importance of keeping political 
philosophy connected with political experience eventually led Oakeshott to trim his earlier 
conception of general philosophy. In PP he made it clear that it is no longer profitable to take 
the philosophical nature of political philosophy as consisting in detecting “the permanent 
character of political activity,” or recognizing “the activity in politics in its place on the map 
of the intelligible universe,” or even determining the meaning of political experience in its 
context; these characterisations are replaced by the emphasis on philosophy as a relentless 
activity of dialectical understanding.37 In the metaphor of ascending a tower, “[t]here is no 
top to this tower, or at least the philosopher has no means of knowing whether or not he has 
reached the top,”38 so that “he is a philosopher not in respect to something he achieves at 
the end, but in respect of his predisposition towards the ascent.”39 
 With the Absolute fading away, the specification of political philosophy’ subject matter 
can only be preliminary and unstable, to be revised and superseded as the philosophical 
 
36 Oakeshott, “Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence,” 172-74; Oakeshott, “Concept of a Philosophy of 
Politics,” 129-31. 
37 Oakeshott, “Political Philosophy,” 151. 
38 Ibid., 143. 
39 Ibid., 144. 
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investigation proceeds. “Politics,” said Oakeshott casually, “are the means by which the 
institutional expression of approval and disapproval is adjusted to the gradual shift of 
judgment, and the means by which the integrity of the methods of satisfaction is 
preserved.”40 This is by far the most precise definition of the “political” Oakeshott had 
offered, and he was to refine it as he became increasingly versed in the political experience 
of modern Europe. 
However, after the aim to relate political activity to the totality of experience gives place 
to the persistent dissatisfaction with whatever conclusions are temporarily reached, it is no 
longer clear whether the holism and dialecticism about political concepts still survive in this 
new conception of political philosophy, and if they do survive, to what extent. Judging from 
Oakeshott’s review of Mabbott’s book, it is safe to say that at this stage he still adhered to 
the conclusions in his early political philosophy: examples include the concept of the 
individual and the concept of the State leading to the same dialectical destination41 and the 
philosophical identity between the individual’s action and the State’s action.42 As we shall 
see later, as the State gradually recedes into inscrutable background in Oakeshott’s late 
political philosophy, the holism and dialecticism do not so much disappear as become 
enshrined again in the ideas of civil and enterprise associations and their corresponding 
associates, the individual and the anti-individual; though, of course, this has moved far from 
the ambition to construct a political philosophy by attending to those institutions which are 
“of far greater importance in our social life, such as the family, the school, marriage, war, 
property and the rest.”43 
 As to the holism and dialecticism about modes of experience, the metaphor of the tower 
provides clearer clues to Oakeshott’s revised position.44 The relative heights of different 
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42 Ibid., 257. 
43 Oakeshott, “The Cambridge School of Political Science,” in What Is History? and Other Essays, ed. Luke 
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kinds of enquiry are unimportant in distinguishing philosophy, whose unique feature is the 
peculiarly radical transformation of the view seen after ascending from the previous level of 
understanding. Therefore, the holistic task mentioned in CPJ of assigning varying degrees 
of concreteness to the various modes of experience and relating them as a whole, loses its 
point. Moreover, Oakeshott finally clarified that every kind of enquiry including philosophy 
itself begins from the ground floor of common sense, so that the dialectical procedures are 
present in every mode of enquiry. But philosophy is different not because the philosopher is 
“prepared to go on where the others are content to stop,”45 not because, as in EM, he 
proceeds from any other modes of experience and goes beyond them till it can go no further. 
Rather, while every kind of enquiry begins from common sense, in philosophy what is 
identified in common sense is not merely preserved and made more intelligible, related, and 
wider in the next level, but also transformed into another thing in that level. 
 It is time to take stock of our argument in this section so far. The emphasis on the 
connection between political philosophy and political experience results in the abandonment 
of the Absolute as the defining hallmark of philosophical activity. This abandonment will in 
turn make political philosophy and political experience closer than before, especially 
through the emphasis on the preservation of political experience in the course of 
philosophical investigation. After all, if the Absolute can no longer serve as an intelligible 
conclusion which philosophical activity ultimately reaches, neither does it make sense to say 
that philosophy is a radical subversion of common sense or a thorough transformation of 
ordinary knowledge. Furthermore, if the Absolute is inscrutable, taking it as the aimed 
criterion instead of the final product makes no difference: either way the direction towards 
which philosophy moves has already become opaque. The next section will show that 
eventually Oakeshott did not live up to this qualified task he himself set to political 





than other approaches to understanding politics, but this plane does not seem to be higher or 
more transformative than other ones. Consequently, the theoretical exposition of the 
postulates of civitas is strictly speaking not a radical subversion of the character of civil 
association but a distillation thereof, which is likewise extrapolated from the societas in the 
political experience of modern Europe in the first place. 
 
4. Political Philosophy before On Human Conduct 
 
 After PP, there are many apparently “political” essays paving the way for Oakeshott’s 
late political philosophy in OHC. This subsection briefly considers the continuity between 
these writings, and argues that it is a mistake to excavate any evidence from these writings 
to illustrate Oakeshott’s ideological position vis-à-vis the context of political history. 
 The first of such “political” essays was probably The Politics of Faith and the Politics 
of Scepticism, judged by Fuller to be written in 1952.46 This is a very reliable judgment. As 
the next chapter will show, beginning in 1947, Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism in politics 
is logically completed by Political Education in 1952. This development in his general 
philosophy does not reflect the changes in his political philosophy which we have just 
examined. Rather, it is more an exploration of the themes implicit in EM than an amendment 
of the original position, which was not carried out until The Voice of Poetry in the 
Conversation of Mankind in 1959. Similar to his earliest religious writings associated with 
his general philosophy, the motivation for this exploration is not primarily philosophical, but 
arises from the need of a philosophical underpinning for Oakeshott’s political polemic 
against current ideological developments. Between 1952 and 1958, he was preoccupied with 
constructing a political philosophy in accordance with his revised account of the nature of 
this academic discipline. Only after this period did the need to revise his general philosophy 
 
46 Timothy Fuller, introduction to The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996), ix. 
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according to the demands of his renewed political philosophy become the priority in 
Oakeshott’s intellectual endeavours. 
By contrast, there is a view widely shared by commentators that PFPS and other similar 
subsequent writings are a political extension of the development in Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy, that the critique of the politics of faith is continuous with the earlier critique of 
rationalism in politics, and that this is a transition from the epistemological arguments to 
moral or political ones.47 However, if our analysis has been on the right track so far, this 
interpretation is not quite adequate. Despite apparent continuities, the critique of rationalism 
and the enquiry into two ideal types of the nature of government have different subject 
matters, and serve different purposes in Oakeshott’s political and general philosophy, 
respectively. 
 As the attributed title suggests, PFPS sets out to outline the ideal types of the politics 
of faith and the politics of scepticism extracted from the political experience of modern 
Europe. In the very beginning, Oakeshott significantly confessed his hesitation about the 
genre to which this work should belong.48 It is neither philosophical, nor historical, nor 
practical, though all of them may seem involved in it. In fact, in light of our previous 
discussion about the emphasis on the connection between political philosophy and political 
life, it is not surprising that Oakeshott was reluctant to attribute the starting point of his 
philosophical investigation to any kind of thinking. This starting point is simply our ordinary, 
pre-theoretical knowledge of politics, not any mode of experience. Although in PFPS he did 
proceed somewhat from this common sense understanding and gave it some philosophical 
reflection, Oakeshott began to feel that the term “philosophy” retains an unwanted 
connotation of something ultimately achieved. This explains his uncertainty about regarding 
this preliminary comment on modern European political experience as unreservedly 
philosophical. In other words, the general philosophy presupposed in PFPS is largely in line 
 
47 For example, see Franco, Michael Oakeshott, 107-8. 
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with Oakeshott’s earlier development of the conception of political philosophy in CPJ, CPP, 
and PP. 
 Concerning the substantive content of political philosophy, as Terry Nardin correctly 
perceives, Oakeshott began to define “politics” ever more narrowly. 49  This is also 
continuous with the trend in Oakeshott’s thought outlined in the previous three subsections. 
In particular, the scope of analysis is now limited to government rather than the State, and 
especially concerned with the office of government instead of the constitution of its 
authority.50 This qualification of dialecticism undoubtedly strikes a stark contrast with his 
early complaint about contemporary literature’s unhealthy focus on governmental 
institutions, to the neglect of the wider social life in terms of which the ends of government 
should be understood. Nevertheless, a more confined and specific conception of the 
“political” also enables Oakeshott to distinguish his position from that of his appointed 
intellectual predecessors such as Locke, Berkeley, Shaftesbury, Halifax, and Hume. In 
Oakeshott’s opinion, it is unfortunate that these thinkers connected the voice of scepticism 
with the whole field of human conduct when in fact it is appropriate to politics only.51 
This conclusion paves the way for Oakeshott’s famous 1956 lecture “On Being 
Conservative.” He began from the observation that the conservative attitude in general is 
particularly conducive to attending to general rules of conduct.52 Political conservatism is 
then justified locally and contingently by the fact that the British people traditionally 
understand the activity of governing as primarily a matter of upholding such non-substantive 
and non-instrumental rules.53 Any other argument appealing to natural rights or the Natural 
Law is rejected not because they are flawed, but because they are not necessary. 
OBC has a long pedigree of being acclaimed as perhaps the most ingenious and unusual 
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defence of conservatism in twentieth century political thought. In contrast, more recent 
commentators, such as Efraim Podoksik, argue that its nature is essentially philosophical 
rather than ideological.54 While agreeing that this and other apparently political essays are 
not primarily practical, we must be careful about the sense in which it is understood as 
philosophical. Stuart Issacs, for instance, points out that the concepts of law, tradition, 
pursuit of intimations, etc. appearing in this essay are not political at all, but have their 
origins in Oakeshott’s early general philosophy. In his own words, “[t]he mistake should not 
be made of taking what is being said here as a ‘political’ statement in favour of a kind of 
‘conservatism.’ Rather, this is a philosophical understanding put forward on the basis of a 
theory of human action and knowledge.”55 However, this view ignores Oakeshott’s earlier 
efforts in restoring political philosophy’s connection with political life without 
compromising its genuinely philosophical character. The alleged continuity between 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy and OBC is therefore spurious. Besides, in light of 
Oakeshott’s newly acquired uncertainty about philosophy construed in terms of the 
ultimately concrete definition of concepts, it is unfounded to take these concepts as 
straightforwardly philosophical or logical. Instead, in accordance with his updated account 
of philosophy as primarily a dialectical movement from ordinary understanding, this essay 
is philosophical as far as it serves as the point of departure for Oakeshott’s late political 
philosophy. This is the sense in which we should understand why the argument in OBC 
begins from a common sensical concern “with ourselves as we are,”56 rather than some 
foundation of “a theory of human action and knowledge” accepted from the very outset as it 
is. As before, the continuity between OBC and Oakeshott’s earlier writings does not consist 
primarily in his general philosophy, but in his political philosophy. 
 Turning to the substantive content of Oakeshott’s development in political philosophy 
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again, by 1957 it had become clear that these and other arguments extrapolated from our 
ordinary knowledge of the political experience in modern Europe were in effect a preparation 
for a political philosophy in the future. “The Masses in Representative Democracy” offers a 
sketch of the individual, and the individual manqué who fails to live up to the moral 
requirements of individuality and out of jealousy and hatred turns himself into the anti-
individual. If we feel perplexed about the shift of focus from government to individual, we 
may recall the holism about political concepts in which this is precisely the other route to 
the same destination. The anti-individual and the individual are simply theoretical correlates 
of the two divergent conceptions of the office of government examined previously in 
PFPS.57 With the concept of the State as the totality of political experience having faded 
away, the philosophical identification of the self with the State is naturally replaced by the 
theoretical correspondence between the moral life of the individual and the anti-individual, 
and the nature of the office of different kinds of governments. Again, MRD might be 
considered as a criticism directed at the totalitarian regimes extending from Oakeshott’s 
earlier critique of rationalism in politics. About the latter and its ideological implications 
more will be said in the next chapter on Oakeshott’s late general philosophy. However, even 
if the practical significance of this essay could be revealed by his contemporary political 
context, by itself it belongs more properly to Oakeshott’s political philosophy than his 
general philosophy. 
The Harvard Lectures delivered in 1958 made this point even clearer. The second 
chapter of Morality and Politics in Modern Europe incorporates Oakeshott’s earlier sketch 
of the morality of the individual and that of the anti-individual. Its inclusion in a lecture on 
the history of modern political thought is based on its importance as a context to which “the 
political reflection of modern Europe may be referred in order to make it intelligible.”58 
 
57 Oakeshott, “The Masses in Representative Democracy,” in Rationalism in Politics, 363-83. First published 
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Nevertheless, “moral and political beliefs and sentiments usually develop in interaction with 
one another. Consequently, they may be used to elucidate one another as text and context.”59 
From this it is reasonable to judge that the absence of the State does not make Oakeshott’s 
late political philosophy depart from the Idealist style of argumentation, but only renders its 
holism somewhat weaker. 
With regard to the definition of “politics,” Gerencser seizes upon Oakeshott’s slip of 
the tongue that it is “an activity … of determining the manner and the matter of 
government”60 and argues that in MPME Oakeshott’s conception of the “political” still 
includes both the constitution and the office of government, whereas later in OHC the scope 
is further narrowed to the office of government only.61 However, if we take into account the 
actual content of MPME, the subject matter of political philosophy is clearly concerned 
merely with the activity of governing or what the government does. This is continuous with 
PFPS which we have just examined above. 
 Turning again to the presupposed general philosophy, though he had previously 
characterised philosophical activity by virtue of its dialectical movement, Oakeshott still 
kept talking about texts and contexts here in MPME, about concrete concepts in his critique 
of rationalism in politics (to be considered in the next chapter), and about the totality of 
experience in his lectures on the history of political thought during the 1960s.62 In those 
lectures in particular, political philosophy is said to be “an attempt to explain political 
activity and the experience of governing and being governed by elucidating its place on the 
map of human activity in general.”63 But these characterisations of philosophy had earlier 
been set aside by Oakeshott as the secondary or at most derivative features of philosophical 
activity. This discontinuity can be understood with the help of hindsight provided by OHC. 
In this comparison, Oakeshott’s preliminary comments on the political experience of modern 
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Europe made between the 1950s and the 1960s do not seem to undergo radical 
transformation in his final philosophical construction of civitas. On the contrary, the 
philosophical exposition in OHC appears more like something which parallels the 
experience of political life. Therefore, in the process of strengthening the connection 
between his political philosophy and our common sense understanding of politics, it is likely 
that Oakeshott softened his emphasis on the radical subversive nature of philosophy. As a 
result, the conclusions of a platform of understanding, denigrated especially in PP, regain its 
importance in Oakeshott’s late political philosophy. The discontinuity in question thus 
exemplifies the transition from Oakeshott’s post-war self-critical essays to the mature 
position of OHC. As the next section will illustrate, this is also the reason why he in the end 
felt reluctant to pursue the dialectical impulse unceasingly, leaving the theoretical 
contradictions between civil association and enterprise association as they are, which in turn 
reflect the differences between societas and universitas in our ordinary experience of 
political activity. 
 This brings us to the related issue of Oakeshott’s interest in Hobbes. Many Oakeshott 
scholars argue that his late political philosophy is heavily influenced by his interpretation of 
Hobbes, which seriously disparaged the Idealist legacy inherited by the early Oakeshott. 
Gerencser, for instance, claims that “as Oakeshott turned his attention to political philosophy, 
his understanding of Hobbes played a strong role in the development of the themes and 
expression of that political philosophy.”64 In contrast, Kenneth B. McIntyre is the minority 
who maintains that Oakeshott’s essays on Hobbes constitutes no evidence of his departure 
from Idealism, but should be understood as “manifestations of Oakeshott’s historical interest 
in, and theoretical affinity with, the traditions of modern individualism and nomocracy.”65 
Based on our previous discussion, it is improper to take Oakeshott’s preliminary 
observations of political experience in modern Europe as strictly speaking history. 
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Nevertheless, we can certainly judge that the attention he paid to the texts of political thought, 
ranging from the livres de circonstance and ideological doctrines to the more sophisticated 
philosophical reflections on politics, is precisely derived from his conception of the nature 
of political philosophy, updated to be sure, but never the less Idealist. Furthermore, if this 
effort is contrasted with Oakeshott’s youthful, confident remark that “[a] philosopher is not, 
as such, a scholar” and that “philosophy, more often than not, has foundered in learning,”66 
it is ironical that the political philosophy at the hands of the mature Oakeshott culminating 
in On Human Conduct is not influenced by merely Hobbes’ theory as it is, but is indeed 
founded in learning. 
 
III. The Ideological Image of On Human Conduct 
 
 The previous long section has provided a fuller picture of the way Oakeshott gradually 
revised his earlier view on the nature of political philosophy and, after this revision had been 
roughly settled, his initial construction of such a political philosophy. The next chapter will 
clarify how Oakeshott adapted his general philosophy according to the needs of his renewed 
political philosophy. In this section, we deal with his completion of this political philosophy 
in OHC, and search for an adequate interpretation of the practical messages implicit in this 
book which is at once philosophical, highly sophisticated, and remote from political issues 
of the day. 
 The political philosophy in OHC has been scrutinised and criticised by a plethora of 
commentators to the extent that it seems redundant to rehearse all of Oakeshott’s arguments 
and conclusions as he originally presented them. For our purposes, suffice it to say firstly 
that, in the last of the three long essays composing this book, Oakeshott gives his final 
version of our ordinary knowledge about the experience of governing and being governed in 
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modern Europe since medieval times. The sources of materials include not only the common 
sensical understanding of politics, but also ideological doctrines which rationalise our 
experience of political life for either explanatory or practical purposes, as well as the truly 
philosophical attempts to make our political activity intelligible. Clearly, as such the 
conclusions reached in this essay fall far short of being purely philosophical (for which we 
must look in Oakeshott’s second essay of OHC). 
The general thesis of this quasi-historical survey is that the states in modern European 
politics have always been a mixture of the two extreme poles of civil association and 
enterprise association.67 In the former, a state is construed as an association composed of a 
set of non-instrumental rules of conduct in subscription to which the associates are free to 
pursue their self-chosen ends. In the latter, a state is taken to be associated for the sake of the 
collective pursuit of religious, economic, or other kinds of substantial end, from which the 
content of laws derives and to which the associates are expected to contribute whole-
heartedly. Both, however, are ideal types in terms of the office of government, and cannot 
be unconditionally realised in any actual state because of the contingent factors in human 
association.68 The inevitable existence of wars, for example, qualifies civil association’s 
non-purposive nature by introducing the necessity for mobilisation or other national 
measures of preparation;69 and a purely enterprise association is inherently unstable against 
the background of modern Europe when the morality of individuality has been on the rise.70 
 In the second essay, Oakeshott presented a philosophical investigation of the postulates 
of civil association. Since there is no longer any talk of the complete concept of the State or 
the social whole, civitas is strictly speaking a theoretical concept about what we ordinarily 
understand as government. Here Oakeshott even abandoned the term “philosophy” which 
might suggest the kind of experience without arrest or reservation in his early general 
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philosophy. Instead, in accordance with his new conception of political philosophy as a 
dialectical activity beginning from and moving beyond the common sense understanding of 
politics, what makes the conclusions about civitas in the second essay theoretical is primarily 
their progression from the platform of understanding in the third essay to a higher one, and 
the transformation they have gone through. Furthermore, in this transformation there is 
almost no coverage on the overcoming of contradictions encountered in the previous 
platform of understanding. The emphasis is placed on the excavation of the postulates 
presupposed by the theoretical concept of civitas, such as agency, freedom, morality, and so 
forth. The main task becomes to rid this theoretical concept of those contingent factors which 
happen to coexist with the government of actual states, but are logically speaking irrelevant 
or inessential to our understanding of civitas. 71  Obviously, this falls far short of the 
dialectical reconciliation of the tensions between apparently antithetical concepts which 
radically subverts our ordinary common sense in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy. 
 There is now a general agreement among commentators that Oakeshott’s theoretical 
treatment of civitas cannot be compared to Hegel’s concept of the State in terms of the latter’s 
scope and richness, and that Oakeshott’s interpretation of Hegel in the final essay of OHC is 
a distillation of what is theoretically useful to his own exposition of the lineage of civil 
association. Paul Franco, for example, notes that “[w]here Hegel sees a linear evolution 
toward individuality and societas, Oakeshott sees a tension between societas and 
universitas.”72 Similarly, Podoksik argues that “Oakeshott seems to downplay [Hegel’s 
philosophy’s] holistic and teleological aspects, in which the idea of Right reaches its 
dialectical completion in the system of customs, laws and beliefs of a particular society.”73 
More sensitive to the intellectual context of Oakeshott’s writings, James Alexander 
recognises that one of the reasons for which Oakeshott deems Hegel’s use of the word Staat 
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injudicious is the worry about the confusion caused in referring to both the philosophical 
idea and its contingent counterparts by the same term; nevertheless, the deeper reason is that 
Oakeshott’s exposition is actually a watered-down version of Hegel’s position. “For by 
distinguishing two philosophical conceptions by which he supposed the merely contingent 
state was to be ideally understood, Oakeshott was declaring that the state itself was not 
something which could be considered an unconditional philosophical conception—nor, for 
that matter, was it an unconditional actuality.”74 Based on our analysis in the previous 
section, this follows quite reasonably from Oakeshott’s revised conception of political 
philosophy. The next chapter will illustrate how this change in his political philosophy brings 
about similar alterations in his general philosophy as laid out in the first essay of OHC. 
Concerning the fate of the holism and dialecticism about political concepts, here it became 
obvious that the various social institutions apart from the individual and the government are 
generally considered at most as a conglomerate of contextual background,75 rather than the 
imperfect but necessary stages of dialectical progression culminating in the concept of the 
State. Comparing this aspect of Oakeshott’s political philosophy with that of Hegel’s, 
Alexander clarifies that “even though the state only emerged in the third part of the 
Philosophy of Right it was taken to be the actual precondition of those elements of right 
which preceded it dialectically, such as property, contract, morality, family and civil 
society—and it was, in addition, not merely the guarantee of freedom, as it was for Oakeshott, 
but the substantiality of freedom.”76 
 Whilst Oakeshott’s skilful manipulation of Hegel and his departure from the latter’s 
philosophical treatment of the State have been demonstrated manifestly by secondary 
literature, the relation between OHC and his early political philosophy has not received a 
balanced assessment and fair criticism. Exceptions are few. Stuart Isaacs, for example, 
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argues that the individualism in Oakeshott’s works are not political nor liberal but have 
always been philosophical from the beginning to the end of his academic career.77 More 
recently Nehal Bhuta recognises in passing that the conclusions about the State are not totally 
disposed of in Oakeshott’s late political philosophy, but at most undergo a process of 
deflation; that the self and society being mutually constitutive reappears in the mutual 
constitution of the individual and civil association (and, we may add, of the anti-individual 
and enterprise association) is an important evidence.78 We have seen that this mutuality was 
clearly illustrated in MPME and MRD, which is here incorporated into the last essay of OHC. 
In light of this continuity, Luke O’Sullivan’s judgment that the individual is no longer 
a metaphysical entity in Oakeshott’s later works in contradistinction to his earlier ones, can 
be misleading.79 Of course, the individual as it is discussed in the last essay of OHC is not 
a theoretical concept. Yet, as we have also noted, neither does it belong to the mode of 
practical reasoning. When Oakeshott referred to individuality as the dominant form of moral 
life,80 he was not recommending it to us as a normative ideal to be pursued in our practical 
lives, but merely articulating our ordinary knowledge about the actual experience of politics 
in the past from which he later proceeded to another platform of theoretical understanding. 
A similar mistake is made by Podoksik when he claims that Oakeshott’s philosophical 
account of civil association is a defence of individuality which purges the tradition of 
liberalism of unnecessary incoherence.81 By itself the theoretical analysis of civitas cannot 
entail any prescriptive conclusions concerning practical politics, as Oakeshott had always 
emphasised. In addition, the proposition that the self is the State in his early political 
philosophy still holds in the mutual relationship between cives and civitas. Indeed, were 
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Oakeshott to embark on the task of investigating the postulates of the theoretical counterpart 
of enterprise association, he would certainly affirm its interrelationship with the 
corresponding theoretical concepts of anti-individual. Therefore, if there are any practical 
suggestions implicit in Oakeshott’s works, they reside neither in his presentation of our 
experience of political life in modern history, nor in his theoretical account of that experience. 
Rather, they are embodied in his deliberate choice to theorise about civil association only 
and to leave enterprise association as it is, even though the latter is as partially exemplified 
in modern European states as the former. As we shall see towards the end of this section, this 
is an important clue to understanding the way Oakeshott’s philosophical writings are 
politically relevant without giving us any practical recommendations. 
 Related to the issue of individualism is the question of whether in his late political 
philosophy Oakeshott abandoned the attribution of a substantive end or purpose to the 
concept of the State in his early political philosophy. Concerning OHC, there is a similar 
confusion in secondary literature about an alleged departure from Idealism on Oakeshott’s 
part. Franco, for instance, argues that in his late political philosophy Oakeshott rejected the 
teleological implications of a substantive purpose of the State found in his early political 
philosophy.82 This early talk of the end of the State is further compared with Oakeshott’s 
late interpretation of Aristotle, where Aristotle’s notion of the good life or human excellence 
is understood as a formal condition instead of a substantive purpose; an interpretation, just 
as in the case of Hegel, which accords well to Oakeshott’s own position in political 
philosophy.83 
However, the reference to Oakeshott’s view about Aristotle rather than to Aristotle 
himself should remind us that this formal interpretation applies equally well to the discussion 
about the end of the State or the social whole in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy. There, 
we may recall, one of the philosophical conclusions is that the action of the individual is the 
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action of the State in the sense the individual, in performing that action, contributes also to 
the end of the State. It would be wrong to take this as a version of enterprise association, for 
this is precisely the kind of misunderstanding which Oakeshott had always hoped to avoid 
by repeatedly disclaiming any implications of the enslavement of the individual by the State 
in his early writings. In fact, as one searches in vain for any determinate specification of the 
nature of the end of the State, such as the religious or economic ones associated with 
enterprise association, one begins to suspect that this, too, is a formal, philosophical notion 
awaiting further theoretical explication which has nothing to do with any of the practical 
purposes pursued by actual instances of enterprise association. For example, in CPP 
Oakeshott said: 
 
A philosophy of politics may plausibly be supposed to undertake the task of 
representing political life as activity in pursuit of some end, and the task of analysing 
the general concept of an end; but this is quite different from the actual determination 
of which among many presented ends political activity might choose. And if a genuine 
philosophy of politics rejects, for example, happiness as the end in political activity, 
and substitutes ‘self-realization,’ what it is asserting is not that happiness and self-
realization are two possible ends in political activity and that self-realization ought to 
be preferred, but that happiness is a false analysis of the end actually sought and that 
self-realization is a true analysis.84 
 
Hence, if the mutual constitution of the self and the State is transformed into that of the 
individual and civil association after Oakeshott updated his conception of political 
philosophy, we should expect that a similar transformation occurs in the end of the State 
after the State is replaced by the tensions between civil association and enterprise association. 
 
84 Oakeshott, “Concept of a Philosophy of Politics,” 125. 
113 
 
To avoid further confusion, we may say that the real issue here is about the significance or 
value of political life. Consequently, what Oakeshott maintains in OHC is that it is false to 
analyse the significance or value of civil association in terms of the existence of any 
substantive purpose collectively pursued because the true meaning of civil association 
consists in its respect for the formal postulates of human agency such as freedom. This, if 
formulated in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy, is precisely the “end” of civil 
association; though from the perspective of the late Oakeshott, this manner of speaking had 
invited too many irrelevant misunderstandings. 
 Stressing the continuities between Oakeshott’s early and late political philosophy, of 
course, does not mean overlooking the alterations his position underwent. Although the 
philosophical task of examining the end of the State continued to occupy Oakeshott’s mind 
in his exposition of the end of civil association, the changed scope of analysis naturally leads 
to different conclusions. Take his discussion about the relation between law and morality as 
an example. In Oakeshott’s early political philosophy, law as the means of government does 
not enforce morality not because its content is undesirable, but because its imposition is 
logically beyond the capability of law. This position is formulated into the proposition that 
might is right. Similarly, in OHC moral right and wrong do not belong to the business of law 
not because its prescriptions are objectionable, but because its enforcement is incompatible 
with the philosophical character of law. However, the discontinuities loom larger when we 
look into the specific reasons supporting this identification of might with right. Earlier, it is 
precisely because the State or the social whole desires that the morality be enforced that the 
law of government, as part of the State, refuses to interfere with that to which its interference 
would be detrimental. As a result, this refusal itself constitutes the contribution made by law 
to the end of the social whole, namely the maintenance of moral standards. By contrast, after 
the comprehensive concept of the State is replaced by that of civil association, the 
indifference of law to morality can no longer be understood as equally concerned with the 
promotion of moral codes, not least because the collective pursuit of substantive purposes 
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like this has no place in the true analysis of the end of civil association. 
 On the other hand, it is true that law, as a part of civil association, contributes to its end 
by remaining aloof from the advocacy of any particular standard of morality. This end is the 
moral life of individualism which Oakeshott made great efforts to distinguish from its 
popular vulgarisations and misunderstandings.85 Therefore, by confining his theoretical 
investigation to the concept of civitas, Oakeshott does not immediately contradict his earlier 
analysis of the end of the State. Civitas is only a part of our social life. Indeed, the other 
social institutions apart from it are more properly understood in terms of an analogy to 
enterprise association. What requires an explanation is not that Oakeshott’s account of civil 
association differs from his earlier exposition of the State; different subject matters of course 
demand different analyses and conclusions. Rather, what is more important is, again, why in 
his late political philosophy he chose to focus on government and left all other social 
institutions untouched. Had he also presented a theoretical discussion of the concept 
corresponding to enterprise association, it would have been made clear that the law of civil 
association contributes as much to the maintenance of moral standards through refusing to 
interfere with them because their enforcement belongs to the logical territory of other social 
institutions than civil association. As Franco points out, in Oakeshott’s rehearsal of his 
arguments of political philosophy in “The Rule of Law” published in 1983, “[h]is remarks 
about justice … about the desirability of a civil association’s reflecting the moral-legal self-
understanding of its members indicate that he does not seek to sever law completely from 
morality.”86 The impression of a strict separation between law and morality is in part caused 
by the concentrated attention to civil association in OHC. In fact, they are separated from 
each other only in the limited context of civil association. 
 It may be countered that, in the absence of the holistic context of the State, law is 
certainly detached from morality, and even if we take into consideration the unanalysed 
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context of all other social institutions, the logical nature of law in civil association cannot be 
said to contribute to the end of any enterprise associations because of their contrary attitudes 
towards the collective pursuit of substantive ends. This returns us to Oakeshott’s departure 
from Hegel. If we can understand the reason behind Oakeshott’s reluctance to supersede the 
contradictions between civil and enterprise associations and the contingently inevitable 
mixture of them in the actual modern European states, we will also be able to understand the 
ideological image implicit in his late political philosophy and the way it is conveyed. 
 In the final pages of OHC, Oakeshott reflected on the temptation to go beyond the 
analysis of civil association. It is acknowledged that the ideal types of civil and enterprise 
associations are the two poles of understanding the office of government extrapolated from 
the political experience of modern Europe. Oakeshott took it as an admirable philosophical 
feat to clarify the theoretical connections among a variety of concepts from the viewpoint of 
civil association. Nevertheless, it inevitably seems to be only partially connected with the 
modern experience of government and being governed, which is a mixture of the two 
polarities. Consequently, to recall the lesson from CPP, the second essay on civitas becomes 
genuinely philosophical at the expense of weakening its connection with the facts of our 
political life. The third essay is perhaps designed to alleviate the suspicion of this defect by 
supplementing an account of the fortunes of civil and enterprise associations in our 
experience of political activity. Yet eventually Oakeshott thought that we should resist the 
temptation to theorise the tension between societas and universitas in more general terms.87 
An ideal character of the State, which is a reconciliation overcoming the tensions between 
civil and enterprise associations, is not mentioned. 
 More importantly, this refusal to synthesise the theoretical concepts corresponding to 
civil and enterprise associations is not based on the radical subversion of common sense by 
which Oakeshott earlier characterised the dialecticism of his philosophy. The argument of 
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OHC is not that the political life is ultimately the civil condition or civitas; nor did he argue 
that, if this theoretical account contradicts our ordinary understanding of politics, then so 
much the worse for conventional wisdom. After the Absolute disappears from the dialectical 
progression in Oakeshott’s conception of political philosophy, it is doubtful to use what is 
regarded as an incomprehensible whole a criterion at which theoretical investigation aims. 
Consequently, what is arrived at in the theoretical platform of understanding is no longer 
more concrete than, or supersedes the contradictions of, the previous platform of 
understanding from which the theoretical pursuit begins. The next chapter will see how 
Oakeshott adapted his general philosophy to this demand in his political philosophy in OHC. 
Regarding his late political philosophy, the aim is no longer to overturn our ordinary 
common sense understanding of political life, but to reveal a much closer connection with it 
than before. 
 Unfair appraisals and inappropriate characterisations have clouded this aspect of the 
late Oakeshott. Franco, for example, criticises that Oakeshott’s historical account of the 
modern political history of Europe fails to meet the postulates in his own account of the 
historical mode of experience.88 However, according to our interpretation, the role played 
by this quasi-historical account in Oakeshott’s works is not to serve as an example of 
historical writing, but to bring into manageable form our pre-theoretical knowledge of 
politics from which his political philosophy then proceeds. As such, Alexander is wrong to 
criticise Oakeshott’s progression from history to philosophy because of its violation of the 
modal separatism in EM.89 In any case, his position in EM was soon revised for the sake of 
his renewed conception of political philosophy. On the other hand, McIntyre correctly points 
out that “in Oakeshott’s account of both morality and the character of the modern state, his 
historical exposition of individuality and nomocracy closely parallels his theoretical account 
of human conduct and civil association.” 90  Nonetheless, he does not explain why this 
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parallel arises between ordinary knowledge and theoretical conclusions. Finally, Sullivan 
states more boldly that “Oakeshott’s claims are historical and practical, not metaphysical. 
His argument is a blend of pure practice and rationalism, a blend which he has already 
formulated as the only adequate method of political thought and action.”91 In opposition to 
this interpretation, we have noted that in making closer the connection between political 
philosophy and political life, Oakeshott did not thereby concede any scope for making 
philosophy more practical. 
 That Oakeshott’s political philosophy can be practically relevant without being directly 
applicable to our political life has attracted the attention of various commentators. Isaacs, 
for example, argues that Oakeshott should neither be interpreted as a defender of liberal 
ideology, nor understood as purely a philosopher. Rather, his works actually express a moral 
imperative derived from his philosophical epistemology.92 More concerned with religion, 
Alexander is inspired by Maurice Cowling’s evaluation of Oakeshott in taking Oakeshott’s 
abandonment of the State as analogous to his silence on God, to which the fervour of his 
earliest political and religious writings represent a stark contrast. The message implicit in 
Oakeshott’s works, therefore, reflects the secularisation of Britain and the retreat of 
Christianity from public life.93 
These and other comments capture the practical significance of Oakeshott’s political 
philosophy better, but still fall short of providing the context and the manner in which this 
political relevance is conveyed. Gerencser is nearer the mark when he correctly perceives 
that “Oakeshott suggests the possibility that those who live exclusively in the practical world 
may interact with and even learn much from the philosopher” in retelling Plato’s Allegory 
of the Cave in OHC.94 This passage in Oakeshott’s late political philosophy is a continuation 
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93 Alexander, “Oakeshott on Hegel’s ‘Injudicious’ Use,” 174. 
94 Gerencser, The Skeptic’s Oakeshott, 48. 
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of the theme dealt with in “The Claims of Politics” of his early political philosophy.95 As 
we have seen in Chapter 2, in that article the social role of the philosopher is to recreate and 
maintain the values of the society to which he belongs; and he can succeed in performing 
this task provided that he does not directly apply philosophy to practical politics as if it were 
an ideological doctrine, but embarks on theoretical investigations which are genuinely 
philosophical. In OHC, we finally have the opportunity to witness how this can be actually 
carried out in political philosophy. In relegating the Absolute to the inscrutable background, 
Oakeshott made closer the connection between theoretical understanding and ordinary 
knowledge to the effect that theory no longer aims to contradict or subvert common sense. 
This leads to the expectation that there will be a more intimate parallel between his 
discussion of civil and enterprise associations and that of civitas and the theoretical 
counterpart of enterprise association. As it turns out, he chose to analyse civitas only, setting 
all other social institutions and the State aside. The motivation of this choice may consist in 
an aversion to the denial of human freedom exemplified by rationalism in politics, or in an 
awareness of the death of God and with it the recession of the State. However, as the 
disproportional attention to civitas suggests, the more prominent driving force is more 
probably Oakeshott’s recognition of the importance of individuality as the dominant value 
of the age in which he lived. Thus, the renewal and maintenance of the moral life of the 
individual manifests itself through a genuine philosophical investigation which by itself does 




 Oakeshott’s attempt to reinstate the connection between his political philosophy and 
our experience of political life is not straightforward. It began with a full-blown revival of 
 
95 Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, 27-31. 
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the holism and dialecticism about modes of experience. However, he quickly recognised that 
the point of departure in philosophical investigation is common sense or ordinary knowledge 
of politics rather than any of the other modes of experience. Consequently, the holism was 
abandoned again whereas the dialecticism now held only between ordinary understanding 
and philosophical exposition. This dialecticism was preserved in the new characterisation of 
philosophy as a radically transformative activity, in contradistinction to his earlier 
conceptions of it as the concrete definition, the totality of experience, or the most 
comprehensive context. Nevertheless, this new account qualified the dialecticism again. 
Without the Absolute as the ultimate aim of dialectical progression, political philosophy was 
no longer radically subversive, and was thereby brought much closer to ordinary common 
sense than before. In this context, the “political” essays written after the year 1952 when 
Oakeshott completed his critique of rationalism in politics, should be understood not as a 
continuation of his general philosophy and its more immediate ideological concerns, but as 
a preliminary organisation of our pre-theoretical understanding of political life from which 
philosophical investigation later commenced. 
 On the other hand, the holism and dialecticism about political concepts are weakened 
by increasingly specific definitions of “politics” and increasingly narrow conceptions of the 
scope of political philosophy’s subject matter. Although this could also be understood as part 
of the effort to relocate the anchorage of political philosophy in the sea of undifferentiable 
experience, the sharp distinction between the “political” and the “social” lumps all the other 
social institutions together as the background against which the political life is to be 
understood. Neither is each of these institutions essential to our holistic picture because of 
the places they occupy in the necessary stages of dialectical progression. In the absence of 
the Absolute it is no longer the aim of philosophy to supersede the contradictions between 
civil and enterprise associations by the highest idea of the State which goes beyond the 
contingent mixture of societas and universitas in actual modern European states. 
 As the concept of the State faded away, the conclusions of Oakeshott’s early political 
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philosophy were reformulated in terms of civil association. Since this is strictly a 
philosophical concept, it is inadequate to interpret the new formulations as a defence of 
liberalism. The mutual constitution between the self and the State now obtains between the 
individual and civil association, and logically speaking between the anti-individual and 
enterprise association as well. That the action of the self is also a contribution to the end of 
the State is transformed into the proposition that the end of civil association is the moral life 
of individuality, with the same transformation applicable to the end of enterprise association 
and the morality of anti-individuality. Might is always right, but, similarly, the relationship 
between law and morality in civil association will be different from that in enterprise 
association, which is again different from the case in the context of the State. While the 
refusal to go beyond the internal tensions of these new formulations follows from 
Oakeshott’s updated conception of political philosophy, his choice to focus only on civil 
association does not. This decision is more properly understood as the peculiar manner in 
which he expressed a renewal and maintenance of the dominant value of individualism in 
his epoch; the manner, in other words, precisely articulated in “The Claims of Politics” in 
his early political philosophy. 
 That Oakeshott’s philosophical expression of the moral life of the individual is closely 
connected with the political experience of modern Europe does not make it any the less 
philosophical. Despite the ideological force of this philosophical expression, Oakeshott’s 
late political philosophy is not capable of giving clear and unambiguous recommendations 
about current affairs. This point will become clear in the contrast between Chapter 6 on 
Kenneth Minogue and Chapter 9 on Peregrine Worsthorne. Whilst Minogue uses Oakeshott’s 
late political philosophy to buttress the economic and liberal side of Thatcherism in the name 
of conservatism, Worsthorne understand Oakeshott’s account of individuality as referring to 
the aristocratic ideal embodied by Britain’s traditional ruling class instead of the clichés of 
laissez-faire mouthed by the middle class. As such, the intellectual portrait of Oakeshott’s 
development of his political and general philosophy serves as the ideal theoretical context in 
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 Oakeshott’s revision of his conception of political philosophy in the late-1930s and the 
1940s may lead one to expect that he would have also adjusted his general philosophy 
according to the changing needs of his political philosophy around the same period of time. 
However, this was not the case. Like his early general philosophy, developments in his late 
general philosophy were in the first place motivated not by the new demands made by his 
late political philosophy, but by the felt urgency of dealing critically with the political and 
ideological problems directly or indirectly caused by the Second World War. Of course, 
Oakeshott was not primarily interested in current affairs, but in the patterns of political 
argument employed by his contemporaries thinking about those problems. However, even 
though his response to the intellectual atmosphere of his time is philosophical in nature, its 
ideological implications are clear and unmistakable. The second section of this chapter deals 
with this former, polemical phase of the Oakeshott’s late general philosophy. I shall argue 
that many writings associated with his famous critique of rationalism in politics in the late-
1940s and the early-1950s are in effect a consistent extension of his early general philosophy. 
Consequently, it is inadequate to link the content of these works to that of Oakeshott’s late 
political philosophy despite their apparent concern with politics. 
 Oakeshott completed his critique of rationalism in politics by his inaugural address 
Political Education in 1952. As we have noted in the previous chapter, after this he began to 
conduct investigations about the experience of political life in modern Europe. In 1958, he 
delivered of a lecture entitled ‘Morality and Politics in Modern Europe,’ which represents a 
recapitulation of the results of this enquiry and serves as the starting point for his later 
construction of a political philosophy. Based on these publication dates, it becomes 
intelligible that Oakeshott first incorporated the requirements of his revised conception of 
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political philosophy into his general philosophy in The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation 
of Mankind in 1959. This is the time when the position in his late general philosophy began 
to depart from those held in his early works, not for the sake of responding to the central 
political issues of the time, but in order to reflect changes in his opinions about the nature of 
political philosophy. This latter, more philosophical part of Oakeshott’s late general 
philosophy will be the main theme in the third section. I will focus on the internal coherence 
between his general and political philosophy in On Human Conduct published in 1975. 
Passages from his 1983 essay “On History” will be cited in support or for clarification where 
it is necessary. We will observe that the uncertainties about the starting place of political 
philosophy reflect very well the equivocations and ambiguities concerning the logical status 
of, and the interrelationship among, different levels of understanding. Nevertheless, this does 
not diminish the extent to which Oakeshott’s late general philosophy serves its purposes, the 
most important of which is to maintain a close connection between political philosophy and 
the experience of political life. 
 
II. The Critique of Rationalism in Politics 
 
1. Rationalism as a Manner of Practical Reasoning 
 
 After Experience and Its Modes was published in 1933, it seemed that there was for a 
moment no more motivation to conduct further investigations in Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy. His keen interest in theological debates lost its momentum, which had shaped 
many aspects of his early general philosophy. Moreover, it was not until 1938 that he began 
to revisit his conception of political philosophy, whose new demands on his general 
philosophy became more manifest only after the late-1940s. This lack of attention to general 
philosophy in the mid-1930s is further testified by the publication of A Guide to the Classics, 
or, How to Pick the Derby Winner in 1936, a book about horse racing. 
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 Nevertheless, the year of 1939 is notable, when “The Claims of Politics” appeared in 
formal publication and emphasised the social function of the philosopher. This might lead 
us to expect that soon Oakeshott would have revised his general philosophy accordingly. In 
the same year he responded, probably reluctantly, to an invitation by his senior colleague 
Ernest Barker to edit a selection of readings. This anthology was meant to enable the general 
reader to understand ‘The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe,’ where 
the task Oakeshott attributed to the philosopher is still to understand political ideologies (we 
are conveniently using this shorter term in accordance with Oakeshott’s understanding of it 
as social and political doctrines) rather than recreate them. Edmund Neill argues that these 
two works in 1939 do not show any real consistency.1 Placed in our interpretive framework, 
it becomes clear that they belong to different types of Oakeshott’s writings. The former is a 
rehearsal of the conclusions of his early political philosophy, and also suggests the direction 
towards which his subsequent revisions of the nature of political philosophy should move. 
The latter is the beginning of his systematic effort to understand practical politics with the 
help of his early general philosophy. An adequate interpretation of Oakeshott’s works must 
go beyond the observation that they are inconsistent with each other. It must try to understand 
why the changes of opinions in his general and political philosophy, though not synchronised 
at this time, nevertheless followed one after the other. 
 Viewed from hindsight, Oakeshott’s short introduction to this anthology of 
contemporary political ideologies is his first attempt to diagnose the phenomena of 
rationalism in politics in a manner more theoretical than the brief glimpse given earlier in 
his 1932 article on “The New Bentham.” The aim of SPDCE is to identify the logical status 
of the political ideologies then gaining wider currency in practical politics, and to place them 
in the context of his general philosophy. Ideologies are evidently not themselves 
philosophies in Oakeshott’s understanding of that academic pursuit, and “it would be a 
 
1  Edmund Neill, “Oakeshott, Modernity, and Cold War Liberalism,” in Michael Oakeshott’s Cold War 
Liberalism, ed. Terry Nardin (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 45. 
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mistake to be disappointed because they are not what they do not pretend to be.” 2 
Nonetheless, they are frequently connected with philosophical ideas. What, then, should 
genuine philosophers do with them? In Oakeshott’s opinion, “it would be a mistake to 
dismiss these social and political doctrines on account of the inadequacy of the philosophical 
ideas or systems with which their apologists have chosen to ally them” (xvi). The underlying 
reason is that, since these political ideologies strictly speaking do not belong to the category 
of philosophy, it is pointless to criticise the content of the philosophies appropriated by them 
in their own undertakings. Even if the philosophical ideas thus appropriated were by 
themselves perfectly sound, the political ideologies appropriating them would be no less 
defective from the philosophical point of view. The real question concerns the purpose and 
nature of such appropriation. Therefore, “the most useful service the philosophic critic can 
perform is that of freeing these social and political doctrines from the encumbrance of these 
largely parasitic philosophical and pseudo-philosophical ideas” (xvi). It is not difficult to 
observe that this argument is an example of the philosophical critique of ignoratio elenchi 
championed by EM. More importantly, it is also a plea for understanding ideologies from an 
adequate perspective which provides the relevant criterion of their success or failure, a 
perspective obscured by their unnecessary and unfortunate connection with philosophy. 
 If political ideologies are not philosophies, what is their place in the universe of our 
experience? Generally speaking, political ideologies are employed in practical reasonings, 
which Oakeshott regards as a relatively new phenomenon in the way political decisions are 
made. Their ubiquitous presence is evidence that “nobody now expects a hearing who does 
not exhibit some anxiety to act on principle, who is not prepared to explain his conduct in 
some terms other than those of mere personal inclination.”3 What, then, is the logical status 
of these principles within the practical mode of experience, which are used both to motivate 
and explain political undertakings? 
 
2  Oakeshott, introduction to The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1939), xv. 
3 Ibid., xi. 
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Here, Oakeshott’s view was more implicit than his unpublished lecture notes written 
after the publication of SPDCE. In the introduction to this anthology, the logical nature of 
five currently fashionable ideologies are noted only in passing. Representative Democracy 
or Liberalism, for instance, contains “a more comprehensive expression of our civilization 
than any of the others.”4 Similarly, Catholicism is recognised as “the repository of an 
element of profound importance in the European tradition.”5 Again, Communism, in spite 
of its scientific and philosophical pretensions, “has its connexions with the past, and, as a 
doctrine, it is certainly not what some of its professors pretend—related to the past only by 
reaction.”6 Even in the case of newcomers, their relation to the existing social and political 
conditions are stressed. Fascism, for example, is more than “an elaborate and verbose 
expression of the spirit of fregarsene;” it becomes understandable if we take into account the 
situation where “some people after a period of peace or humiliation should be persuaded that 
life without la gloire is an ignoble thing.”7 Finally, National Socialism is not merely the 
invention of the Nazi Party, but, “in form and content, can be seen in many respects to exhibit 
the temperament of the community in which it prevails, and to belong to a tradition in 
German social and political thought.”8 In these characterisations of the logical status of 
political ideologies, the terms to be made famous by Oakeshott later, such as “rationalisation” 
and “abridgement,” do not appear, though the same message is successfully conveyed. It is 
in Oakeshott’s unpublished lecture notes that he explicitly affirmed that “this rationalisation, 
this setting down in language of abstract ideas, of the relationships and institutions of a 
society is the beginning of a social and political doctrine,”9 that “it is something which 
follows upon a high degree of institutional and legal organization in a society, rather than 
 
4 Ibid., xviii. 
5 Ibid., xix. 
6 Ibid., xx. 
7 Ibid., xxi. 
8 Ibid., xxii. 




precedes and guides that organization,” 10  so that “its essential character is to be a 
rationalization of the life of an existing society.”11 However, at this stage of Oakeshott’s 
thought there was no substantial critique of the logically abstract nature of political 
ideologies, as opposed to the traditions of conducting politics already existing in a society. 
That is the project he was to undertake after the Second World War. 
 W. H. Greenleaf once remarked that “Oakeshott’s … attack on rationalism is not, as 
some have imagined, a new critique simply aroused or conditioned by circumstances in the 
period since 1945.”12 This is true if we are talking merely about Oakeshott’s interest in, and 
his use of, the idea of rationalism. This idea can be traced back to his 1932 article on Jeremy 
Bentham’s rationalist mentality; and even the rejection of a fixed conception of Christianity 
and the concomitant defence of a living form of religious life in his earliest theological 
writings can be understood as a precursor of his later critique of rationalism in politics. 
Nonetheless, it is only after the publication of EM in 1933 that the embedding of his analysis 
of political ideologies in general philosophy became possible. Furthermore, this further 
development of his early general philosophy is not a revision based on the needs of his 
renewed conceptions of political philosophy. Judging from the ideological potential of his 
early general philosophy, it is indeed surprising that Oakeshott had not embarked upon the 
task of attacking rationalism in politics after placing it in the framework of his general 
philosophy in 1939. The reason that he did do so only after 1945 is that he eventually found 
new ideological targets to attack from the vantage point of his general philosophy. 
 On the other hand, commenting specifically on SPDCE George Feaver contends that 
“we can detect in this prewar collection of documents an implied alignment between 
‘Representative Democracy’ and Oakeshott’s subsequent discussions of the ‘politics of 
scepticism,’ and then ‘the politics of individualism,’ and ultimately, of ‘civil association.’”13 
 
10 Ibid., 153. 
11 Ibid. 
12 W. H. Greenleaf, Oakeshott’s Philosophical Politics (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), 46. 
13 George Feaver, “Regimes of Liberty: Michael Oakeshott on Representative Democracy,” in The Intellectual 
Legacy of Michael Oakeshott, ed. Corey Abel and Timothy Fuller (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), 136. 
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However, Oakeshott’s preparations for the actual construction of a political philosophy in 
line with his revisions of the view about the nature of such a philosophy during the late 1940s, 
began only after his The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism was composed in 
1952. As we will see towards the end of this section, this is also the year when Oakeshott 
completed his critique of rationalism in politics. In 1939, his conception of political 
philosophy was still undergoing continual revisions without reaching a settled position. It is 
unlikely that at this time he had already taken his insights into practical politics to be the 
preliminary of his later political philosophy. Therefore, if Oakeshott appeared to reveal a 
preference for Representative Democracy and Catholicism in his editorial introduction to 
SPDCE, it has less to do with his later development of political philosophy, than with his 
subsequent ideological attacks on rationalism in politics and his defences of the tradition of 
political conduct which the British people had until recently inherited from their unique and 
exceptional past. 
 
2. Critique of Rationalism in General 
 
 1947 was the year when Oakeshott, having returned from military service, entered 
another battlefield, this time ideological. Already in the early pages of “Rationalism in 
Politics” war had been declared upon almost every political project of the time: national self-
determination, the Reunion of the Christian Churches, the selection of civil servants on the 
sole criterion of personal abilities, the Beveridge Report, the planned society, the Education 
Act of 1944, and so forth.14 The disease that had infected contemporary politics across all 
party lines and moral persuasions is that of rationalism. Nevertheless, since rationalism was 
not particularly tied to political affairs but had been present in every field of human conduct, 
Oakeshott’s critique had to begin in a very general manner. “Every science, every art, every 
 
14 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics,” in Rationalism in Politics, 11. First published in Cambridge Journal 
1 (1947): 81-98, 145-57. 
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practical activity requiring skill of any sort, indeed every human activity whatsoever, 
involves knowledge.”15 In this knowledge Oakeshott distinguished between two different 
but inseparable components. “Technical knowledge” refers to the knowledge of technique, 
which can be formulated into explicit rules and thus can in principle be written down in 
books, can be deliberately learned, and the rigidity of which gives the appearance of certainty. 
By contrast, “practical knowledge” is flexible and exists only in use, which can be learned 
only by practising the activity under discussion, and whose spontaneity makes it seem full 
of imprecisions.16 With the help of these distinctions, Oakeshott contended that rationalism 
is the strong assertion that there is strictly speaking no practical knowledge, that all 
knowledge in the end is technical knowledge.17 
 What was Oakeshott doing here? What is the place of these comments in relation to his 
general philosophy? First, the topic dealt with here should not be confused with the practical 
world of experience as characterised in EM because it is confined to the world of morality 
and politics only. The distinction between technical and practical knowledge, in spite of the 
label of “practical,” is applicable to all modes of experience in Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy. It is a corollary that any subsequent criticisms of rationalism will also be relevant 
to historical, scientific, and practical activities, and indeed all kinds of human conduct 
whatsoever. As a result, the scope of this critique is in effect very far-reaching. This point is 
widely recognised by Oakeshott scholars,18 some of whom even go further to stress the link 
between this analysis of rationalism and Oakeshott’s early general philosophy.19 
Nevertheless, while emphasising the continuity we must avoid confusing this analysis 
of rationalism in every mode of experience with Oakeshott’s earlier critique of ignoratio 
 
15 Ibid., 12. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 15. 
18 Greenleaf, Oakeshott’s Philosophical Politics, 47n; Robert Grant, Oakeshott (London: Claridge, 1990), 47; 
Kenneth B. McIntyre, The Limits of Political Theory (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), 53. For an exception, 
which I think is mistaken, see Steven B. Smith, “Practical Life and the Critique of Rationalism,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott, ed. Efraim Podoksik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
136. 
19 Paul Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 
128-29; Stuart Isaacs, The Politics and Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 77. 
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elenchi, as some commentators mistakenly did.20 This brings us to our second point. The 
aim of this 1947 essay is to understand how particular judgments are actually made in a 
specific form of human activity. This is a theme which, though having a place in EM, had so 
long remained untouched. Take the world of practical experience for example. The 
encroachment of science and history on practical judgements is recognised to be either not 
science or history but practical reasoning disguised in scientific or historical masks, or 
genuine science or history which are irrelevant to practice but misused in practical 
reasoning.21 However, the obtrusion of science and history, though committing the logical 
fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, at least tells us how, in their conception, practical judgements 
are to be made. If they are ruled out as illegitimate, what should we put in their place? 
Unfortunately, Oakeshott had been primarily occupied with clarifying the necessary 
postulates of each mode of experience, which can inform us of the essential nature of, say, 
all practical judgments, but by itself gives no account of how particular judgements are made. 
Seen in this light, rationalism in politics is an account, though defective, which fills this gap 
in Oakeshott’s early general philosophy. As a rationalisation of existing political practices, 
its logical status is from the very beginning purged of any non-practical element. Thus, if 
there are any logical defect of rationalism in politics, they do not reside in its invalid 
appropriation of arguments from other modes of experience. In any case, this appropriation 
is not necessary to its purposes and has already been dealt with by the the critique of 
ignoratio elenchi. Rather, the defect consists in the guidance of political conduct through the 
rationalisation of traditional political practice. The same can be said of the rationalisms in 
history, in science, and in all other modes of experience. 
However, beyond this basic characterisation of the claim of rationalism, “Rationalism 
in Politics” offers us little philosophical critique of it. Most of its pages are concerned with 
the intellectual history of this disposition of mind, as well as the contingent circumstances 
 
20 Grant, Oakeshott, 30, 54; Terry Nardin, The Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 90. 
21 Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 311-16. 
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in which they came to infect politics. Yet the practical effect of this essay is never the less 
limited. For it may provide hardly any consolation for the rationalists to be told that this 
historical outline is strictly historical and has nothing to recommend in practice when they 
are portrayed as the politically inexperienced and uneducated to whom ideological book-
learning came as a rescue. 22  As Paul Franco rightly points out, “[t]hese essays … 
transformed Oakeshott from a well-regarded Cambridge don into a major public 
intellectual.” 23  It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that, like his early general 
philosophy, Oakeshott’s development of his late general philosophy arose firstly from the 
need to critically respond to his contemporary intellectual atmosphere. It was not until this 
urgent task of ideological raid had been completed that he could concentrate on putting his 
updated conception of political philosophy into practice and revise his general philosophy 
according to its new requirements. 
 
3. A Positive Account of Rational Conduct 
 
 “Tower of Babel” (1948) is concerned with the same theme of rationalism, but now 
applied to morality rather than politics.24 Oakeshott made the contrast between the moral 
life of spontaneous habit of affection and conduct and that of reflective application of ideals 
and principles. But there was not much advance in the philosophical critique of the latter 
save the accusation of the corruption brought about by the rationalistic cast of mind. In the 
same year, however, Oakeshott’s book review of Hans Morgenthau’s Scientific Man Versus 
Power Politics revealed that he came to recognise the direction in which such philosophical 
critique is to proceed. Whilst he shares Morgenthau’s opposition to rationalism in politics, 
he thinks that such rationalism will necessarily fail not because man is in part irrational; 
 
22 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics,” 28. 
23 Paul Franco, Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 11. 
24 Oakeshott, “The Tower of Babel,” in Rationalism in Politics, 465-87. First published in Cambridge Journal 
2 (1948): 67-83. 
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rather, and in accordance with his views on “The New Bentham,” the traditions of human 
conduct, though having the appearance of irrationality, are actually perfectly rational and 
capable of being understood by reason. It is the distorted and limited conception of what is 
rational given by the rationalists that has to be reconceived.25 The task, therefore, becomes 
that of explaining the sense in which human conduct can be rationally understood; or, in the 
context of his early general philosophy, showing the way particular practical judgements are 
actually made which is distorted by the rationalists. 
 This is what “Rational Conduct” set out to achieve in 1950.26 After rehearsing the 
features of rational conduct as the rationalist would have it, such as the premeditation of ends 
and the formulation of problems admitting of conclusive solution,27 Oakeshott went on to 
stress that this rationalistic account “has adherents in every department of life.” 28 
Consequently, if the critique of rationalism in politics is sound, the rationalism in all other 
fields of human activity will also collapse. The nature of this critique is philosophical 
because it is not concerned with the practical desirability or undesirability of such an account 
of rational conduct. Rather, it demonstrates the incoherence inherent in this conception of 
what is rational, and thereby the impossibility of finding any actual examples of rational 
conduct falling under this misconception.29 As such, this critique has to be distinguished 
from the attempt to explore the irrational elements in human behaviour, which makes sense 
only if we accept the rationalist’s account of reason in the first place.30 
 In the first stage of his argument, Oakeshott pointed out that practical judgment 
necessarily involves the assessment of current opinions and is related to a particular 
spatiotemporal context, which makes it impossible to yield a mistake-proof answer settled 
 
25 Oakeshott, “Scientific Politics,” review of Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, by Hans J. Morgenthau, in 
Timothy Fuller, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, 106. First published in Cambridge Journal 1 (1948): 
347-58. 
26 Oakeshott, “Rational Conduct,” in Rationalism in Politics, 99. First published in Cambridge Journal 4 
(1950): 3-27. 
27 Ibid., 102-3. 
28 Ibid., 107-8. 
29 Ibid., 109. 
30 Ibid., 114-15. 
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once and for all.31 He anticipated the rationalists’ response that, surely, if all these contextual 
factors are taken into account as the premises in the application of rational principles, then 
the point of this criticism would remain moot.32 Thus, Oakeshott has to show that these 
contextual factors cannot be all taken into consideration in advance because they will appear 
only on the actual occasion of doing the activity. He must further show that making 
appropriate judgments on these occasions cannot be wholly based upon the so-called rational 
principles, but require something larger than that. Accordingly, the second stage of his 
argument insists that these principles can be derived from the traditions of performing an 
activity only with the help of hindsight, rather than vice versa.33 Moreover, the ability to 
identify a particular problem, the acumen to recognise specific factors as relevant and others 
as irrelevant, and the connoisseurship in which adequate judgement about what to do next is 
swiftly made, all of them depend upon a familiarity with a traditional way of doing things.34 
 In this philosophical argument, the framework of Oakeshott’s early general philosophy 
is still preserved. The terms of “abstract” and “concrete” are a case in point. That they are 
still used in the philosophical sense can be seen from the way they are used to describe a 
particular activity and a tradition of activity, respectively. To use one of Oakeshott’s favourite 
illustrations as an instance, it can only invite bafflement in the layperson to say that a cook’s 
engagement of devising a new dish is possible because of his “participation in the concrete 
activity [in this example, cookery in general] in relation to which his particular engagement 
is an abstraction.”35 Even though what Oakeshott said is actually good sense, from the 
philosophically unsophisticated cook’s perspective, cookery as a whole certainly appears 
much more abstract than how to devise a particular dish in a concrete setting. Yet, of course, 
he knows perfectly well that every step of his cooking is inspired by the culinary tradition to 
which he belongs; which part of the meat should be used and how it should be cut, what 
 
31 Ibid., 116. 
32 Ibid., 117. 
33 Ibid., 118. 




range of spices and condiments should be applied in its marination, in what order and for 
how long, which ingredients mix well with one another and how their flavours can develop 
and sufficiently infuse the sauce, and the masterly execution of all these, will certainly reflect 
the knowledge he acquired in learning how to cook in that tradition if the result is not to turn 
out neither fish nor fowl. However, after Oakeshott took seriously the implications of his 
updated conception of political philosophy for his general philosophy, he ceased to talk about 
the contrast between the abstract and the concrete, not least because philosophy is no longer 
construed in these terms and the Absolute no longer serves as the aim or even the criterion 
of philosophical investigation. 
 For the time being this idealist context still remained, especially in the final stage of 
Oakeshott’s argument in “Rational Conduct.” Here we are no longer talking about whether 
a particular activity is rational or not, but brought to the conclusion that “an activity as a 
whole (science, cooking, historical investigation, politics or poetry) cannot be said either to 
be ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ unless we conceive all idioms of activity to be embraced in a 
single universe of activity.”36 From this comprehensive, philosophical point of view, the 
customs, traditions, institutions, and laws which the rationalists regard as irrational and 
attempt to replace by their reason, are in fact the repository of rational knowledge; to use his 
philosophical language, “they are the coherence.” 37  Furthermore, if we look back and 
consider all the rationalistic political programmes, it is undeniable that they were at least 
actually carried out to some degree. Since they are actual, they must be possible; and they 
are possible simply because, ultimately, they are not determined by abstract principles alone. 
Rather, despite the denial on the part of their advocates, they are also guided by the traditions 
of political conduct in a particular community. Again, the practical overtones of this 
philosophical argument cannot be neglected. The sweeping message conveyed to the 
rationalists and their “captive audiences” is that all of their programmes in politics are, after 
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all, no better than what they deem to be irrational. In other words, it is they who are talking 
in self-contradictions and should learn from those whom they despise as being in short 
supply of rational principles. 
 
4. Ideological Application of the Critique 
 
 The critique of rationalism culminates in Oakeshott’s Inaugural Lecture at the London 
School of Economics, Political Education. The philosophical language persisted, as in the 
announcement of the aim to understand an activity as a concrete, self-moved whole.38 The 
criticisms of empiricist and rationalist understanding of politics were similar, arguing that 
they are logically impossible and therefore cannot serve as a satisfactory account of political 
activities.39 Oakeshott’s positive account also remains unchanged: political judgement is not 
infallible, is vulnerable to error, and the pursuit of intimations can be corrupted by the pursuit 
of power. Again, the effect of this philosophical argument is practical, as a book review’s 
designation of it as a conservative ideology testifies.40 
 Whilst no new philosophical arguments seemed to appear in this critique of rationalism 
in politics, there was nevertheless a theme which had hitherto appeared only incidentally in 
Oakeshott’s book reviews: the defence of the political tradition of the British people. This 
task of seeing what is rational in the tradition of an activity follows quite naturally from the 
argument against rationalism. There had been, for example, an insistence on the traditional 
understanding of parliamentary government, and especially of the role played by the 
Opposition, which was in danger of being transformed by the Labour Party into despotism 
and tyranny because more decisions were uniformly made within the Party before they were 
debated in Parliament.41 “It is, and always has been, the business of the Opposition to 
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oppose, to criticize, to expose foolishness, corruption and mismanagement wherever they lie 
hidden. It is required neither to make constructive suggestions nor to have an alternative plan. 
And, in general, it may be said that a disunited Opposition is as necessary as a united 
government.”42 More importantly, this understanding need not be justified by recourse to 
some immutable Nature, but has always been exemplified in the political experience of the 
British people.43  At first sight, this critique is philosophical in nature and dictates no 
particular action to be pursued, which is the business of practical judgment instead of 
philosophy. Nonetheless, it does have political lessons to teach by revealing the rationality 
of traditional habits of conduct and the unsatisfactoriness of rationalistic abridgements of 
foreign experience. 
 Again, there had been a criticism of the pale simulacrum of laisser-faire, which 
obscures our understanding of what freedom was in the past and has been since then. Here 
the derisive tone of practical criticism is unmistakable in the sentence commencing “as every 
school boy used to know,”44 implying that the ignorance of current politicians is worse than 
uneducated pupils. In place of the misleading phrase of laissez-faire, Oakeshott clarified that 
“[t]o know that unregulated competition is a chimera, to know that to regulate competition 
is not the same thing as to interfere with the operation of competitive controls, and to know 
the difference between these two activities, is the beginning of the political economy of 
freedom.”45 
 In Political Education, Oakeshott for the first time explained this difference 
unambiguously via the distinction between attending to and making legal arrangements.46 It 
is used to illustrate what the pursuit of intimations means in the context of politics, where 
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politics is understood to be the activity of seeking coherence and balance in the existing legal 
framework of rights and duties.47 This may seem to anticipate many themes in On Human 
Conduct, but here it is mainly a practical defence of the customary way of doing politics in 
Britain. After all, at this stage of Oakeshott’s thought, he was still unable to incorporate this 
insight into a comprehensive political philosophy. The conception of political philosophy to 
which he gave outward expression in Political Education was still in tune with his early 
general philosophy. It is “to consider the place of political activity itself on the map of our 
total experience,” and cannot contribute to the task of pursuing the intimations.48 Judging 
from what we have seen in the previous chapter, this view did not reflect the radical changes 
Oakeshott had made to his conceptions of the nature of political philosophy earlier in the 
late-1940s. 
 Therefore, it is inadequate to interpret Oakeshott’s works from the late-1940s to the 
mid-1950s as a transition from epistemology or logic to morality and politics, as many 
interpreters have done.49 This is unexpected because even Oakeshott himself once made 
clear that the denunciations of rationalism is not the main topic in OHC, which is concerned 
with “something else.” 50  Whilst the critique of rationalism in politics belongs to the 
development of his general philosophy for polemical purposes in relation to contemporary 
tendencies in political argument, the “political” writings after 1952 left the temporary 
ideological fervour behind for the sake of constructing a political philosophy, which cannot 
directly apply its conclusions to current affairs without distorting its own meanings. Whereas 
the flaw of rationalism can be found in every mode of experience the exposition of which is 
at the same time an ideological critique, the investigation into the ideal types of the politics 
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of faith and scepticism, of the individual and the anti-individual, and of civil and enterprise 
association, is not aimed at disapproving of any particular government. They belong to 
different categories of Oakeshott’s writings. The revision of his early general philosophy is 
delayed because for him after the war the priority was not to revise his general philosophy 
in accordance with his new conception of political philosophy, but to counter the rationalistic 
manner of thinking cultivated in the war years but unsuitable for the times of peace. It is 
unsuitable because of its erosion of the British political tradition, of which a rationalistic 
account of civil association or individuality is no less a pale substitute for our knowledge of 
engaging in political activity than a similar account of enterprise association. This abstract 
liberalism thereby received an equally debilitating criticism in Oakeshott’s comments on the 
minimal state or the atomistic individual. However, after the critique of rationalism had been 
completed, his late general philosophy began to find new directions inspired by his late 
political philosophy. 
 
III. Belated Revisions of General Philosophy 
 
1. The Remaining Task of Revising General Philosophy  
 
 Oakeshott’s investigations in his late political philosophy after the late 1930s does not 
conform to the alleged subsumption of it by general philosophy in EM. Rather, his early 
general philosophy is an outgrowth of his early political philosophy which acquires an 
independent life of its own. Nonetheless, in Oakeshott’s works political philosophy is more 
central to his philosophical concern than general philosophy is. Consequently, it is 
unsurprising that, after he revisited his political philosophy which in turn led to new demands 
on his general philosophy during the late 1940s and 1950s, Oakeshott had no hesitation in 
changing his opinions in general philosophy accordingly. 
 The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind (1959) is mainly focused on art as 
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an autonomous mode of experience which had been earlier subsumed under the category of 
practice. However, Oakeshott scholars have noticed that in this monograph Oakeshott 
abandoned many claims in his early general philosophy. Philosophy is now construed as a 
“parasitic” activity,51 so that it is no longer the king of all modes of experience; neither is it 
its task to determine the degrees of abstraction or arrest exemplified by other modes.52 
Indeed, Oakeshott confessed that he did not “know where to place an experience released 
altogether from modality or a world of ‘objects’ which is governed by no considerabilities.”53 
In other words, at this stage he was no longer willing to talk about philosophy as the most 
concrete and comprehensive experience.54 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, these changes of opinions in general 
philosophy had long been anticipated in Oakeshott’s revisions of his conception of political 
philosophy between the late-1930s and the late-1940s. Therefore, it is reasonable to judge 
that these alterations to his general philosophy reflect the theoretical needs of his political 
philosophy. Oakeshott had not incorporated them into his general philosophy until 1959 
probably because it is only after Morality and Politics in Modern Europe was delivered in 
1958 that he became more confident about the prospects of his political philosophy. It is also 
after this that any attempt to alter general philosophy accordingly is worthy of the effort. 
Consequently, it is misleading for Efraim Podoksik to claim that in Oakeshott’s works 
political philosophy follows the footsteps of general philosophy, though their directions of 
change are the same.55 On the contrary, the pace of his political philosophy had always been 
ahead of that of his general philosophy, until the two were finally synchronised to compose 
a coherent whole in OHC. 
 It is useful to recapitulate the new demands made by Oakeshott’s new conceptions of 
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political philosophy before we examine how he actually carried out the construction of such 
a political philosophy in OHC, and how his general philosophy finally caters to the needs of 
this political philosophy. The most important requirement is that political philosophy should 
proceed from an inquiry into our ordinary understanding of politics, so that the connection 
between philosophy and our experience of political life is retained. Nevertheless, political 
philosophy is philosophical because it does not remain satisfactory on this level of common 
sense, but goes beyond it to another level where what is known in the previous level is 
transformed by being understood in a different manner. This conception of philosophy 
implies a weak form of dialecticism progressing from some levels to others, but does not 
presuppose the Absolute as the final destination or the ultimate criterion of philosophical 
activity. Furthermore, following this qualification of holism, different levels of 
understanding are not to be ranked as higher or lower, and the connection between political 
philosophy and political life is made even closer than before. The task left to general 
philosophy, then, is to show how such close relationships among different levels of 
understanding are still compatible with the categorial differences among them. Moreover, it 
must show this in a comprehensive account in which other important elements of his earlier 
general philosophy can find their place. 
 
2. Where is the Absolute? 
 
 “Understanding is not such that we either enjoy it or lack it altogether,” thus begins the 
first essay in OHC, for “we inexorably inhabit a world of intelligibles.”56 That this claim is 
put at the very beginning symbolises the tribute Oakeshott paid to his Idealist predecessors. 
This is but another way to express the Idealist doctrine that everything in our experience is 
something already mediated, that fact and the interpretation of its meaning are not two 
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separable things but one and the same act of understanding. In the terminology of OHC, even 
if a “‘going-on’ is recognized as a ‘given,’ it is not a mere gratuity; it is itself an achievement 
in understanding and not therefore independent of reflective consciousness.”57 This doctrine 
paves the way for an account of our pre-theoretical knowledge, which falls short of being an 
autonomous mode of enquiry but is never the less a kind of understanding to a certain degree. 
 This primitive, pre-theoretical understanding is called “recognition.” It is arrived at by 
“distinguishing and remembering likenesses and unlikenesses in what is going on,” the 
results of which “may often be vague, obscure, and tentative, and often mistaken; that is, 
unlikes mistaken for likes and likes for unlikes.” 58  At this point the dialecticism in 
Oakeshott’s general philosophy intrudes. While this pre-theoretical understanding is our 
starting point, theoretical enquiry cannot satisfy itself by remaining on this level of 
understanding. The theorist must move. This movement is achieved when the tentativeness 
of the recognition of characteristics is alleviated, and it is alleviated when the “characteristics 
are detached from their contingent circumstances and are combined to compose the features 
of ideal characters.”59 
Understanding at this level becomes “identification,” which Oakeshott called “a 
platform of conditional understanding.” 60  It is conditional in the sense that the ideal 
character thus abstracted from the recognitions of contingent identities is used as the 
postulated condition on which our pre-theoretical understanding of those identities is 
improved by correcting mistaken identities.61 Since this level of understanding does not 
question the postulates themselves, “their acceptance constitutes a suspension of the 
unconditional critical engagement of understanding in which the appearance of an 
assumption is a signal for it to be interrogated.”62 
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Here we come to the core of Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy or theoretical 
enquiry. In the metaphor of ascending a tower discussed in the previous chapter, 
philosophical activity is not primarily distinguished by the height to which it rises compared 
to other investigatory activities. In any case, in the absence of the Absolute as a criterion or 
destination, talks of heights do not make much sense. Rather, what makes it distinctively 
philosophical is the radical nature of the transformation it brings to our understanding at 
previous levels. By contrast, in OHC “the engagement of understanding is not unconditional 
on account of the absence of conditions, or in virtue of a supposed terminus in an 
unconditional theorem; what constitutes its unconditionality is the continuous recognition of 
the conditionality of conditions.”63 In other words, after the holism in Oakeshott’s general 
philosophy is qualified, the focus naturally shifts from the radically subversive nature of 
philosophy to its perpetual movement. This is also true of the dialectical progression from 
our pre-theoretical knowledge to conditional platforms of understanding. The abstraction of 
ideal characters from contingent identities is certainly far less subversive than the manner in 
which the concepts of the State and the self in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy 
contradict our ordinary commonsense about those concepts. Furthermore, as James 
Alexander rightly points out, even conclusions reached in philosophy, or the theoretical 
enquiry into the postulates of previous platforms of understanding, are themselves 
conditional.64 Consequently, they are not so much different in degrees of conditionality as 
occupy different platforms between which there is no longer the kind of radical 
transformation envisaged by Oakeshott’s earlier conception of political philosophy. 
 It has been controversial among Oakeshott scholars concerning whether the Absolute 
is still retained in Oakeshott’s late general philosophy. Davide Orsi, following David 
Boucher, argues that the Absolute still serves as the criterion of coherence in our experience 
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as it did from the very beginning of Oakeshott’s works.65 Terry Nardin, on the other hand, 
argues that, after the notion of the totality of experience recedes, it does not even serve as an 
ideal at which theoretical enquiry should aim.66 To be sure, textual evidence may lend 
support to both interpretations. When Oakeshott said that “[t]he notion of an unconditional 
or definitive understanding may hover in the background, but it has no part in the 
adventure,”67 this background notion may be understood as the aim of theoretical enquiry. 
In contrast, when he mentioned “the difficulties entailed in the notion of an unconditional 
understanding,”68 it seems to follow that a notion problematic by itself could not adequately 
serve as the standard by which the satisfactoriness of a particular platform of understanding 
is to be judged. 
Therefore, the only way out is to see what Oakeshott said about this notion of an 
unconditional understanding implies concerning other elements of his general philosophy. 
We have just seen that the qualification of holism naturally leads to a closer connection 
between pre-theoretical knowledge and conditional platforms of understanding. For, if the 
notion of the Absolute still plays an important role, and even if it is merely a criterion rather 
than the final destination, then talks of higher and lower, or more concrete and more abstract, 
levels of understanding seem to be inevitable. In this case, textual evidence is no longer 
equivocal. In Political Education, Oakeshott opposed a “self-moved” understanding of 
politics as a more concrete idea to that of rationalism in politics. In OHC, it becomes clear 
that when he used the same term to refer to the “self-moved” enterprise of understanding, 
the emphasis is shifted to the dialectical “movement” essential to theoretical enquiries.69 
Furthermore, with the Idealist concept of the Absolute fading away, the use of philosophical 
terms like “concrete” and “abstract” also lapses into ordinary usage. In OHC particular 
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performances, actions, and utterances are described as “concrete,” 70  whereas the ideal 
character of human conduct in general, and specifically of civil association, is said to be 
ideal “not in the sense of being a wished-for perfect condition of things but in being 
abstracted from the contingencies and ambiguities of actual goings-on in the world.”71 
These changes of language use accord very well with Oakeshott’s revised conception of 
political philosophy discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, regardless of whether the 
Absolute still exists or not, and whether it is a criterion or a destination, what is important is 
that it no longer plays a significant role in Oakeshott’s general philosophy. Consequently, a 
theoretical enquiry is no longer philosophical on account of the radical transformation of 
conclusions, but because it is always on the move. The motivation, nevertheless, remains to 
make closer the connection between the pre-theoretical understanding of political life and 
the philosophical enquiry into practical politics. 
 
3. Whither Ignoratio Elenchi? 
 
This revival of dialecticism in general philosophy does not imply a qualification of 
Oakeshott’s critique of ignoratio elenchi in his early works. What it does entail is that the 
critique of category mistake does not necessitate the abandonment of the progression from 
one level of understanding to another one. We have seen that the activity of theorising 
proceeds from the pre-theoretical “recognition” to the conditional platform of “identification” 
by understanding a “going-on” in terms of the postulates abstracted from its characteristics 
in contingent circumstances. Oakeshott continued this account by further introducing the 
concept of “orders of inquiry.”72 This enables us to distinguish between those conditional 
enquiries which understand a “going-on” as an exhibition of intelligence or human conduct, 
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and those which understand it as a process or behaviour.73 Apparently, the historical and 
scientific modes of experience in Oakeshott’s early general philosophy would fit into this 
two-fold scheme of “orders of inquiry.” Besides, when he argued against the reductionism 
of one order into the other,74 this argument could be understood as a reformulation of the 
critique of ignoratio elenchi. More importantly, his subsequent comments on the categorial 
confusion involved in psychology and sociology are a rehearsal of the arguments in EM.75 
However, whilst the critique of ignoratio elenchi is clearly preserved in the categorial 
distinction between “orders of inquiry,” it is less so in the distinctions between different 
“idioms of inquiry” within a specified order of inquiry. These idioms, alongside the order of 
inquiry to which they belong, are entailed in conditional platforms of understanding. For, 
without choosing a certain idiom of inquiry, the identities specified by an order of inquiry 
would still be ambiguous.76 After one decides to understand a “going-on” as an exhibition 
of intelligence, he has to determine whether it is to be understood in terms of ethics, 
jurisprudence, or aesthetics; alternatively, if it is to be understood as a mechanical process 
rather than a human practice, then he has to further specify whether it is to be examined from 
the perspective of physics, chemistry, or psychology. Using the term “sciences” in the 
general sense peculiar to German such as Wissenschaft, Oakeshott did not exclude the 
possibility of the theoretical reduction of one idiom of enquiry into another. In his own words, 
“while the ‘sciences’ which fall within an ‘order’ of inquiry are not categorially exclusive of 
one another and therefore may suffer ‘reduction,’ each is autonomous in being constituted in 
terms of theorems exclusively its own, and each is capable of its own conditional 
perfection.”77 
This account brings closer the relationship between different idioms of enquiry within 
an order of enquiry. Indeed, the relationship between the practical and the historical modes 
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of experience, both of which are concerned with exhibitions of intelligence, is brought so 
dangerously close that Oakeshott was later to highlight their logical separation in another 
essay entitled “On History.” In any case, under this account it is possible to maintain the 
connection between political philosophy and our experience of political life without 
sacrificing the doctrine of modal separatism. The philosophical enquiry into politics may 
proceed from a pre-theoretical recognition of political life to a conditional (practical or 
historical) understanding of politics, and then arrive at a theoretical understanding of the 
postulates employed in the exploration of political activity in the previous conditional 
platforms of understanding. In this process, a theorist may occupy a superior platform of 
understanding in the logical sense that he is concerned with understanding the postulates of 
a previous platform themselves rather than using them to explore a certain subject matter in 
that previous platform. However, his conclusions are no less conditional in that they can be 
subjected to a further enquiry into another set of postulates which he inevitably presupposes 
in conducting his present enquiry. Therefore, he would not be offensive to other adventurers 
in this intellectual journey if he committed a category mistake, which has already been ruled 
out as impossible the moment he is on board of a specified “order of inquiry.” But he will be 
truly offensive if “he so far forgets himself as to assume the office of tutor to those he has 
left behind who have no such concern.”78 
 
4. The World of Practice 
 
 In the second section of the first essay in OHC, Oakeshott continued the exposition of 
his conception of theoretical activity by giving an account of the conditional platforms of 
understanding within the “order of inquiry” concerned with exhibitions of intelligence. He 
was concerned “with the identity ‘human conduct,’ with the engagement of theorizing it, and 
 
78 Ibid., 26. 
148 
 
with its employment as an instrument for understanding contingent substantive actions and 
utterances.”79 As it turns out in the voluminous pages, “the engagement of theorizing it” 
corresponds to the philosophical exanimation of the practical mode of experience in 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy. On the other hand, when he came to deal with the 
understanding of “contingent substantive actions and utterances,” it becomes clear that this 
understanding is what is called history in EM. It is noteworthy that during this investigation 
the logical differences between these two platforms of understanding are not highlighted. 
Instead, the reader is given the impression that they are dealing with two complementary but 
inseparable components of human conduct. This is disclosed by the preliminary definition 
of human conduct as “a human being responding to his contingent situation by doing or 
saying this rather than that in relation to an imagined and wished-for outcome and in relation, 
also, to some understood conditions.”80 It is only through a familiarity with the themes in 
Oakeshott’s early general philosophy that one is in a position to discover that this is what is 
previously called “practice” and that is what corresponds to the “historical world of 
experience.” 
 The world of practice is more readily discernible in Oakeshott’s account. In his remarks 
on the difficulty of sustaining the impulse of theoretical enquiry into the postulates of the 
practical mode of experience, he acknowledged that 
 
no doubt there will be many who may properly find this task uninteresting; they prefer 
to inhabit and to respond to the invitations of the world of pragmata. And others may 
lament the compromise it entails: released from the conditions of doing, having 
recovered the critical initiative in which understanding is not an instrument to be used 
but an energy to be enjoyed, and their sails set to catch the wind of an unconditional 
engagement, they will be disposed to resent this submission to another set of 
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These conditions, as his subsequent discussion reveals, are the postulates of practical 
reasoning such as “free agency,” “deliberation,” “persuasion,” and “explanation.” More 
importantly, the enquiry into the postulates of practical reasoning is theoretical because these 
postulates are themselves subjected to analysis. In contrast, practical reasoning or “the world 
of pragmata” is conditional in the sense of using these postulates in its own enquiry without 
calling them into question. It is probably because this point had not been straightforwardly 
expressed that Oakeshott later made some effort to remove the possible misunderstanding of 
the world of pragmata as a primordial form of experience, from which all other forms of 
experience abstract ideal characters as their own specific “idioms of inquiry.”82 Rather, in 
accordance with the general framework of OHC, the world of pragmata is a conditional 
platform of understanding where practical reasoning presupposes the ideal characters of 
“free agency,” “deliberation,” “persuasion,” and “explanation;” these ideal characters, in 
turn, are abstracted from the pre-theoretical recognition of the identities of what is going on 
in contingent circumstances. Consequently, this account accords very well with Oakeshott’s 
revised conception of political philosophy in which the starting point of philosophical 
investigation is the pre-theoretical knowledge of political life rather than any other 
autonomous modes of experience. 
 From the discussion of these postulates onwards, readers familiar with Oakeshott’s 
published writings in the 1950s and 1960s will have little difficulty in recognising themes in 
his critique of rationalism in politics. Deliberation, for example, “is not to be understood as 
a regrettable frustration of a demonstrative manner of thinking. It is the only kind of 
argument in which an agent can recommend an action to himself, and its reasons are the only 
kind of reasons which may legitimately be adduced for having made this rather than that 
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choice.”83 As such, the so-called practical principles for action “are not flickering shadows 
of necessary truths or premises from which conclusions can be deduced. They are aids to 
deliberation, guesses of varying generality, made with different degrees of confidence and 
drawing upon evidence of varying quality, which, in deliberation, are not subjected to the 
test of a criterion superior to themselves but are made to criticize and illuminate one 
another.”84 More crucially, those who recall Oakeshott’s reason for rejecting the claim to 
philosophical concreteness made by the practical mode of experience will immediately agree 
that an “action the outcome of which is always a new situation calling for new responses”85 
has always been the hallmark of practical reasoning. 
 Similar examples abound. The account of the features of persuasive arguments86 is 
reminiscent of what Oakeshott said in “Political Laws and Captive Audiences.”87 Finally, 
the discussion about practical principles used by an agent to explain his own actions to other 
agents,88 as has been touched upon in the previous chapter, reflects his earliest view which 
had not criticised the logical flaw of social and political doctrines, but regarded them as a 
limited form of explanatory enterprise falling short of being a genuine political philosophy. 
 Nevertheless, it is after Oakeshott further revised his definition of “human conduct” 
that we arrive at the reformulation of the core of his critique of rationalism in politics. Here 
“human conduct” is no longer solipsistically construed, but take into consideration the fact 
that the imagined, wished-for outcome in the future may be “composed of the choices and 
actions of other agents.”89 These transactions between agents postulate relationships which 
are more durable than those which would disappear after the transactions are completed, and 
which are not themselves transactional.90 This kind of relationships he calls a “practice.” 
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At this point it is useful to remind ourselves that Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism in 
politics is based upon a distinction between practical knowledge and technical knowledge 
through which rationalism is defined as the claim that all knowledge is technical knowledge. 
Consequently, when Oakeshott proceeded to say that “[a] practice may be identified as a set 
of considerations, manners, uses, observances, customs, standards, canon’s maxims, 
principles, rules, and offices specifying useful procedures or denoting obligations or duties 
which relate to human actions and utterances,”91 it can be recognised that this identification 
is not a definition of “practical knowledge,” but refers to the formation of “technical 
knowledge.” In particular, “[i]t emerges as a continuously invented and always unfinished 
by-product of performances related to the achievement of imagined and wished-for 
satisfactions other than that of having a procedure, and it becomes recognizable when it has 
acquired a certain degree of definition and authority or acknowledged utility.”92 In contrast, 
what was previously called “practical knowledge” is “knowing how to participate in a 
‘practice,’” which “is not exclusive to conduct. It is present also, for example, in both 
‘historical’ and in ‘scientific’ inquiry, both of which are engagements in theoretical 
understanding released from the considerations of conduct.”93 Oakeshott’s reluctance to 
continue referring to the practical world of experience by the term “practice” coheres well 
with our previous observation that the critique of rationalism is not specific to politics or the 
practical mode of experience, but is applicable to all other forms of experience; and, 
moreover, that the knowledge of how to participate in a “tradition” is as essential to practical 
enquiry as it is to all other kinds of enquiry. 
 Consequently, when Oakeshott claimed that “[a]n action … is an identity in which 
substantive performance and procedural consideration may be distinguished but are 
inseparably joined,”94 it should not be interpreted as an espousal of rationalism which had 
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152 
 
been earlier repudiated by him, nor as the abandonment of unity in human conduct. Podoksik, 
for instance, argues along this mistaken line: 
 
Previously, Oakeshott regarded instrumental conduct as an abstraction which obscures 
the vision of conduct as a coherent whole. Purposive conduct was just a partial aspect 
of the totality of human life. Yet here the distinction is not between what is partial and 
what is concrete, so that the partial necessarily dissolves into the whole. It is rather 
between two independent aspects of conduct which cannot be reduced to each other. 
One corresponds to general conditions which qualify actions. The other refers to the 
sphere of the intentions and purposes of those actions.95 
 
In Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism in politics, the abstraction which obscures the vision 
of conduct as a coherent whole is not its instrumental or purposive features. In any case, in 
EM Oakeshott had already incorporated them into his exposition of the presuppositions of 
the practical mode of experience in terms of the transition from the world of “what is” to the 
world of “what ought to be.” Rather, it is when technical knowledge is mistaken for the 
whole of knowledge required for conducting practical activity successfully that what is 
abstract usurps the status of what is concrete. In OHC the language of “abstract” and 
“concrete” lost their previously rigid philosophical connotations, but this does not mean that 
the doctrine expressed through such language was thereby jettisoned. The partial “practice” 
still arises out of the whole conglomerate of human conduct, and the claim that substantive 
performance and procedural practice are distinguishable but invariably joined exactly 
symbolises a synthesis of Oakeshott’s early general philosophy and his later development of 
it in the critique of rationalism in politics. The rash judgment that it represents Oakeshott’s 
rejection of unity in human conduct might be caused by Podoksik’s interpretive scheme 
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where Oakeshott’s political philosophy follows the steps of his general philosophy in 
abandoning unity and purpose and embracing plurality and individuality. Unfortunately, as 
our interpretation demonstrates, this scheme is untenable. 
 
5. The World of History 
 
 Readers who closely follow Oakeshott’s argument thus far may be confused by the way 
in which the third section of the first essay in OHC begins: 
 
Hitherto, I have been concerned, in the main, with the identity ‘human conduct’ and 
with the engagement of theorizing it; that is, with understanding an ideal character in 
terms of its postulates. It remains now to consider the engagement to understand a 
substantive performance. And by this I do not mean the limited understanding of an 
action or an utterance required in order to respond to it, about which I have said 
something already. … I mean the engagement to theorise an already identified action 
or utterance in terms of its postulates.96 
 
Has he not already discussed the engagement of theorising substantive actions and utterances 
in terms of their postulated ideal characters of “free agency,” “deliberation,” “persuasion,” 
and “explanation?” Hasn’t he already considered the theoretical enquiry into the 
presuppositions of the practical mode of experience? Oakeshott’s answer is very intriguing. 
He explained the need of an additional platform of understanding than what had already been 
provided in virtue of the distinction between different “orders of inquiry.” A particular 
mechanical identity, for instance, can be both identified and elucidated by a science of 
mechanics because it is an example of the laws of mechanics which, besides being capable 
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of identifying the ideal characters of mechanical “goings-on,” can also specify a particular 
mechanical process. By contrast, the substantive performance of an action or utterance, while 
capable of being identified by the ideal character of “human conduct,” cannot be explained 
by the related postulates of “free agency,” “deliberation,” “persuasion,” and “explanation,” 
of which it is not a deducible example but an illustration of human intelligence at work.97 
 Again, this passage of argument gives the reader a false impression about the logical 
status of the engagement of theorising which is to be subsequently accounted for. Since the 
theoretical enquiry into the postulates of the practical world of experience is insufficient for 
the task of understanding specific exemplifications of human conduct, one may reasonably 
expect that Oakeshott would shortly provide another mode of enquiry which enables us to 
accomplish this task. What is actually offered, however, is a mode whose conclusions are 
not about the understanding of the desires, motivations, and intentions behind specific agents’ 
performance of certain actions and utterances. This is a mode which aims at transforming 
these understandings (which belong to the world of pragmata and are thus themselves within 
a conditional platform of understanding) into an historical understanding. As Oakeshott later 
made it even clearer, “[i]f a revenant were to appear, to offer himself as an eyewitness or as 
a participant and were to say: ‘It was not like that but like this,’ he would be recognized as 
only one more, somewhat odd, survival whose utterance has to be translated from the idiom 
of exploit into the idiom of evidence.”98 Such an historical event is “not a merely recorded 
occurrence, not itself an assignable action or an assignable response to an action, but the 
contingent outcome of the choices and encounters of assignable agents and understood as 
this outcome.”99 Consequently, “it cannot be understood in terms of the intentions of a 
performer, his disposition, his beliefs, his reasons for acting or its so-called appropriateness 
as a response to his circumstances.”100 It seems to follow that, from the perspective of the 
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world of pragmata, historical enquiry is not a conditional platform of understanding 
occupying the same level or different levels of the same height, but a theoretical enquiry 
which abstracts its object of analysis from what has already been identified in the previous 
platform and questions these abstractions themselves. 
 Nonetheless, it is important to recall that in Oakeshott’s view the practical world of 
experience is not the primordial form of experience from which all dialectical activity of 
theorising proceeds. Rather, the starting point of philosophical investigation is the pre-
theoretical recognition of the characteristics of what is going on. In addition, when later in 
“On History” Oakeshott revisited the idea of a practical past not mentioned in OHC, and 
made the comparison between practice and history by virtue of their divergent uses of the 
present (which is presumably something corresponding to the recognition of characteristics 
of what is going on in OHC), it becomes clear that these two modes of enquiry are parallel 
to each other in terms of their logical status.101 
 Perhaps, just as his new conception of general philosophy suggests, Oakeshott was 
forever en voyage and never settled his position for too long. Besides, if there had been 
hesitations about which kind of experience should serve as the starting point of philosophical 
activity in the late-1930s and 1940s, then one should not be surprised to see that there were 
also similar equivocations and ambiguities concerning the relationships among different 
levels of understanding in the 1970s and 1980s. Eventually what is important for our 
purposes is to observe that such problems are non-existent in his earliest exposition of 
general philosophy in EM. Yet they follow quite naturally from the new affinities obtaining 
among different forms of enquiry. These affinities, in turn, arise from the revival of a 
weakened form of dialecticism in his general philosophy and the qualification of the holistic 
Absolute, be it an intelligible criterion by which the theoretical satisfactoriness of a particular 
kind of enquiry can be measured, or a coherent aim towards which the dialectical progression 
 





6. General Philosophy Catering to Political Philosophy 
 
 Before concluding this chapter, it is worthwhile to observe briefly how Oakeshott’s 
actual construction of a political philosophy in the third and the second essays of OHC can 
be understood by reference to the framework of general philosophy provided in the first 
essay. In introducing the third essay, Oakeshott concisely mentioned the acquisition of 
authority and power by the rising European states in modern history, but said that “[t]hese 
two themes and histories lie to one side of my main concern, which is to consider what has 
been thought about the character of a modern European state and about the office of its 
government.”102 What he wanted to consider is “some of the fortunes of this inquiry, begun 
in the sixteenth century, into the character of a state.”103 As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, his contention is that the most dominant characters of modern European states are 
the tensions and ambiguities between understanding a state on the analogy of societas and 
universitas, respectively. This essay then deals with the intimations of these two distinct 
understandings of a state in late medieval times104 and in modern times.105 
 From the perspective of Oakeshott’s general philosophy, it becomes clear that this essay 
does not begin from a historical platform of understanding modern European politics. Rather, 
in gathering what has been thought and said about the character of a modern European state, 
what Oakeshott was actually doing is the pre-theoretical “recognition” of characteristics: 
“recognitions of the character of a state of the office of its government which together 
compose the political consciousness of modern Europe.”106 Of course, he referred to his 
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account provided in this essay as an “historical inquiry,”107 but that is something at which 
he finally arrives, not something from which his journey begins. In particular, after this 
intellectual journey sets out from our pre-theoretical understanding of modern European 
politics, it must move from mere recognition to “identification” because in recognition likes 
may be mistaken for unlikes, and vice versa, whose misidentifications must be rectified and 
whose true characteristics reidentified. The famous bracketing of Thomas Paine with a group 
of thinkers including Edmund Burke and Lord Salisbury in terms of the ideal characters of 
societas (as opposed to universitas) is exactly an example of this exercise of 
“identification.”108 
 However, the driving force of this essay is not an unconditional engagement of 
theorising typified by philosophical investigation, but a conditional platform of 
understanding which presupposes the ideal characters of societas and universitas in its 
explorative activities. As to the “idioms of inquiry” adopted in this conditional platform of 
understanding, Oakeshott would certainly insist that it is historical rather than practical. His 
peculiar interpretation of Hegel, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is widely regarded 
by commentators as at worst a distortion and at best a watered-down version suitable for his 
own theoretical purposes. To this comment Oakeshott would reply that this is precisely what 
history, according to his conception of its postulates, should do. Its aim is not to rehearse the 
intentions of all those past thinkers about politics, but to identify a contingent pattern in the 
development of an event from all the evidences available, which is not the design of any 
assignable historical agent, but an outcome of the historian’s own making. 
 Finally, the second essay continues the unconditional engagement of theorising by 
questioning the ideal characters presupposed in the third essay in its exploration of modern 
European political history.109 This exemplifies the dialectical progression from “recognition” 
and “identification” to the theoretical enquiry into the postulates themselves employed in the 
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previous platform of conditional understanding. As such, the transformation of identities 
from one level of understanding to another is no longer comparable to the radical subversion 
of ordinary common sense exemplified by Oakeshott’s early political philosophy. The latter, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, is here replaced by the parallel between the 
theoretical identities of civil and enterprise associations and the historical ideal types of 
societas and universitas. 
This makes the connection between political philosophy and the experience of political 
life much closer than before. Consequently, his late general philosophy, like his early general 
philosophy, lost its initial ideological motivation of responding to the more immediate 
intellectual context of his time. More importantly, his late general philosophy satisfies the 
demands of his late political philosophy so well that it is no longer adequate to talk of his 




 We have finally arrived at a comprehensive picture of Oakeshott’s general and political 
philosophy, their relationship to each other, and the different ways ideological messages are 
conveyed by their philosophical arguments which by themselves do not, qua philosophy, 
directly or logically entail practical recommendations. Certainly, the interpretive framework 
provided in this first part of my thesis is different from, and in some cases even incompatible 
with, those provided by other commentators. Nonetheless, the test of its plausibility consists 
not only in the extent to which the cited textual evidences support my arguments, but also in 
the contribution it can make to our analysis of the ideological movement of the traditionalists. 
In the second part of this thesis, this preliminary bird’s eye view of the whole of Oakeshott’s 
oeuvre will serve as a working hypothesis. Against this background we will be able to 
evaluate the ways in which Oakeshott’s philosophical and ideological ideas were directly 
used, constructively or negatively criticised, deliberately or mistakenly misunderstood, 
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adapted for other practical purposes, or simply rejected, by these traditionalist thinkers. 
Some of these figures are more Oakeshottian or more active in contemporary debates about 
political issues, others are less influenced by Oakeshott or less adequately classifiable as 
public intellectuals. A fruitful understanding of their ideological significance in the history 
of British political thought, as well as the place occupied by Oakeshott’s ideas therein, will 













A Foreigner Explaining to the English What Their Freedom Was About: 




 The history of conservative thought can be studied on a variety of different levels. One 
can focus on conservatism at the height of philosophical sophistication. To do full justice to 
its idiosyncrasies and distinctiveness, the unit of analysis is usually an individual thinker. 
The danger in this kind of enterprise is that the researcher may find it difficult or profitless 
to relate such thinkers as Michael Oakeshott to their contemporary political events. 1 
Consequently, the analysis is likely to become an interpretation of a philosopher within his 
own ideational context, with the link between conservatism and its implementation in 
politics lost from sight. Undoubtedly, Oakeshott identified himself as an academic 
philosopher and avoided the identity of a public intellectual. Nonetheless, this does not 
prevent the intellectual historian from transcending Oakeshott’s self-identification and 
evaluating his contribution to the diversity of conservatism through the influence he exerted 
on his colleagues at the London School of Economics. 
 Alternatively, one can pay attention to more vernacular manifestations of conservatism 
in party politics and the policies pursued by the government. However, doctrinal coherence 
is not required for politicians to gain popular support and electoral success. The advocacy of 
a political proposal, such as the post-war consensus of the Welfare State, may depend more 
often on the expediencies and circumstances of the moment than on loyal adherence to an 
ideological principle.2 In this regard, E. H. H. Green argues that Thatcherism had long 
existed avant la lettre, and the Conservative party’s response to the Beveridge Report was 
 
1 See, for instance, Edmund Neill, Michael Oakeshott (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 81. 
2 E. H. H. Green, “Thatcherism: A Historical Perspective,” in Ideologies of Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 237-38. 
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more of a “pragmatic” acquiescence than “normative” agreement. Therefore, the analyst 
cannot take these apparent exhibitions of conservatism too seriously lest the identity of 
conservatism be dissolved in the political history of modern Britain. 
 Between these two extremes lie the various think tanks associated with the 
Conservative party and the intellectuals contributing to their publications. Taking this level 
of public discussion as the point of entry has the advantage of being more closely connected 
with both the political and the intellectual contexts. Historically speaking, this kind of intra-
party debates usually intensified when the Conservative party was out of power or at a loss 
of its future course of policy.3 Because of this more immediate concern with practical 
politics, we can more confidently locate the context of current affairs to understand the 
changing and conflicting character of conservative ideas in a specific period, and the extent 
to which they were actually adopted by the government.4 On the other hand, among the 
members of these think tanks many are also academics in universities. Their active 
participation in these debates constitutes an ideal material for exploring how the more 
abstract and scholarly exposition of conservatism found its channel into public debate. This 
is the level on which the second part of this thesis explores the tensions between different 
strands of conservatism during its revival since the 1970s. 
 One of these tensions is usually characterised as between the economic liberalism more 
closely associated with the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Centre for Policy Studies, the 
Adam Smith Institute, etc., and the Tory traditionalism represented by the Conservative 
Philosophy Group, the Social Affairs Unit, and more unequivocally the Salisbury Group. 
However, one must be careful not to attribute clearer ideological identities to these 
organisations than what their actual publications could allow. As the think tanks had 
interlocking membership, it is common to find an intellectual’s presence in a particular 
grouping unnatural. For instance, an important early study of these think tanks observes that 
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it is “ironic that the [Salisbury] Group’s most celebrated self-publicist, Roger Scruton, 
should have become, in the late 1980s, identified as a leading ‘Thatcherite intellectual,’ when 
he was, with the Salisbury Group, a leading advocate of that traditional, authoritarian, 
hierarchical Conservatism that the IEA, the Selsdon Group and all the younger 
Conservatives were arguing was no longer relevant to the modern world.”5 Furthermore, 
even focusing on a relatively homogeneous set of intellectuals, one cannot extract a 
consistent doctrinal position therefrom as a convenient point of reference in characterising 
the nature of the tensions between different wings of conservatism. For example, defining 
“traditionalists” as those upholding patriotism, social order, authority and tradition, a more 
recent survey of Conservative thinkers comments that the main internal division among the 
traditionalists centred precisely on whether they thought what they defend is compatible with 
the classical liberalism espoused by the marketeers.6 Therefore, a case can be made for 
taking a particular intellectual as the vantage point to shed light on the complexities of these 
doctrinal divergencies scattering everywhere within the conservative family. 
 In this regard, Kenneth Minogue (1930-2013) is of much academic interest in that his 
long intellectual journey arguably embodies almost all the elements across the spectrum of 
divergent versions of conservatism. Together with Shirley Robin Letwin (1924-93) and Elie 
Kedourie (1926-92), he defined himself as belonging to the same “curious tradition in which 
foreigners explained to the English what their freedom actually was about.”7 Yet Minogue 
soon went beyond the neoliberal emphasis on the economic values of the market and the 
moral virtues of enterprise. This testifies the extent to which Oakeshott’s academic ideas 
influenced conservatism at the level of public discussion, notably through CPG. 
More importantly, Minogue lived long enough to exhibit the changes of tone and 
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emphasis in his conservative critique of morality and politics. These changes are what 
Oakeshott’s influences alone cannot sufficiently explain. The nature of these changes can in 
part be glimpsed from his increasing contributions to SAU, its magazine Standpoint, and 
The Salisbury Review of SG in his late years, in contrast to his earlier association with CPS, 
The Bruges Group, and similar think tanks back in Australia such as The Centre for 
Independent Studies. The evaluation of the degree to which Minogue became more 
sympathetic to Tory traditionalism without compromising the legacy he inherited from 
Oakeshott must await the next chapter on Scruton and SG. Nevertheless, the development 
of Minogue’s political thought suffices to illustrate the richness of intellectual resources in 
conservatism during this period. It will turn out that the complication involved makes it 
difficult to characterise the tensions within conservatism in terms of ideal types which are 
not as flexible as the actual fortunes of conservatism suggest. 
 
II. From an Academic to an Intellectual 
 
 Kenneth Robert Minogue was born in 1930 at Palmerston, New Zealand, but later 
attended high school and studied for an arts and law degree at Sydney, Australia. He came 
to London in 1951. After graduating from LSE and holding a temporary lectureship at Exeter 
University, he went back to teach in the department of government at LSE from 1956, 
remaining there for the rest of his academic career.8 
 Once formally registered as a student under Oakeshott studying the political thought of 
Edmund Burke, Minogue’s early political persuasion is not hard to estimate. Nevertheless, 
before 1975 he seldom participated actively in debates about current politics, whether at the 
national or the party level. Part of the reason may be the uninspiring atmosphere in the post-
war consensus of Keynesian demand-side economics. For example, reviewing a book on 
 
8  David Martin Jones, “Minogue, Kenneth Robert [Ken] (1930-2013), political philosopher,” in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/109259. 
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Burke, Minogue praised it because the author “makes no compromise with the welfarist 
notions no modern thinker can avoid.” 9  Later, in a review of a biography of Harold 
Macmillan published during his premiership, Minogue complained that Macmillan’s 
dullness is analogous to that of a party’s dogmatic political broadcast, full of liberal and 
socialist thinking about a planned government giving welfare to the poor.10 
 However, if this were sufficient to explain Minogue’s relative silence on current affairs, 
he would have already become much more interested in contemporary politics since Edward 
Heath rose to power in 1970. At least before his notorious U-turn in 1972, Heath’s 
government had symbolised the hope of finally breaking new grounds towards a freer market 
economy than was possible in the consensus era. 11  Instead, it was not until Margaret 
Thatcher led the Opposition from 1975 onwards that Minogue began to publish political 
comment more regularly. Furthermore, most of his contributions to the think tanks associated 
with the Conservative party appeared after Thatcher’s premiership had gained a firmer basis 
in the middle of 1980s thanks to the Falklands War, rather than in the very beginning of 
Thatcher’s government. Consequently, there must be other reasons than the contemporary 
political atmosphere which underlay Minogue’s decision to resist Oakeshott’s insistence on 
the practical irrelevance and uselessness of academic enquiry. What made Minogue become 
a public intellectual unashamedly taking advantage of Oakeshott’s political philosophy as a 
powerful weapon in the battle against ideological opponents? 
 
1. The Genre of Minogue’s Scholarly Writings 
 
 Minogue’s earliest scholarly publications exemplify the seminal influences of the 
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(May 1957): 172. 
10  Minogue, “Portrait of a Politician: Macmillan among the Pink Mystics,” Beaver Book Supplement, 
November 29, 1962, 3. 
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168 
 
modal separatism in Oakeshott’s early general philosophy. The distinction between 
explanation and understanding on the one hand, and practical recommendation on the other, 
proved exceptionally useful in Minogue’s polemic against the pitfalls of a whole genre of 
academic disciplines such as comparative politics. 12  This distinction was to remain 
presupposed in all his subsequent writings. 
Nonetheless, Minogue’s changing attitude towards the Idealism underpinning 
Oakeshott’s philosophical project reveals that Minogue gradually became more reluctant to 
ground the useful lessons learnt from his mentor on what by that time might have seemed an 
outdated philosophical burden. In the beginning he still expressed sympathy for the Idealist 
tendency of subjecting everything it studies to the universal context of the Absolute. Writing 
as if he were a friendly populariser of Oakeshott’s early political philosophy, Minogue 
distinguished Idealism as the enterprise of explaining the individual in the context of the 
State from the misunderstanding of the State as the actual enslavement of individuals by a 
government.13 However, by the time he published The Liberal Mind in 1963, his first 
monograph analysing the ideology of liberalism, he noted the difficulty inherent in Idealism: 
 
there is nothing especially objectionable about seeing the world in terms of whole and 
aspects, though when this becomes a metaphysical exercise, it rapidly turns into 
idealism and begins to undermine the independence of everything in the world. In 
idealist terms everything is simply an aspect of an all-inclusive whole which is usually 
referred to as the absolute. How does this general point affect the definition of the State 
as “society in its political aspect?” Obviously the definition is positing society as a 
whole which includes and determines politics. But in that case, we will have some 
difficulty in discovering the nature of this peculiar whole.14 
 
 
12 Minogue, “The Language of Comparative Politics,” Political Studies 6, no. 3 (October 1958): 270. 
13 Minogue, “Power in Politics,” Political Studies 7, no. 3 (September 1959): 277. 
14 Minogue, The Liberal Mind (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1999), 130. First published 1963. 
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This might sound like Oakeshott’s self-criticism of his own early Idealism. Yet unlike 
Oakeshott, Minogue was not interested in repairing this philosophical scaffolding. This can 
be seen from Minogue’s Nationalism (1967), a book on nationalist ideology. The explicit 
attempt in the concluding chapter to demonstrate the logical deficiency of all other modes of 
understanding nationalism than the historical and the philosophical, cannot but appear to be 
a deliberate parody of Oakeshott’s “The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence.” 
Moreover, the reader is promised a section on the nature of the philosophical method of 
explanation. However, the book did not fulfil the promise, leaving only the empty formula 
of an “attempt to explain nationalism as an intellectual system belonging to an ordered 
universe.”15 
 Despite his gradual departure from Oakeshott’s Idealist philosophical framework, 
Minogue did not fall prey to the temptation of extracting Oakeshott’s conclusions in political 
philosophy from their philosophical context and putting them to use in political debates. On 
the contrary, as a notable reviewer of LM regretted, it is unfortunate for Minogue to “avoid 
any real confrontation with any particular theory or argument” since he “does have things of 
interest and value to say.”16 To be sure, LM contains many Oakeshottian materials upon 
which Minogue was to rely heavily after he became more fully involved in Conservative 
think tanks. The Oakeshottian themes include the transition from classical to modern 
liberalism and from moralised desire to impulsive need,17 freedom as a distinctive way of 
life and moral taste which a society contingently inherits,18  and the restoration of the 
classical sense of vocabularies opposite to freedom, such as “despotic” and “slavish.”19 The 
influences from Oakeshott’s Lectures in the History of Political Thought can also be seen in 
Minogue’s Nationalism. For example, Minogue argued that the presupposition of politics 
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rule out nationalist ideologies from the category of political doctrine because of their 
ultimate aim to abolish politics itself.20 Consequently, the nationalist conception of the 
political life has difficulty in understanding the possibility of loyal opposition in modern 
European government.21 
 Nevertheless, Minogue refrained from employing these academic resources to criticise 
current politics until 1975. He largely maintained his role as an academic in the university, 
refusing to take the rostrum as the opportunity to disseminate a political message, not even 
such a formidable one as the defence of liberty as a valuable legacy of the English’s 
traditional way of life. Certainly, part of the reason is the incomparable philosophical power 
of Oakeshott. It is only after On Human Conduct was published in 1975 that Minogue was 
able to refine his earlier accounts of freedom, moral identity, and individualism accordingly, 
now with an eye to contemporary political controversies. However, the more important 
reason is that he had other more urgent and local things to do between 1967 and 1975. 
 
2. Responding to the Student Revolt at LSE in the Late 1960s 
 
 One can hardly exaggerate the impact on Minogue made by the student militants around 
1968 at LSE.22 As an academic staff working there, he witnessed all the major disorders at 
first hand. Later he composed a detailed report for the Select Committee on Education and 
Science of the House of Commons, insisting on the integrity of academic freedom and the 
distinction between scholarly and political activities. 23  It is also significant that he 
commented on this event in The Daily Telegraph twice, arguing that the problem was not 
caused by the so called “generation gap” but arose from different understandings of 
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21 Ibid., 128. 
22 For a comprehensive account of this event and its aftermath, see Harry Kidd, The Trouble at L.S.E. 1966-
1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
23 The House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee on Education and Science: Session 1968-69, 
vol. 4, Student Relations: Sub-Committee A, Evidence and Appendices (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1969), 377-92. 
171 
 
education;24 and that the difference is between the academic and the ideological.25 This is 
the beginning of Minogue’s career of public intellectual. For one thing, the derisive tone 
could no longer hide itself behind the academic attempt to understand the nature of student 
unrest. After all, the event under analysis was not merely something bad, but what devastated 
the very identity of the academe to which Minogue had been fully devoted. For another, DT 
(and, associated with it, The Spectator) in the 1960s and 1970s played an important role in 
sustaining conservative ideas in public discussion.26 After these two comments in DT, from 
1970 onwards Minogue published more and more reviews of books ridiculing the 
intellectuals of the Left.27 After 1975 he began to write political commentaries frequently 
till the 1990s. It is thus not wide off the mark to say that the student revolt at LSE was the 
crucial event which triggered Minogue’s more passionate participation in media debates, and 
eventually in party politics through the think tanks. 
 Certainly, the process in which Minogue became a public intellectual was not instant. 
Nevertheless, in the course of preparing The Concept of a University, dedicated to Oakeshott, 
as a response to the darkness of the late 1960s, Minogue became increasingly conscious of 
the immense practical power of academic analysis. This is a book which depends 
substantially on Oakeshott’s doctrines of modal separatism in attacking all forms of 
intellectuality which imitate scholarship. With the various autonomous modes of experience 
in mind, Minogue called the mistake of transposing ideas from one mode to another as 
“monism.”28 The debt to Oakeshott became unmistakable when the term ignoratio elenchi 
 
24 Minogue, “As the New LSE Term Begins: Behind the Student Anxiety,” The Daily Telegraph, April 27, 
1967, 14. 
25 Minogue, “Fantasy World of Student Militants,” The Daily Telegraph, February 1, 1969, 12. 
26 Peter Oborne, “Ken Minogue: Resisted the Relentless March of State Control; Professor Minogue Was One 
of a Small Group of Thinkers Who Fought for Individual Freedom,” Telegraph Online, July 3, 2013, 
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A335764280/STND?u=duruni&sid=STND&xid=4497e79e. 
27 For example, Minogue, “Guide to Galbraith,” review of A Contemporary Guide to Economics, Peace and 
Laughter, by J. K. Galbraith, The Spectator, November 27, 1971, 770; and Minogue, “Erotics in Wonderland,” 
review of The Party of Eros, by Richard King, and Counter Revolution and Revolt, by Herbert Marcuse, The 
Spectator, October 28, 1972, 676. 
28 Minogue, The Concept of a University (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005), 89. First published 1973 
by Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
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was actually used to characterise the logical status of ideologies. 29  However, unlike 
Oakeshott, Minogue was ready to acknowledge more explicitly that “the reasons for a policy 
have some effect upon its nature, and in that sense academic criticism may directly affect the 
world. A Neutral … is a non-combatant: this does not mean that neutrals do not affect the 
world they live in, but they affect it in varied and complicated ways.”30 Consequently, what 
purports to be a beautiful and poetic description of the original meaning of “lecture” in a 
university, for instance, cannot help but be more than a historical interpretation: 
 
The ordinary lectures for the undergraduates are, then, not merely exhibitions revealing 
to students how someone who is presumed to know a great deal about a subject goes 
about giving an account of some part of it; they are also rituals which force scholars to 
re-examine their subject as a whole, and therefore a significant complement to minute 
or specialized researches.31 
 
A reviewer of CU remarked that “it is a point of view that every academic will agree with. 
Anyone who disagrees is not an academic: he is probably an intellectual,”32 who is diverted 
from the scholarly pursuit of knowledge and is eager to interfere with practical politics. The 
conservative nature of this book lies in the fact that it is when a tradition ceased to be a 
shared presupposition that those wishing to defend it are bothered at all to explain what it 
was before, and by implication, what it ought to be in the future. In Minogue’s opinion, the 
problem with universities was that the students either did not have the aptitude to play the 
undergraduates’ role properly, or had too much questions automatically answered by 
ideologies.33 
 
29 Ibid., 158. 
30 Ibid., 182. 
31 Ibid., 58. 
32 “On Being an Academic.” Review of The Concept of a University, by Kenneth Minogue, The Times Literary 
Supplement, June 29, 1973, 738. 
33 See n. 23. 
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 To combat this and other decadent tendencies, Minogue contributed a regular column 
to The Times Higher Education Supplement between 1975-76. He seized this excellent 
opportunity to publish his comments on controversial events in education and beyond. From 
the congregation of Oxford University refusing to award an honorary degree to Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto34  to Crowther-Hunt’s talk of planning, human resources, and national needs in 
educational policies; 35  from the Huntingdon affair at Sussex concerning academic 
freedom36 to the demand on school education to be “relevant,”37 and even the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament,38 Minogue practised the craft of social criticism to perfection. 
Kenneth Minogue the Public Intellectual thus came into existence. When his attention shifted 
from education back again to the wider sphere of politics, he was no longer an ascetic 
Oakeshottian residing calmly in the ivory tower, but a Conservative apologist crushing 
ideological opponents ruthlessly under the flag of Thatcherism. 
 
III. Associating with Think Tanks and Underpinning Thatcherism 
 
 After Heath’s electoral failure, the mid-1970s was a time when Conservative think tanks 
began to sprout in the wake of a wider recognition that the post-war consensus was no longer 
feasible. They were to become the motivating force impelling changes in the fundamental 
assumptions on which political argument of whatever persuasion had to be based. 39 
Thatcher and Keith Joseph founded CPS in 1974, though Minogue’s closer involvement with 
it began much later. It is after 1983 that Minogue sat on the Board of CPS and contributed 
 
34 Minogue, “Who Gains from the Bhutto Fiasco?” The Times Higher Education Supplement, March 7, 1975, 
5. 
35 Minogue, “Crowther-Hunt and the Future Confident,” The Times Higher Education Supplement, August 15, 
1975, 5. 
36 Minogue, “Free Speech for Closed Minds,” The Times Higher Education Supplement, October 31, 1975, 5. 
37 Minogue, “A Culture to Match One’s Geography,” The Times Higher Education Supplement, April 9, 1976, 
5. 
38 Minogue, “Is LSE Light Horse Enough of a Defence?” The Times Higher Education Supplement, July 4, 
1975, 5. 




to its publications, including The Egalitarian Conceit (1989), “Europe: Limits to Integration” 
(1992), and The Constitutional Mania (1993). In other words, when Minogue was active in 
CPS, the years during which Alfred Sherman played a central role had already been over. 
The CPS had already transformed its original character of an autonomous institute aiming at 
influencing opinion-formers, into a semi-official body of the Conservative party creating 
“stepping stones” for the government’s policies.40 
 Consequently, the view that Minogue “has a good claim to being a founder of 
Thatcherism” 41  must be justified by his contributions to CPG. CPG was similarly 
established around 1973-74, where academic papers of a broadly philosophical character 
were presented and discussed. Importantly, Oakeshott was also a main figure in its meetings. 
Since the proceedings were informal and confidential, there is no recourse to publications if 
we want to understand its influence on Thatcher, whose regular participation and eagerness 
to learn made Minogue an ally to her later government in power. Nevertheless, Minogue’s 
writings in the late 1970s give us a taste of the way Oakeshott’s political philosophy 
influenced Minogue’s broader interpretation of Thatcherism. This influence initially 
buttressed the arguments of economic liberalism which Thatcher learnt from her friendship 
with IEA; but later it led Minogue to transcend the ideological tendencies of Hayek. When 
Minogue further became increasingly concerned with the social conditions of freedom, he 
entered a territory about which Oakeshott did not seem to be much worried. 
 That said, up until the late 1980s, Minogue’s public image was still more of a calm 
philosopher of Capitalism with sharp wits than a passionate and zealous cultural critic of 
Scruton’s sort in SG founded in 1976. His presentation of the revival of classical liberal 
theory in a series of the BBC Channel 4 programme The New Enlightenment strengthened 
this impression.42 It is also significant that his invited contribution to Maurice Cowling’s 
 
40 Denham, Think-Tanks of the New Right, 53-57. 
41 John O’Sullivan, “A Tribute to Ken Minogue: Remembering an Antipodean Founder of Thatcherism,” The 
Spectator, July 2013, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2013/07/a-tribute-to-ken-minogue. 
42 Minogue, “May the Market Force Be with Us,” The Listener, November 20, 1986, 8, 10. 
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Conservative Essays, a product of SG of which he was not a member, is quite out of tune 
with the Group’s ethos and primary concern. Subsequently he rarely published political 
commentary in SR until the end of 2010s, namely well after the end of Scruton’s editorship 
in 2001.43 Finally, his contribution to the publications of SAU began to appear some 15 
years after it was established in 1980 to conduct sociological analysis of the cultural 
problems afflicting modern society. This may reflect Minogue’s hesitation to make 
connection with think tanks which were more concerned with the need for political and 
social authority than the advocacy of freedom and individuality. Therefore, tracing 
Minogue’s development of his defence of Thatcherism will not only illuminate Oakeshott’s 
political influence through the CPG as opposed to other more economically-minded and 
policy-centred think tanks. The limited boundary will also be made clearer beyond which 
Minogue’s conservatism can no longer accommodate the territory so easily as it did with that 
of the free marketeers. 
 
1. The Moral Significance of Choice in Individualism 
 
 Thatcherism was frequently attacked from the Left for its paradoxical combination of 
economic permissiveness and moral authoritarianism. The Thatcherites usually dismissed 
the attribution of this alleged paradox, stressing that a free and prospering economy depends 
for its viability exactly upon those virtues which the market alone could not cultivate. 
Minogue was no exception, and often defended Thatcher’s government in precisely these 
terms.44 Nonetheless, if one looks more closely at Minogue’s argument, the content of the 
virtues believed to be essential to a liberal society ranges far wider than what the marketeers 
would think necessary or even be prepared to share. 
 
43  For instance, Minogue, “Governmental Creep,” Salisbury Review, Autumn 2003, 4-7, and Minogue, 
“Morality and the Bottom Billion,” Salisbury Review, Autumn 2009, 11-13. 
44 See, for example, Minogue, “Not Guilty! The Moral Premises of Modern British Conservatism,” Quadrant, 
December 1988, 11. He also published widely in other Australian periodicals and think-tanks, but a significant 
proportion of these writings concerned British politics rather than that of his native homeland. 
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 CPS in its early years can serve as a contrasting example. Probably anticipating 
criticisms from the Left, in the very beginning there was an emphasis on the moral values 
which are essential to sustain the free market.45 This emphasis was in the main narrowly 
focused on those “Victorian” virtues related to economic prosperity such as hard work, thrift, 
and self-reliance. 46  In line with the movement against welfare dependency, Minogue’s 
shared espousal of these values is readily understandable. 
However, the more philosophical source on the basis of which Minogue came to share 
the position of CPS explains why he was soon to transcend this primarily economic doctrine. 
Writing in 1975 on Oakeshott for his native Australian audience, Minogue remarked that 
“readers will recognise in much though not all of what Oakeshott has to say a version of the 
producer’s ethic of enterprise, initiative and risk as elaborated by John Anderson at Sydney 
in the 1940’s.”47 Indeed, had he not come to the Old World and become an Oakeshottian 
during his formative years in the 1960s, Minogue would have been confined to the “Learned 
Clan” of that towering philosopher Anderson in his homeland.48 We will see in the next 
section that this impulse to go beyond what influences him most at a certain stage of his 
academic career is also present in Minogue’s later attempt to break through the confines of 
Oakeshott’s intellectual legacy. That Minogue quickly grew dissatisfied with the economic 
wing of neo-conservatism is therefore unsurprising. 
 In the early years of the rise of Thatcherism, Minogue published several important 
pieces of writing expounding the moral life of individualism as a traditional way of life 
which the British people inherited from their medieval institutions. As it was in the 1970s 
rather than the 1960s, Minogue had the advantage of supporting materials not only of 
Oakeshott’s post-war essays but also the incisive arguments in On Human Conduct. Reading 
Minogue’s works around this period makes one feel like having an approachable interpreter 
 
45 Denham, Think-Tanks of the New Right, 45. 
46 Ibid., 46. 
47 Minogue, “Oakeshott and the Idea of Freedom,” Quadrant, October 1975, 82. 
48 Minogue, “Chieftain of the Learned Clan,” The Times Higher Education Supplement, January 17, 1975, 5. 
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at one’s side when attempting to decipher the dense and arcane prose of Oakeshott’s late 
political philosophy. Thus we read that “[o]ne way in which we may analyse the emergence 
of the modern world is in terms of the intensification of a disposition among more people 
than ever to construe life not in terms of a trial or a pilgrimage, nor in terms of filling one’s 
station by doing one’s duties, but as a game in which the point was to be a success at rising 
in the world.”49 Consequently, selfishness became distinguished from self-interest, vicious 
conflict from cooperative competition, and the common critique from the Left dissolves not 
only in the realm of economics, but also in that of politics. If the achievement of a free way 
of life consists in transforming conflict of interests into competition of skills, then the idea 
of loyal opposition is no longer mysterious. For this is what the political parties in Britain 
had been doing for a long while. One plays the game of politics not against one’s competitor, 
but against one’s own performance in exercising the art of government. That economic 
competition is an analogous game in human life becomes a natural, logical consequence 
rather than something fortuitous and thereby suspect of serving self-interest. 
Certainly, this account is an idealised version of British politics. Nevertheless, with this 
account it becomes clear that whenever Minogue insisted on the central place which morality 
and a common sense realism occupy in Thatcher’s policies,50 he had in mind not merely the 
uncompromising reality of market and the important virtues of industry recognised by 
monetarism, but the free way of life actually embedded in every sphere of the British society. 
Borrowing from Oakeshott’s distinction between self-disclosure and self-enactment, 
Minogue argued that central to this way of life is the moral identity involved in an 
individual’s free exercise of choice. In his own words, “[p]references can be ranked in order 
 
49 Minogue, “Natural Rights, Ideology and the Game of Life,” in Human Rights, ed. Eugene Kamenka and 
Alice Erh-Soon Tay (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), 29. 
50 For example, Minogue, “The Thatcher Experiment,” in The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist 
Institutions in Europe and the U.S., ed. Centre for Political Research and Information (Athens: Centre for 
Political Research and Information, 1981), 103; Minogue, “The Context of Thatcherism,” introduction to 
Thatcherism: Personality and Politics, ed. Kenneth Minogue and Michael Biddiss (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1987), xv; and Minogue, “The Emergence of the New Right,” in Thatcherism, ed. Robert Skidelsky (London: 
Chatto & Windos, 1988), 136. 
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of desire, but choice is a much deeper idea, because it includes consideration not only of 
what satisfactions different courses of action may give, but also the sense of moral identity 
revealed in choosing whatever we way choose.”51 
 It is this more comprehensive concern with morality that marks Minogue’s political 
identity as conservative rather than liberal; and this, not in spite of, but exactly because of 
his seemingly relentless talk of individualism and freedom. This point can be observed more 
clearly from an important pamphlet published by CIS. There Minogue expressed a warning 
against the ideological tendencies latent in Hayek and his more dogmatic followers. Minogue 
used the term “ideology” in a specific sense derived from his important study Alien Powers, 
referring to 
 
the view that the evils of life are not part of an immemorial human condition which it 
is beyond human power to change, or a set of problems to each of which a specific 
solution may be hazarded, as politicians often suggest, but that they are part of a single 
system of dehumanization which determines everything that happens, and which cannot 
be changed except by a complete transformation.52 
 
He usually used this analysis to attack the “apolitical” character of left-wing intellectuals. 
Nonetheless, in “Hayek and Conservatism: Beatrice and Benedick?,” he contended that more 
recently the neo-liberals associated Hayek were prone to the temptation of regarding what 
they cherish as absolute truth in opposition to the hopeless falsity of socialists’ planned 
economy. These liberals became unaware that their beliefs are a political doctrine to be 
argued for in the conventions of parliamentary debate, where both socialism and 
conservatism are no less respectable competitors for the best way to arrange society.53 In 
 
51 Minogue, How Much Justice Does a Society Need? (St. Leonards: Centre for Independent Studies, 1992), 
12. 
52 Minogue, Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology, 2nd ed. (Wilmington, DE: ISI, 2008), 40. First 
published 1985 by St. Martin. 
53  Minogue, “Hayek and Conservatism: Beatrice and Benedick?” in Ideas about Freedom, ed. Khud 
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other words, the problem with economic liberals is that they tend to become as ideological 
as those on the Left. Conservatives may share liberals’ support of market freedom. However, 
in Minogue’s ludic conception of human life, promoting prosperity can hardly be the point 
of it. Failure no less than success serves as a great teacher of an individual’s understanding 
of his own identity. Consequently, with regard to the free market and the “Victorian” virtues, 
the “conservative support for what we have inherited arises from … a concern with our own 
concrete identity, and this is a concern for which Hayek, whose strength lies in abstractions, 
cares little.”54 
 
2. The Complementary Role of Conservatism 
 
 While Minogue’s argument above sounds like a practical translation of Oakeshott’s “On 
Being Conservative,” Oakeshott’s optimism about the vitality and resourcefulness exhibited 
in the moral life of the individual is what Minogue gradually qualified over the years. 
Towards the end of the think-tank publication under discussion, there is a revealing passage: 
 
A human being in the early modern period was identified with his desires, but in that 
intensely individualistic period, desires were thought to constitute a coherent system by 
which possible choices might be rationally judged. The entire apparatus of religion 
reinforced that system and kept it within limits. But with the disappearance of religion 
from many people’s lives, and the expansion of distractions and possibilities, it might 
more plausibly be said of the later generations of moderns that they are bundles not of 
desires, but of mere impulses. This is a very agreeable condition for those living within 
the prosperities of the West, but it is also subject to evident perils; and we just do not 
know from generation to generation how society is changing as a result of it. In such 
 
Haakonssen (St. Leonards: Centre for Independent Studies, 1986), 13-16. 
54 Ibid., 16. 
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circumstances, liberals would be well advised to embrace some of the conservative 
elements of the political tradition to which they belong.55 
 
In LM, Minogue once distinguished between the libertarian and the salvationist traditions of 
liberalism. The former refers to the inclination to question authority which cannot pass the 
test of rational justification, whereas the latter is exemplified by a variety of ideological 
projects aimed at perfecting society.56 If the first half of Minogue’s intellectual life was 
mainly concerned with refuting the salvationist element of liberalism, the late 1980s may 
signify the beginning of the second half of his career  addressing the self-destructive 
elements in liberalism. 
 Certainly, Minogue’s shift of emphasis was all the way accompanied by his continuing 
attack on the servile character of many aspects of contemporary politics. As a reviewer of 
AP points out, at times “Minogue displays an uneasiness about some conservative thought, 
noting that conservatives frequently share with ideologists a hostility to modernity and a 
preference for a past that both groups see as less individualistic, more rooted in integrated 
communities.”57 The defence of individuality Minogue inherited from Oakeshott is obvious 
when he referred to an American neoconservative, Allan Bloom, as on a par with Marx, 
being “both backward-looking critics of modernity who yearn to retrieve the shattered world 
of classical Greece.”58 Nevertheless, upholding modern individualism is not incompatible 
with being alert to the potential pitfalls of the free way of life. Minogue was a thinker realistic 
enough to point out the moral and economic costs any plan of social justice eventually must 
pay. In a similar way, he proved equally prepared to acknowledge the prices for enjoying the 
kind of liberty he had always been advocating. Substantive inequality is notoriously one of 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 Minogue, The Liberal Mind, 57-58. 
57 Grant Morrison, “The Ideological Revelation,” review of Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology, by 
Kenneth Minogue, Modern Age, Winter 1988, 74. 
58 Minogue, “The Graves of Academe,” review of The Closing of the American Mind, by Allan Bloom, The 
Times Literary Supplement, July 24, 1987, 786. 
181 
 
them. For another, at one point Minogue frankly confessed that it is individualism itself 
which contains the seeds of license and impulse.59 
 The distance Minogue travelled in the journey towards the more traditional kind of 
conservatism can be more easily recognised if we view his writings in a longer temporal 
perspective. Writing back in 1965 on the possible effects of liberalism on religion, Minogue 
was still very optimistic about the ability of a Western free society to maintain its moral 
standards, which appear miraculous in the eyes of all other cultures in the world. He told the 
familiar story of the collapse of Christian sexual morality under liberalism’s unending 
demand of justification and its impatience with mysteries. This habit of thought was 
attributed to the West’s peculiar obsession with truth, which inevitably led to conflicts of 
beliefs between different spheres of life.60 In this tension “between the passion for clarity 
and understanding on the one hand, and the ceaseless re-emergence of mystery and 
intellectual difficulty on the other,” Minogue was not worried about the possibility of the 
absolute dominance of either one of these tendencies.61 After all, “the university with its 
open conversation between equals all seeking similar but not identical paths” will keep the 
civilisation in balance and vitality.62 
 Thirty years later, Minogue was no longer willing to leave sexual morality to take care 
for itself. In a review of Andrew Sullivan’s book supporting homosexuality, Minogue 
criticised the author’s mistake in “ignoring the fact that marriage is not merely a framework 
for the satisfaction of desires. It creates families, and families involve children, and upon 
children depends the continuance of our civilization.”63 Furthermore, in defending his case, 
Minogue appealed to one of the famous tropes in conservative arguments. Extending the 
 
59 Minogue, “Theorising Liberalism and Liberalising Theory,” in Traditions of Liberalism: Essays on John 
Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, ed. Knud Haakonssen (St. Leonards: Centre for Independent Studies, 
1988), 196-97. 
60 Minogue, “How Has Liberalism Affected Religion?” The Aryan Path 34, no. 12 (December 1965): 535-39. 
61 Ibid., 539. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Minogue, “A Politics of Homosexuality,” review of Virtually Normal: An Argument about Homosexuality, 
by Andrew Sullivan, National Review, November 27, 1995, 64. 
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enfranchisement of an institution has the paradoxical consequence that the very inclusion of 
a new class of people destroys the original institution in which they first thought they desire 
to participate; so what they actually gain cannot not be what they wanted. Consequently, just 
as the opening of universities to all people regardless of aptitude or disposition resulted in a 
significantly increased number of students studying at institutions which ceased to be 
university in the proper sense; so “if homosexual marriage actually came to be taken 
seriously, this could well be the last straw leading to the collapse of an already weakened 
institution.”64 What makes this review noteworthy is that Sullivan was actually also an 
Oakeshottian intellectual. In other words, here Minogue was gradually going beyond 
Oakeshott’s influence. After all, Oakeshott probably would not hold such strong views 
against homosexuality. Even in his early political philosophy marriage is only notionally 
mentioned as an essential part of the dialectical progression towards the State; no substantive 
account of Scruton’s kind has ever been offered. 
 Minogue’s attitude towards religion also underwent similar modification. Writing in 
1983 when he was still confidently expounding the presuppositions of freedom by analogies 
to a game, formal equality was said to have “come down to us primarily in the religious form 
of a belief that all are equal in the sight of God, but in essence, it seems to me to be the kind 
of equality necessary to games players; for the more unequal the players, the less interesting 
the game.”65 But in 2000 he recognised that the whole ludic conception of life as “a test or 
challenge is deeply embedded in a Christian civilization.”66 Moreover, when asked in an 
interview “Do you think religion is essential to society?” Minogue took it to be more 
fundamental than we thought because there is usually a time lag between the collapse of 
Christianity and the disappearance of its associated virtues.67 
 This provokes the question of why in Minogue’s thought the emphasis on the meaning 
 
64 Ibid. 
65 Minogue, “Freedom as a Skill,” in Of Liberty, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 209. 
66 Minogue, “The Escape from Serfdom,” 13. 
67 Minogue, “Can Individualism Survive in a Collectivist Age?” Policy, Summer 1995, 26-27. 
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of freedom peculiar to Western culture moved gradually to the attack on the permissive 
society. The brief answer is that, a generation after the revolution of the soixante-huitards, 
its corrosive effects on modern life began to manifest itself more unambiguously than 
Minogue had estimated. Therefore, before concluding this chapter, the next section deals 
with the trajectory of this alteration of tone in Minogue’s writings and his changing attitudes 
towards Cowling and Scruton of the SG. 
 
IV. The Late Minogue: Piety, Authority, and Reverence 
 
 In the preface to the reprint edition of LM published in 1999, Minogue regretted not 
realising that “a political program which consisted simply of thumbing one’s nose at the 
pomposities of the Establishment would devastate what we may, as a shorthand, call culture 
and morality.”68 He could not be blamed for it, since that book of 1963 was written before 
the advent of the student revolts. Besides, he was not alone in this naïve opportunism. Even 
a major figure like “Bertrand Russell spent most of his life exploiting—and thereby 
destroying—the pleasures of debunking what was coming to be sneered at as ‘conventional 
wisdom.’ It was only late in life that he remarked that human beings need piety and, he might 
have added, authority and reverence.”69 Now that almost all those institutions such as armed 
services, universities, and churches had been dominated by leftist ideologies and ceased to 
be the generator of non-liberal ways of thought, Minogue was bound to launch his counter-
attack. 
 The solution one adopts largely depends upon how one conceives of his problem at 
hand. Expectedly, Minogue’s first move resorts to his famous analysis of ideologies, the 
main academic genre in which he wrote. In the preface to the second edition of AP, Minogue 
defended the relevance of his earlier dissection of the apolitical nature of ideology after the 
 




collapse of Communism in 1989.70 The result is that feminism, homosexualism, nationalism, 
and even environmentalism were seen to be essentially intellectual descendants of Marxism. 
According to the prevalent discontents one chooses to take advantage of, the flexible 
(because vacuous) concept of the proletariat can be replaced by other targeted classes of 
people (xxiv). This tactic of criticising ideology is operative, for example, in Minogue’s 
indictment of the betrayal of Christianity by liberation theology, which compares the 
Church’s loss of interest in true religion with feminism’s aversion to what most women are 
actually like.71 
Nevertheless, as Minogue was aware, this kind of criticism is valid only with radical 
ideologies. If feminism as a political doctrine also follows the rule of the political game in 
the tradition of parliamentary democracy, proposing specific measures to redress particular 
incoherence in law, then he was prepared to accept it.72 Yet this limited attack on ideological 
ways of thinking hardly suffices to combat the tendency of permissiveness. As we have seen 
earlier, the source of social disorder includes both the salvationist and the libertarian 
traditions of liberalism. Consequently, the dangers of the libertarian element are left 
untouched by denouncing the illusion of perfectionism cherished by radical ideologies. 
 It is here that Minogue’s increasing participation in SAU after 1995 becomes 
informative. Founded in 1980, the role of the SAU in relation to cultural problems was 
somewhat analogous to that of the neoliberal think tanks such as IEA in the 1960s with 
regard to economic issues. Actually, SAU was established within IEA as an offshoot into the 
realm of social policy, though within a few years SAU became independent of IEA, and the 
catholicity of its publications grew more conspicuous. This can be seen from some of the 
SAU’s contributors’ attempt to “demonstrate that capitalism is not merely compatible with 
a Christian outlook, but is in fact the most ‘Christian’ form of political economy there is, at 
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least in relation to [when compared with] Marxism or Christian Socialism.”73 As such, the 
originally more limited moral virtues thought important to economic prosperity are now 
imbued with religious connotations and become part of the Christian way of life, so that “a 
significant role can be set aside for other ‘non-market institutions—schools, the family, 
neighbourhoods, local communities, the church itself—to generate and maintain such 
values.”74 
 In this context, it is unsurprising that Minogue’s contributions to the SAU, and later its 
monthly magazine Standpoint established in 2008, exhibited a wider concern with the social 
problems of license and permissiveness, and a severer criticism beyond what his academic 
analysis of ideology could allow. For instance, in his first publication, Minogue took his 
theme from the student revolution in the late 1960s and attacked the abuse of drugs, the 
addiction to alcohol, and the unthinking defiance of authorities which afflicted various 
spheres of social life including family, work, school, clubs, churches and so forth.75 The 
vacuum left by authority came to be filled increasingly by government regulation, followed 
by inevitable ramifications such as the loss of formality as well as intimacy, and the collapse 
of integrity throughout the professions.76 
 Apparently, these arguments retain an Oakeshottian flavour in that authority is 
construed not as something opposite to freedom, but as one of its important preconditions. 
Moreover, analogous to Oakeshott’s view of the dialectic relation between Hobbes in the 
tradition of Will and Artifice in political philosophy and Plato in that of Reason and Nature, 
Minogue thought it wrongheaded to ask authority to justify itself by reason; for authority is 
needed exactly when an indisputable reason is not available.77 However, as Minogue later 
 
73 Denham, Think-Tanks of the New Right, 68. 
74 Ibid., 72. 
75 Minogue, “The End of Authority and Formality: And Their Replacement by Intrusive Regulation,” in This 
Will Hurt: The Restoration of Virtue and Civil Order, ed. Digby C. Anderson (London: Social Affairs Unit, 
1995), 65-66. 
76 Ibid., 68-75. See also Minogue, “To Hell with Niceness,” Standpoint, February 25, 2009, and Minogue, 
“Slaves of the Bonus Culture,” Standpoint, June 23, 2009. 
77 Minogue, “End of Authority and Formality,” 66. 
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made clear, when he talked about problems of authority in social life, it has to be 
distinguished from the concept of authority as it is dealt with in the political philosophy of 
Hobbes, and a fortiori, Oakeshott.78 This remark is revealing. Oakeshott was impatient with 
various misdirected leftist criticisms of his philosophical account of authority as 
“authoritarian.” For him, that the justification of authority excludes the reasons for its 
desirability is strictly based on a philosophical distinction and has nothing to do with 
practical politics. Here Oakeshott’s indifference to the problems of social morality contrasted 
starkly with Minogue who became increasingly concerned with these cultural problems. 
While “authority” as it is meant in social criticism never finds its place in Oakeshott’s OHC, 
Minogue was by no means contented with being an academic philosopher alone and nothing 
more. In this spirit, he published another long pamphlet defending religion, morality, and 
patriotism against the erosion by the media.79 Though tinted by Oakeshottian elements here 
and there, Minogue’s criticisms went beyond his earlier delimited critique of ideology and 
narrower concern with the meaning of freedom. 
 Nevertheless, there is still a doctrinal distance between Minogue and the members of 
SG, despite the similarities in the views they expressed concerning contemporary issues in 
politics such as permissiveness and Euroscepticism. In the introduction to his edited volume 
Conservative Realism sponsored by CPS, Minogue characterised the key figures he thought 
representative of the brand of conservatism to which he belonged: 
 
What I have been calling ‘conservative realism’ ought not to be confused with Tory 
realism, a much more specific and locally rooted view of politics—one which might be 
described as ‘poetic’ rather than philosophical. Indeed, it is so specific a plant that 
Oakeshott, Kedourie and Letwin themselves could hardly claim it—Oakeshott because 
he was a philosopher, and Tory conservatism is above all not a philosophy, and Letwin 
 
78 Minogue, The Servile Mind: How Democracy Erodes the Moral Life (New York, NY: Encounter, 2012), 297. 
79 Minogue, The Silencing of Society: The True Cost of the Lust for News (London: Social Affairs Unit, 1997). 
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and Kedourie because, like many of the present contributors, they came from abroad.80 
 
One suspects that the localness of Tory conservatism actually refers to Cowling, as he was 
based in Cambridge; likewise, the poetic character may best be exemplified by Scruton’s 
prose. Concerning Cowling, Minogue’s view of him has always been a complaint about his 
reductionist tendencies. Reviewing Cowling’s The Nature and Limits of Political Science 
and Mill and Liberalism back in 1964, Minogue thought that the interpretation of an author’s 
arguments through uncovering his intentions alone, without engaging the very arguments 
put forward, does not do justice to the author in question, and is somewhat akin to Marx’s 
trivial unmasking of hidden interests behind a plethora of knowledge claims.81 After more 
personal contact through the think-tanks, Minogue’s strictures about Cowling’s “Tory 
Marxism” softened over the years. Yet in Minogue’s obituary of Cowling one can still 
perceive that this is one of the main gulfs between the LSE Right and the Peterhouse Right 
which is difficult for Minogue to bridge.82 
 Minogue’s discussion of Scruton was relatively little in spite of the latter’s feverish 
involvement in the SG 1978 and the Education Study Group of CPS, and shared participation 
in CPG. Reviewing another author’s book, Minogue once mentioned Scruton in passing, 
criticising that his dogmatic conservatism “suggest[s] the radicalism of the 1960s” and, with 
its conviction that “there is only one right path in politics,” is quite different from “anything 
that might be called conservative in Oakeshott.” 83  Perhaps Scruton also softened his 
conservative views later, but the shift of focus in Minogue’s later social criticism did make 
him more appreciative of Scruton’s contribution to the revival of conservatism. Though not 
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by George Watson, The Times Literary Supplement, January 17, 1986, 65. 
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directly reviewing Scruton’s own publication, Minogue regretted that Scruton has got 
enough denouncement, but not enough academic engagement which his conservatism 
deserves.84 This may be a public statement by Minogue, but may as well be a personal regret 
of his own lack of effort in combating more fiercely the corruption of modern morality than 




 In this chapter, we have observed how Minogue inherited the strict separation between 
political philosophy and practical politics in Oakeshott’s early general philosophy, and how 
he nonetheless went beyond the role of an academic and became a public intellectual. In the 
beginning, Minogue borrowed heavily from Oakeshott’s late political philosophy in his 
support of Thatcherism. This is achieved mainly through his distinctive interpretation of 
conservative realism which supplements the neo-liberal, economic side of neo-conservatism. 
However, delving deeper into the social conditions of freedom, Minogue’s political 
commentary gradually touched upon contemporary moral and cultural problems. This 
development is what Oakeshott’s influence alone cannot fully account for, though on the 
other hand Minogue has always kept an intellectual distance with the more traditional, Tory 
conservatism exemplified by Scruton and other thinkers. 
Nevertheless, in making the judgment that Minogue eventually did not follow 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy in every aspect, we have relied primarily on Minogue’s own 
understanding of Oakeshott. In later chapters, we will see that Minogue’s interpretation and 
use of Oakeshott’s ideas by no means monopolises the way conservative thinkers were 
influenced by Oakeshott. The next chapter deals with Scruton’s more Hegelian account of 
freedom which Minogue, discarding Idealism very early, was reluctant to embrace; but 
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which Oakeshott’s early political philosophy may readily accommodate. The chapter on 
Peregrine Worsthorne further demonstrates that the moral life of the individual in 
Oakeshott’s late political philosophy does not necessarily refer to the free way of life 
exemplified by the middle class, but symbolises the ideal of an authoritative aristocracy 






Back to a Full Theory of the State: 




 I have devoted the first half of this thesis to an intellectual portrait of Michael 
Oakeshott’s development of his general and political philosophy. This is followed by a case 
study of Kenneth Minogue, who, participating in contemporary public debates, adhered 
faithfully to the late Oakeshott’s portrayal of the moral life of the individual and the 
concomitant account of civil association. It is natural that the subsequent chapters should 
deal with thinkers who can provide a contrast. If we were to go on with other Oakeshottians 
such as Shirley Robin Letwin, such efforts would amount to little more than what the chapter 
on Minogue has already done in illustrating the significance of Oakeshott’s political thought 
in the history of British conservatism. After all, if most conservative intellectuals are 
influenced by Oakeshott’s late works, why should we refrain from identifying the late 
Oakeshott directly as a conservative as well? What is the point of having paid so much 
attention to the early Oakeshott? 
 These considerations may help us highlight more clearly the way in which our 
interpretive framework is laid out in the former part of this thesis. Our account of Oakeshott 
avoids the alignment of his political philosophy with any conservative or liberal ideological 
position. Having qualified those arguments which represent the late Oakeshott as a liberal, I 
do not thereby take Oakeshott’s early philosophy (or what remains of it in his later writings) 
as a manifestation of conservative tendencies. This move is tempting especially considering 
Roger Scruton’s philosophical conception of the gulf between conservatism and liberalism, 
as we will see in this chapter. However, what prevents us from understanding Oakeshott’s 
development of his ideas as a partial transition from conservatism to liberalism is not 
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primarily the necessity of being faithful to his own insistence on the modal separation 
between philosophical enquiry and practical politics. This is not to deny the importance of 
what a thinker intends to express through his writings. In any case, we have already pointed 
out the reasons for thinking that there is still a practical role in society reserved for the 
philosopher in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy. 
 Rather, our motivation consists in the more important need to accommodate different 
strands of conservatism in our historical picture. What makes Oakeshott interesting in this 
picture is precisely the fact that the difference between his early and late philosophy is useful 
to our understanding of the tensions within conservatism. The example of Minogue shows a 
tradition of conservatism directly influenced by Oakeshott’s late political philosophy. Had 
we interpreted the late Oakeshott as a liberal, we would have been puzzled by Minogue’s 
self-identification as a conservative. We would also have failed to understand the 
significance of his view that conservatism complements liberalism by enriching the concept 
of individual’s choice, that is, by elevating the satisfaction of desire from the philistine level 
of irrational impulses to a serious matter of moral identity. 
 On the other hand, if we regarded Oakeshott’s late political philosophy instead as a 
conservative doctrine, we would not only be at a loss as to what to do with his early political 
philosophy. We would also be unable to make space for another development of 
conservatism that focuses not on the individual as such, but on the associations, institutions, 
customs, and traditions in society which nourish the individual’s moral identity in the first 
place. In the context of this development, it is the early Oakeshott’s attempt at a full theory 
of the State or the social whole that would be properly conservative. The lack of discussion 
about the importance and complexities of various spheres of social life in his late writings, 
then, would rather be a sign of unfortunate infection by the liberal disease. Therefore, in 
order to take Scruton into account as well, it is necessary to set aside the question of 
Oakeshott’s ideological position. 
In short, the relationship between philosophy and ideology is itself a contestable 
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philosophical issue which lies outside the concern of our exercise in intellectual history. Our 
framework of interpretation refuses to decide whether Oakeshott’s political philosophy is 
conservative or liberal, not because it presupposes that philosophy and ideology are logically 
distinct. After all, the public intellectuals to be integrated into our historical account are 
prepared to buttress their political commentary by philosophical arguments. Rather, it is 
because both the early and the late Oakeshott’s writings are rendered conservative in 
different ways by Minogue’s and Scruton’s respective contributions to the development of 
conservatism, that it becomes necessary not to attribute any unitary ideological stance to 
Oakeshott. It becomes equally necessary to consider the early Oakeshott, and by extension 
the British Idealist and pluralist philosophy, as the context in which Scruton’s political 
thought can be made intelligible. 
 Therefore, this chapter will be dedicated mainly to an analysis of Scruton’s political 
philosophy. Through comparisons with Oakeshott and Minogue, we will be able to arrive at 
a more accurate characterisation of Scruton’s position than his more casual and polemical 
works in conservative dogmatics would allow, though these more practically relevant 
sources will also be cited in support. Nevertheless, in this thesis our interest is not confined 
to political philosophy alone, but includes more concrete engagements with contemporary 
politics as well. This has already been exemplified by the chapter on Minogue. Consequently, 
Scruton’s contributions to public debates, and the think tanks associated with him, will be 
the topic of the next chapter. 
 
II. The Politics of Culture: A Radical Conservatism? 
 
 In the previous chapter, we have noticed that even a sympathetic expositor of 
conservatism like Minogue found in Scruton nothing which is conservative in the 
Oakeshottian sense. Minogue’s main criticism of the ideology of the Left is that it attributes 
the causes of social problems to the ills of the fundamental human condition, and therefore 
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attempts to solve these problems by comprehensively politicizing our social life. When he 
complained about the radical overtones of the 1960s in Scruton’s works, what he had in mind 
was Scruton’s tendency to extend political discourse beyond what in Minogue’s view should 
be the proper concern of politics.1 
 This impression is largely confirmed if we focus only on Scruton’s more political, and 
thus less philosophical writings. In the statement of the first issue of The Salisbury Review 
(henceforth referred to as SR) in 1982, the organ of the Salisbury Group which Scruton edited 
from its very beginning to 2000, it is announced that 
 
We hope to carry similar articles in future issues, devoted to matters such as race, 
sexuality, death and religion, which, while deeply implicated in the conservative vision 
of society, are passed over in the prevailing liberal philosophies of the state. It is in the 
nature of conservatism that politics is not the only matter for discussion. Like classical 
socialism it maintains an outlook on all those aspects of culture and society that have 
been thrown into the crucible of change.2 
 
This passage was a response to Maurice Cowling’s call, in the first collection of essays 
published under the auspices of the SG in 1978, to combat the narrow conception of what is 
relevant to politics, and to enrich the conservatism of the present by incorporating those 
“discussions and considerations which are not primarily or necessarily political.”3 In that 
volume, Scruton also contributed an essay on “The Politics of Culture.” He argued that the 
practical knowledge of the culture of a community is a prerequisite for the statesman’s 
success because knowing what is right to do in politics involves locating the true voice of 
the society which he governs.4 In this sense a conservative politics has to engage with social 
 
1 See Ch. 6, sec. IV. 
2 Christopher Silvester and Roger Scruton, “Statement,” The Salisbury Review 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1982): 2. 
3 Maurice Cowling, “The Present Position,” in Conservative Essays, ed. Maurice Cowling (London: Cassell, 
1978), 23-24. 
4 Scruton, “The Politics of Culture,” in Conservative Essays, 110-13. 
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and cultural issues apart from the more narrowly political ones. 
In this account Scruton referred approvingly to Oakeshott’s critique of rationalist 
ideology and managerial conception of the state, and “the voice of society” sounds like a 
reinterpretation of Oakeshott’s notion of “the pursuit of intimations” during the post-war 
development of his early general philosophy. Nevertheless, Scruton’s position can hardly be 
accommodated by Oakeshott’s late political philosophy. The earlier passage cited from SR 
is notable for its implication about what distinguishes both conservatism and socialism from 
liberalism. It is the recognition, or the lack thereof, that more is at stake in a complete 
philosophy of the state than politics strictly conceived. In the context of this “politics of 
culture,” the difference between Oakeshott’s early and late political philosophy acquires an 
ideological significance. We have observed that he gradually narrowed the scope of the 
subject matter of political philosophy. Concomitantly, in his late works he confined his 
attention to the difference between the moral lives of the individual and the individual 
manqué (transformed into the anti-individual), and the parallel contrast between civil and 
enterprise associations. The role played by various social institutions between the state and 
the individual is a theme which the late Oakeshott did not attempt to analyse in detail. In an 
address summarising the arguments of On Human Conduct in 1975, Oakeshott even 
denounced the “drivel about something called ‘society,’ a fanciful total of unspecified 
relationships which only a simpleton would think of identifying with a state.” 5  This 
deliberate neglect is a far cry from the solemnity of the early Oakeshott. For him a political 
philosophy would fall short of its title if it analysed only different forms of government 
without having something significant to say about family, school, marriage, war, property, 
and, in short, the social whole that is the State.6 Judging from Scruton’s perspective, this 
change in Oakeshott’s philosophy of the State would amount to a transformation from 
conservatism to liberalism. On the other hand, given Minogue’s close adherence to the late 
 
5 Michael Oakeshott, “Talking Politics,” in Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays, new and expanded ed. 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), 450. First published in National Review, December 5, 1975. 
6 See Ch. 2, sec. II. 
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Oakeshott’s political philosophy and his identification of it with the conservative tradition 
of political doctrine in Britain, it is little wonder that Scruton’s “politics of culture” should 
have aroused so much of Minogue’s suspicion. 
 Minogue was not alone in expressing reservations. Another Oakeshottian academic, 
Noël O’Sullivan, also thought that Scruton asked too much of politics and ran the danger of 
moving conservatism beyond parliamentary debates and towards anti-constitutional 
radicalism.7 What is more surprising and ironical is that, even in the same first issue of SR, 
the reviewer of Scruton’s The Politics of Culture, and Other Essays cautioned against the 
politicisation of culture and favoured the old-fashioned, limited conception of politics.8 
However, if we examine Scruton’s earliest scholarly articles in political philosophy in 
addition to his more careless expression of the broad conception of politics, we will find that 
these representations of Scruton’s view are inadequate because they are incomplete. 
 In “The Significance of Common Culture” (1979), Scruton justified the extension of 
the scope of politics without implying the politicisation of what in this account is rendered 
politically relevant or “accessible.” He began with his own conception of the task of political 
philosophy: 
 
Now political philosophy is, at least in part, the elaboration of a theory of human nature 
in terms of which the sphere and aims of politics may be described. Any theory of 
human nature which does justice to the facts will not confine itself to the philosophy of 
institutions, and will not regard the sphere of politics as delimited by specific rights and 
privileges such as those I have just referred to [i.e. private property and education]. It 
may have to recognize the “political accessibility” of many things more basic to rational 
nature than the institutions of property and education, things in respect of which there 
 
7 Noël O’Sullivan, “The New Right: The Quest for a Civil Philosophy in Europe and America,” in The Nature 
of the Right, ed. Roger Eatwell and Noël O’Sullivan (London: Printer, 1989), 179. 
8 Mark Le Fanu, “Adversarial Critic,” review of The Politics of Culture, and Other Essays, by Roger Scruton, 
SR 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1982): 44. 
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can be no rights and privileges. It may have to make room for a politics of culture, 
where culture includes everything that an anthropologist might wish to subsume under 
that term.9 
 
This formulation throws into sharper relief the nature of the incompatibility between Scruton 
and the late Oakeshott. For the latter, politics is precisely the activity of seeking coherence 
and balance in the existing rights and duties, of “attending to” rather than “making” legal 
arrangements. 10  Or, in the language of OHC, politics is the deliberation about the 
desirability of laws which are not commands to be obeyed in undertaking a shared enterprise, 
but adverbial rules of conduct to which individuals are obliged to subscribe in pursuing their 
self-chosen ends.11 Scruton’s dissatisfaction with accounts of politics of this “liberal” or 
procedural type concerns its narrow focus on the legal framework. Nonetheless, the 
broadening of this focus beyond what lies within the scope of the state’s constitutional action 
does not thereby entail that the sphere of the state’s legitimate interference now includes all 
the cultural activities in society. That is, it does not follow that Scruton’s broadened account 
of politics should also advocate making statutory Acts for the sake of common goals such as 
the restoration of culture. 
This point is important to our understanding of Scruton’s objection to, for example, the 
establishment of National Curriculum from above in the Education Reform Act of 1988. This 
objection was notable because this Act was the first serious attempt, after nearly a decade of 
ineffective Conservative endeavours in education policy, to combat the “relevant” and 
indoctrinatory courses in schools which Scruton had also strongly criticised by devoting 
nearly all his pamphlets in the 1980s to this cultural cause. Due to the neglect of Scruton’s 
more nuanced philosophical account of politics, the widespread representation of this Act, 
which also strengthened parental choice in the education system, as a contradictory 
 
9 Scruton, “The Significance of Common Culture,” Philosophy 54, no. 207 (January 1979): 51. 
10 See Ch. 5, sec. II. 
11 See Ch. 4, sec. III. 
198 
 
conglomerate of the free economy and the strong state simplifies and mislocates the real 
tensions between the neo-liberal marketeers and the neo-conservative traditionalists.12 
 Nevertheless, at this stage, neither did Scruton provide a guarantee that his extended 
conception of politics is, unlike socialism which shares this wider concern with the whole of 
our human condition, proof against the fallacy of politicising society. An argument to this 
effect should show that those cultural affairs which politicians should take into consideration 
are not of politics’ making and cannot be decided by political means, probably but not 
necessarily in the fashion in which the early Oakeshott understood the relationship between 
law and morality. For Oakeshott, it is because the State has social morality so earnest in its 
mind that it refuses to touch upon those matters which its touch would mar. Certainly, 
Scruton’s political commentaries exhibited a clear recognition of this limitation. For instance, 
he observed in a tone similar to Mingoue’s that the cause of the catastrophe in the twentieth 
century lies in “the repeated attempt to create, by politics alone, that ‘unity about a common 
purpose’ which will be a final substitute for consensus.” 13  Again, in relation to the 
encroachment of the welfare state and the erosion of the enterprise spirit, Scruton 
commented that “to imagine that our [economic] decline is a purely political problem is 
precisely to give way to the radical illusion … that all social problems might therefore be 
finally solved.” 14  More importantly, politics is explicitly defined as the expression, 
reconciliation, and acceptance of conflicts of interest, so that the “political process is 
therefore only one part of life, and dependent for its success on a more general acceptance 
of the human condition.”15 This is a conclusion in line with Oakeshott’s argument in “The 
Claims of Politics,”16 as is the advice Scruton later gave to the East European countries 
longing for national revival after the collapse of the Soviet’s control of these satellite states: 
“do your best to ensure that politics in general, and democracy in particular, are of no 
 
12 More details will be explored in the next chapter. 
13 Scruton, front matter of SR 3, no. 1 (October 1984): 2. 
14 Scruton, front matter of SR 3, no. 3 (April 1985): 2. 
15 Scruton, front matter of SR 3, no. 2 (January 1985): 2. 
16 See Ch. 2, sec. III. 
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overriding importance in the lives of the people. Take as your goal not a particular kind of 
politics, but the depoliticization of society. Only in a depoliticized society is the practice of 
politics possible.”17 
Admittedly, these are merely assertions, not arguments. Yet, as the preface to his widely 
cited The Meaning of Conservatism (1980) makes clear, Scruton did not intend to provide 
answers to the philosophical questions raised by his political commentaries in these more 
practical writings.18 It is thus pointless to direct criticisms at his works of “dogmatics” 
which are not meant to be a contribution to scholarship in the first place. 
Even in the more academic “The Significance of Common Culture,” Scruton was 
preoccupied with establishing the political relevance of culture only. He first made a detour 
to consider the epistemological features of the kind of knowledge involved in understanding 
a culture, and expressed F. R. Leavis’ position in the language of analytical philosophy that 
this kind of knowledge involves certainty of one’s emotions which is not reducible to 
scientific knowledge.19 Then, he defended in a Hegelian manner the view that this cultural 
knowledge is acquired not within the individual himself, but through his participation or 
self-realisation in social life.20 The importance of the politics of culture is thus justified by 
the fact that political arrangements may have an impact on those aspects of social life on 
which the well-being of the individual depends. However, once the “political accessibility” 
of culture is demonstrated, the question of whether culture, being thus politically “accessible,” 
belongs to the legitimate range of state activity is set aside: 
 
So clearly there is a real question as to the political provision for the satisfaction of 
human desires. Whether one considers it the duty of the state to provide for this 
satisfaction is not in issue. It is of course possible to hold that the sphere of political 
 
17 Scruton, “Editorial: Finding Central Europe,” SR 8, no. 3 (March 1990): 47. 
18 Scruton, preface to The Meaning of Conservatism (Middlesex: Penguin, 1980), 9. 
19 Scruton, “Significance of Common Culture,” 52-62. 
20 Ibid., 62-67. 
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significance is wider than the sphere of state authority. Some philosophers [referring to 
Friedrich Hayek in a footnote], believing that the legitimate activity of the state can 
only reside in the enforcement of a code of justice, would look to other lesser 
institutions, or to the ‘civil society’ itself, for the satisfaction of the determinate 
aspirations of individual men. But this issue, of the legitimate activity of the state, and 
of the relative autonomy of its subject institutions, is not relevant to our question. 
Whatever one’s theory of legitimacy, the question of political accessibility will remain. 
For this is a question which must be answered if the value of any particular arrangement 
is to be discerned.21 
 
Consequently, we must look in Scruton’s later philosophical development for such a theory 
of legitimacy that can underpin his more casual remarks against the politicisation of those 
aspects of social life which are nevertheless politically relevant. Nevertheless, by now we 
can at least see the nuance in conservatism concerning the disparity between what is 
desirable in its vision of society and what is desirable to bring about through political means.  
This difference is not identical with Oakeshott’s modal separation between theory and 
practice, where a philosophical proposition undergoes a distortion of its meaning when it is 
transposed to the discourse of practical politics. In any case, we have seen that he gradually 
qualified the radically subversive nature of philosophy in his Idealist conception of it.22 
Scruton’s account here is also different from the discrepancy between thought and action 
which takes a Machiavellian form in the hands of Minogue. For Minogue, what is morally 
right is not necessarily politically right and vice versa, and it is the failure to comprehend 
the significance of Staatsräson and the naïve conception of a politico-moral continuum that 
account for the ideologue’s misunderstanding of politics.23 What is important to our present 
purpose is to notice that even in his theory of political accessibility alone Scruton already 
 
21 Ibid. 68. 
22 See Ch. 4, sec. II. 
23 Kenneth Minogue, The Servile Mind (New York: Encounter, 2010), 209-215. 
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recognised that its scope may well be distinct from that of state authority. Consequently, the 
impression of radicalism conveyed by his conservatism is wholly mistaken. Indeed, his 
important contribution is to remind us that such a wide concern of politics is not the sole 
possession of socialism, as the early Oakeshott and the late Minogue testify. We will see in 
the following sections that in Scruton’s philosophical theory of freedom and corporate 
personality the difference made by the politics of culture manifests itself explicitly. It is also 
in his philosophical arguments that his departure from Minogue and Oakeshott can be more 
precisely characterised. 
 
III. Freedom in the Moral Life of the Individual 
 
 The motivation behind Scruton’s extended notion of political accessibility is to call 
attention to those aspects of social life which are essential to the happiness of individuals but 
received insufficient consideration by conventional politics. Nevertheless, he agreed with 
the traditional conception of a limited sphere of legitimate political action, favoured by 
Minogue and the late Oakeshott. Consequently, the difference between these thinkers 
probably consists in their attitudes towards the causes of the social ills associated with the 
modern human condition. 
 We may usefully begin with Scruton’s handling of the issue concerning the welfare state. 
Since this is also one of the socialist tenets most frequently attacked by Minogue, it is here 
that the difference in their outlook is more likely to display itself. In the 1984 Latham 
Memorial Lecture, delivered in Australia and later published in Quadrant (a conservative 
magazine based in Minogue’s home country to which he frequently contributed political 
commentaries), Scruton attributed the ineffectiveness of conservatism’s attack upon the 
welfare state to its unwise reliance on arguments couched in the liberal language of politics: 
 
Faced with this triumph of impersonality [referring to the welfare state], however, the 
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conservative in recent years has had a single stratagem. He says that we must affirm the 
individual against the state, that we must ‘roll back the frontiers of the state,’ as Winston 
Churchill once put it. Now, someone who says that we must affirm the individual 
against the state, is not going to carry much credence in the modern climate of opinion. 
For to those who stand to lose, this cry for the individual against the state looks like 
another cry for the powerful against the weak. The weaker individual is protected by 
the impersonal state (or at least so he has been persuaded to believe), and the only 
person who will gain by reaffirming the rights of the individual is the one with power. 
The majority of people, not being powerful, see no reason why the interests of the 
powerful should be furthered.24 
 
The qualification in the parentheses is an important clue. In light of this, we can regard 
Minogue’s whole intellectual endeavour as an attempt exactly to dissuade the “weaker” 
individual from the mistaken belief that the welfare state can protect him from poverty and 
unemployment, and guarantee the satisfaction of both his physical and mental needs. On the 
contrary, the despotism of the welfare state will further encourage the servile mentality which 
deprives him of the ability to enjoy a free way of life, the spirit of initiative and enterprise, 
and the resourcefulness necessary to his feeling at ease in the human condition of modernity. 
By contrast, for Scruton it is too rash to dismiss out of hand the understanding which the 
majority of people have of their own situation. “The complaint against ‘alienation’ may, of 
course, be so much self-indulgence: after all, it issues from people who are ‘not at home in 
the world.’ Nevertheless, we ought for that very reason to take it seriously: when self-
indulgence becomes the norm, something is wrong with the society that engenders it.”25 
From this perspective, we can understand Scruton’s willingness to countenance most of 
 
24 Scruton, “The Usurpation of Australia,” in The Philosopher on Dover Beach: Essays (Manchester: Carcanet, 
1990), 277. Previously published in Quadrant, November 1984. 
25 Scruton, “In Defence of the Nation,” in Philosopher on Dover Beach, 308. Previously published in Ideas 
and Politics in Modern Britain, ed. J. C. D. Clark (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
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socialism’s diagnosis of the problems of modernity (though not its radical solutions to them), 
for “it is the state of alienation which, in inviting despotism, makes despotism possible” in 
the first place.26 
 Therefore, the task lying before Scruton is two-fold. First, he must show that the root 
cause of alienation in modern society is not the institution of private property or freedom as 
such. If this socialist analysis were accepted, the solution could be nothing but despotic. 
Secondly, he must also point out where the liberal conception of freedom goes wrong, and 
substitute for it a conservative one which preempts the problem of alienation. This task is 
accomplished by the arguments in his philosophical essay “Freedom and Custom” published 
in 1983 by the Royal Institute of Philosophy. Since this article appeared in the same volume 
where Minogue also contributed his “Freedom as a Skill,”27 it is instructive to pursue 
Scruton’s argument to the point beyond which even Minogue’s enriched (that is, compared 
to the marketeers) account of freedom could no longer accommodate. 
 Scruton began with a minimal version of the liberal theory of freedom. Through 
pointing out its insufficiencies at each stage, he inflated (as the analytical philosophers 
usually put it, sometimes not without pejorative connotations) this theory of freedom by 
successively incorporating philosophical resources until it eventually becomes a 
conservative one. The simplest liberal account construes freedom as the individual’s ability 
to satisfy his desires freely without any constraints. Certainly, Minogue’s conception of 
freedom is far from the naivety of this account; but his initial delineation of the distinctive 
features of freedom clearly conforms to this schema by maintaining that freedom is not about 
the catering for needs (central to socialism) but the satisfaction of desires.28 
The inadequacy of this naïve account of freedom, Scruton argued, becomes evident 
after we distinguish between various kinds of desires, and come to recognise the possibility 
of an individual having certain desires which he nonetheless does not intend to satisfy 
 
26 Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, 124. 
27 Minogue, “Freedom as a Skill,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 15 (March 1983), 197-215. 
28 See Ch. 6, sec II (i). 
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(because they are fleeting or mere velleities, for example). Without the notion of intention, 
that of desire alone cannot account for the observation that “[a] political order which 
obstructs only those desires which a man has no intention to fulfil clearly removes less of 
his freedom than one which obstructs his intentions while leaving other desires to fulfil 
themselves at will.”29 Although Minogue’s discussion about freedom is less systematic, it 
does take this complication into account. As the previous chapter has shown, he also 
emphasised that the individual he talks about is not a bundle of impulses but a person of 
rationalised desires.30 
 To continue with Scruton’s argument, when an individual does not intend to satisfy 
some of his desires, it is not necessarily or only because these desires do not involve a long-
term perspective or are not profound enough. It may as well because he is aware that the 
satisfaction of these desires does not result in the satisfaction of himself. Consequently, a 
self-conscious being “has, not only desires and intentions, but also a conception of his own 
satisfaction, and a conception of the desirable (of the value of the object of desire).”31 
Against the background of these philosophical distinctions, the virtues of the concept of 
freedom in Minogue’s exposition become more evident. In distancing his position from 
vulgar individualism, he clarified the notion of free choice as not merely the freedom to 
satisfy whatever desires one happens to entertain, but also involves the decision to become 
a particular kind of person in thus choosing. Therefore, choice implies the responsibility for 
one’s moral identity, and Minogue took this profound concern in the moral life of the 
individual as the most important feature which distinguishes conservatism from liberalism.32 
 In short, the difference between Scruton and Minogue does not lie in their 
understanding of the sophistication implicated in the freedom of self-conscious human 
beings. It consists instead in their answers to the question of what makes this kind of moral 
 
29 Scruton, “Freedom and Custom,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 15 (March 1983), 184. 
30 See Ch. 6, sec. III (ii). 
31 Scruton, “Freedom and Custom,” 185. 
32 See Ch. 6, sec III (i). 
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beings possible, or how the individual acquires the skill of exercising this freedom. As the 
previous chapter has shown, the importance which Scruton attached to tradition and custom 
was acknowledged by Minogue only gradually and implicitly in his late years, but is not 
incorporated into his original theory of freedom.33 By contrast, rejecting both the Kantian 
account of autonomy and the existentialist doctrine of authenticity, Scruton’s theory of 
freedom borrows heavily from the familiar Hegelian argument: the capability of free choice 
cannot arise from the moral resources internal to the individual, but has to be nurtured 
through his participation in the various institutions of social life, which are the 
presupposition of rational agency instead of its products.34 
With the help of this argument, Scruton can side with liberalism in emphasising the 
importance of the individual’s moral understanding of himself in any serious account of 
freedom; and in defending this first-person perspective against the dangerous socialist notion 
of the objective needs or “real” interests of which the individual may be unaware or 
misinformed, and which therefore has to be determined from the outside by a bureaucratic 
state. Nevertheless, at the same time this argument also enables Scruton to show that the real 
culprit leading liberalism to its antithesis, socialism, is its flawed individualism which 
alienates the individual from his social life in the first place: 
 
If we consider that, because men are free by nature, their freedom does not need to be 
acquired, then not only do we commit an evident logical fallacy; we naturally begin to 
think of institutions in a single, highly distorted way. They become not the precondition 
but the outcome of human freedom. (Or, if they are not the outcome of freedom, they 
are then dismissed as local tyrannies.) It is characteristic of liberal thought to see all 
institutions on the model of what lawyers call “voluntary associations”—even the 
institutions which constitute the state.35 
 
33 See Ch. 6, sec IV. 
34 Scruton, “Freedom and Custom,” 188-92. 




Therefore, in his more casual writings Scruton seldom devoted much space to the concept 
of freedom. For him, it is more important to consider the associations, institutions, customs 
and traditions (especially those that are not voluntary) through which freedom acquires its 
value in a public world of meanings. 
 It is useful to take stock of our argument so far. I have pointed out that Scruton’s 
extended account of what is politically “accessible” is the key to uncovering the hallmark of 
his conservatism. Contrary to the view of many commentators, this account does not imply 
the politicisation of social and cultural life. Nevertheless, nor does it possess the theoretical 
resources to guarantee against such politicisation. We are thus in need of a theory of 
legitimacy to delineate the proper scope of the state’s activity which, at the same time, must 
be different from that held by Minogue and the late Oakeshott. Otherwise, such a theory of 
legitimacy could not buttress Scruton’s distinctively wide conception of politics. We have 
noticed that Scruton’s Hegelian theory of freedom goes beyond Minogue’s analysis of this 
concept. Consequently, the remaining task of this section is to consider whether it is his 
theory of freedom that provides such the required account about the scope of legitimate state 
activity, and distinguishes Scruton’s conservatism from other versions with a narrower 
conception of what is politically relevant. 
 In Scruton’s argument the emphasis is shifted from the concept of freedom itself to its 
preconditions, namely the various social institutions which make possible the acquisition of 
the ability to live a free way of life. It may prove more immediately illuminating to focus on 
one of such institutions which is central to our present concern: law, or the medium through 
which government exercise its power. In this regard, Scruton’s account agreed with 
Oakeshott and Minogue’s formulation that the freedom as it has been traditionally 
understood and enjoyed in Britain is “a freedom to do precisely what is not forbidden by 
law,” though he was more interested in the fact that “what is forbidden by law records a long 
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tradition of reflection on the nature and constitution of English society.”36 The potential of 
this formula for evaluating contemporary policies is far-reaching. For instance, commenting 
on the introduction of the Poll Tax and the Community Charge by the Conservative 
government, Scruton responded that the subject rightly “expects taxation to conform to its 
inherited idea of fairness, and this idea is not the logical outcome of a clear philosophy, but 
the muddy residue of a thousand years of dealing between sovereign and subject.” 37 
Consequently, his complaint about this new local tax was not primarily that it transfers 
resources from the private sector to where they are bound to be inefficiently used. Rather, he 
was concerned with the ramifications of this transfer for the subject’s freedom. Noting the 
socialist tendency of this tax which is hostile to civil society and all the institutions lying 
outside the reach of the state, Scruton urged that “[a] truly conservative reform in local 
government would have had as its first concern the liberation of voluntary associations from 
a tax that is calculated to destroy them.”38 
It would be too hasty to characterise the difference between the conservatism of Scruton 
and liberalism simply as one between the protection of those social institutions, which are 
essential to the individual’s self-fulfilment, from the encroachment of the state, and on the 
other hand the protection of the individual from the tyranny of both these institutions and 
the state. This would presume a too simplistic account of liberalism which is unable to 
accommodate its complicated history. Commenting on the erosion of the moral sense of 
criminal punishment in post-war Britain, Scruton admitted that the demoralisation of society 
is not a problem admitting of a political solution because “[n]othing short of a religious 
revival can turn the tide against decay.”39 To think otherwise is exactly to commit the fallacy 
of politicising society. Nonetheless, “[t]he external impediments to crime, unlike the internal 
constraints of moral feeling, are the true concerns of politicians. And it is here—in eroding 
 
36 Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, 18. 
37 Scruton, “Editorial,” SR 8, no. 4 (June 1990): 42. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Scruton, “Editorial,” SR 10, no. 2 (December 1991): 46. 
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the ethics and the institutions of criminal justice—that modern governments must take the 
blame.” 40  In other words, for Scruton, the state should discharge its responsibility by 
removing these permissive trends in its law and institutions of punishment which have 
constituted an obstacle to the development of the individual’s moral life. This view about the 
scope of state authority in effect sounds very similar to the Bosanquetian conception of the 
State as the “hinderer of hindrances” which, as we have seen previously, Oakeshott’s account 
of law in his early political philosophy also echoes. However, other British Idealists and 
pluralists contemporary to the early Oakeshott also shared an account about state activity of 
this “removal of obstacle” kind. More importantly, some of them, like T. H. Green, even 
adapted the Hegelian framework to the native condition of Britain in shoring up their liberal 
credentials. The view that the various social institutions are essential to the individual’s 
development of his ability to exercise freedom, as it turns out, is not unique to Scruton’s 
conservatism. 
Here we are in a position to revise our earlier judgment that Scruton’s conservatism can 
be understood by embedding it in the context of Oakeshott’s early political philosophy, 
whose full theory of the State exhibits a similarly avid concern with the institutions of social 
life. In fact, as late as 1948 when Oakeshott was beginning the revision of his earlier 
conception of political philosophy, he still discussed the scope of the state’s activity in the 
following manner: 
 
The politician in office may be said to have a second function to perform. It is to take 
the initiative in seeking out the current mischiefs and maladjustments in a society and 
to set them right, not arbitrarily but by bringing to bear upon them the legal principles 
which constitute the recognized method of adjustment in any experienced and civilized 





individual” (who may be either the beneficiary or the sufferer of the mischief) and “the 
government,” but also the vast mass of healthy relations between the members of a 
society (some established by law and others by custom) which, from any point of view 
except that of revolutionary jusqu’aboutisme, are more important than the few which 
are morbid.41 
 
The reference to both law and custom suggests that Oakeshott, like Scruton, recognised in 
the individual’s social life the importance of both the institutions which arise from voluntary 
association and those which are not the product of choice or consent. For, Oakeshott 
continued, 
 
we do not begin by being free; the structure of our freedom is the rights and duties 
which, by long and painful human effort, have been established in our society. 
Individuality is not natural; it is a great human achievement. The conditions of 
individuality are not limitations; there is nothing to limit. And the adjustments of those 
conditions are not interference; they are the continuation of the achievement.42 
 
Instead of regarding these passages simply as conservative remnants which were to fade 
away in Oakeshott’s late political philosophy, we should notice that they reflect the 
intellectual context of his formative years in the early 1930s, namely Idealism. As we have 
seen earlier, the influence of this context was by no means purely conservative. Consequently, 
although Scruton’s argument shares the wider concern with social life in Oakeshott’s early 
political philosophy, this is not the distinctive feature of his renewal of conservatism during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, we have another example of the virtues of refraining from 
 
41 Oakeshott, “Contemporary British Politics,” review of Labour Marches On, by John Parker, and The Case 
for Conservatism, by Quintin Hogg, in Luke O’Sullivan, The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence (Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2007), 216. First published in Cambridge Journal 1 (1948): 474-90. 
42 Ibid., 216-17. 
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prematurely assigning ideological identities to Oakeshott’s philosophy in the framework of 
this thesis. Had this been done beforehand, we would have been easily misled in making an 
inadequate characterisation of Scruton’s conservative political thought solely or mainly in 
terms of his Hegelian account of freedom.43 
To conclude this section, the philosophical element which makes Scruton’s 
conservatism distinctive must lie somewhere else. In the following, we turn to his renewal 
of the doctrine of corporate personality in the attempt to understand the nature of the evil of 
communism and other totalitarian regimes. Here Scruton finally provided his philosophical 
argument concerning the nature of the state’s activity, and further criticised the kind of 
liberalism (e.g. Minogue’s conservatism from Scruton’s perspective) which, despite having 
been enriched by Hegelian Idealism, is unable to recognise fully the moral (in addition to 
the legal) reality of social institutions. More significantly, even the early Oakeshott had 
already expressed doubts about the notion of corporate personality by the early 1930s. In 
other words, it is more probable that the distinctiveness of Scruton’s conservatism consists 
in his departure from the mainstream in the tradition of English jurisprudence. 
 
IV. Corporate Personality and the Cold War Political Context 
 
 An intuitive way of understanding conservatism is to construe its central tenet as the 
conservation of what is valuable in the inherited institutions of a society. We have seen that 
in Minogue’s view what is worthy of conservation is the individual’s free way of life which 
has been led and enjoyed by the British people, and indeed, by all those spreading across the 
whole Anglosphere. Scruton would not disagree with this laudable interpretation of 
conservatism, but preferred to give more importance to the conditions which make this 
 
43 It is undeniable, of course, that in Scruton’s less philosophical works it is often his Hegelian elements that 
are more conspicuous. See Stefan Collini, “Hegel in Green Wellies: Roger Scruton’s England,” review of 
England: An Elegy, by Roger Scruton, in Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 196-208. 
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freedom possible. Celebrating the unique virtues of his own culture distinct from the rest of 
the world, Scruton revealed its underlying secret thus: 
 
the idea of corporate personality and the comparable English concept of the trust lie at 
the root of Western institution building, and have become cornerstones of law and 
politics throughout the Western world. Such concepts are among what is most 
distinctive of our civilization and constitute a prime explanation of its success.44 
 
The tone is less triumphant than Minogue’s not without a reason. In fact, Scruton’s narrower 
reference to the “comparable” English law of trust contains a critique of English lawyers’ 
reluctance to recognise the moral personality of corporate groups over and above their legal 
identity. Consequently, he was more broadly concerned with similar ideas in the wider 
Western culture (than the Anglosphere) which may provide a corrective to the English 
tradition; the ideas, namely, surrounding the notion of corporate personality. 
 The priority in Scruton’s argument is not to establish that the moral personality of 
associations is important to the individual’s self-realisation. Certainly, this proposition is no 
less important and is closely connected with his Hegelian account of freedom examined in 
the previous section.45 Nevertheless, what is distinctive in his conservatism lies rather in his 
reference to the real personality of the state. In his political commentaries, Scruton utilised 
fairly frequently the distinction between the state as a person and the state as a thing to 
portray the corruption of politics brought about by socialism (or at least its ideological, anti-
constitutional moments approaching communism). For instance, concerning the welfare 
state, he argued that the fostering of the “illusion of a ‘natural right’ to home, health, wealth 
and comfort” transforms the state into “a kind of machine, a centre of distribution, an alien 
 
44 Scruton, “Spengler’s Decline of the West,” in Philosopher on Dover Beach, 24. Previously published in The 
World and I, September 1988. 
45 For his argument on this matter, see Scruton, “Corporate Persons,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Supplements 63 (1989): 264-66. 
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object which sometimes grants, and sometimes withholds, what is thought of as an 
independent right.”46 Again, with regards to criminal punishment, Scruton reacted strongly 
against the view that the cause of crime is rooted in “society” and hence the purpose of law 
is to reduce its crime rates. If we accept these assumptions and understand the task of 
punishment in terms of rehabilitation and deterrence, then the “state ceases to appear as the 
citizen’s friend, and begins to take on the aspect of a bureaucratic process, a conspiracy of 
the enlightened to render impotent the natural feelings of the ordinary man.”47 Conversely, 
to conceive punishment as an institution which gives the criminal what is his desert, is to 
“uphold the ideal of the state as person, as will and as end in itself: that is the ideal of 
conservatism.”48 
 That Scruton put more emphasis on the personality of the state than that of the 
associations (where the individual nurtures his capacity of freedom and moral personality) 
is understandable in the political and military confrontation between the West and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. As a philosopher, it was his task to find a metaphysical (as 
opposed to empirical or historical) explanation for the unaccountability of the Communist 
government. The commonplace criticisms of particular undesirable features of the social life 
under Communist rule is something that should be left for second-rate political 
commentators to express. Scruton’s philosophical answer is that when a state is 
depersonalised and becomes a thing, it loses the ability to hold responsibility for its 
wrongdoing. On this basis, he urged the new governments of East European countries to 
ascribe “legal personality to all potential wrongdoers—including the Communist Party, the 
Secret Police and their agents” because it is important to “prosecute all these for their crimes, 
and to sue them for their civil wrongs: even to the point where their assets are forfeit.”49 
Furthermore, at a time when the West was taken unawares by Mikhail Gorbachev’s talk of 
 
46 Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, 50. 
47 Scruton, “Editorial,” SR 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1983): 46. 
48 Scruton, Meaning of Conservatism, 82. 
49 Scruton, “Editorial,” SR 8, no. 2 (December 1989): 47. 
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perestroika, Scruton still poured relentless condemnations on such “reforms” of the 
Communist Party, for “they seem designed precisely to reinforce this extra-legal character 
of the party, to ensure, in other words, that it is never the party itself that is arraigned before 
a court of law, but always some ‘mistaken’ or ‘criminal’ element within it. This is the root 
cause of the party’s lack of accountability.”50 
However, to make sense of these examples, it does not seem that we need to commit 
ourselves to Scruton’s stronger view about the moral personality of the state. Is not its legal 
identity sufficient to make it accountable to both the individuals and their associations and 
institutions? What did Scruton mean when he said that the state is a person “not only in the 
legal sense but in a deeper sense, once captured in the institution of monarchy but displayed 
more widely and more discreetly through the rule of law”?51 To answer these questions and 
to characterise Scruton’s departure from the English tradition of jurisprudence, we have to 
consider his philosophical essay “Corporate Persons,” published at the turning point of 
political history in 1989, in the intellectual context of British Idealism and pluralism. 
Scruton began his argument with a delineation of the various features manifested by 
corporate personality in general, showing that the recognition of such personality by law is 
not only merely a small part of the complex phenomenon of social life but also arises from, 
rather than precedes, the moral reality of this personality. In particular, corporate persons 
have their decision-making process, are capable of free and responsible action, have moral 
and legal rights and duties, possess law-making capacities, are objects of praise and blame, 
undergo prosperity and decline in history, exhibit habits of mind, and stand in human 
relations with persons both natural and corporate.52 Certainly, personality is a matter of 
degree, and it is not the business of Scruton’s argument to defend the indefensible claim that 
all associations and institutions possess corporate personality in the sense of exemplifying 
every feature in this list. Nevertheless, with this full picture at hand in advance, he was able 
 
50 Scruton, “Editorial: Finding Central Europe,” 45. 
51 Scruton, Thinkers of the New Left (Essex: Longman, 1985), 208. 
52 Scruton, “Corporate Persons,” 245. 
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to consider the reasons underlying the unwillingness of the tradition of English jurisprudence 
to recognise the legal personality of corporate groups, especially the state. One of them is 
that the concept of trust in English law makes that of corporate personality unnecessary: 
 
It is true, as [F. W.] Maitland has demonstrated, that the device of corporate personality 
is not strictly necessary for the protection and control of associations—the English law 
of trusts being a rival method, whose very existence might tempt us to the view that 
“personality,” like “trust,” is a mere creature of the law which discerns it, and not 
something that exists “in itself.”53 
 
However, referring to the celebrated Taff Vale case in the beginning of twentieth century, 
Scruton argued that there is an inherent tendency in law to recognise personality even though 
the recognition may not fall under that description, and even though the Parliament may 
attempt to resist this tendency.54 What Scruton’s comments further suggest is that this 
resilience of law would be difficult to explain if the personality it acknowledges were merely 
a legal device designed for the sake of convenience but not a moral reality in the first place. 
In other words, it is on account of a significant development in the moral life of a people that 
law (at least in the conservative vision), seeking to reflect morality and enforce justice in the 
dealings among the subjects and the state accordingly, is predisposed to recognise the moral 
fact of group personality through whatever legal devices may be available from their national 
tradition. 
 Nevertheless, largely borrowed from Maitland, Scruton’s renewed argument so far is 
not conclusive. For example, in considering Maitland’s position, Ernest Barker expressed 
doubts about the “nebulous” talk of real personality beyond the legal sense,55 and thought 
 
53 Ibid., 246. 
54 Ibid., 246-47. 




that the theoretical advantages of moral personality can still be preserved when it is reduced 
to a legal notion: 
 
even if we reduce the group to the category of a juristic person, we may still hold to 
Maitland’s main tenet, and plead that such personality grows and is not made. In other 
words, these juristic persons can exist, and do exist, before there is any legal act of 
incorporation or “creation,” just as law itself can exist, and does exist, before there is 
any legal act of legislation. Law, Gierke writes, is the result of a common conviction 
not that a thing shall be, but that it is; and in the same way we may hold that juristic 
personality is the result of a common conviction not that corporate persons shall be 
allowed to exist, but that they exist already.56 
 
It is certainly possible to question the ontological status of this pre-existing personality which 
is not moral but legal, as Oakeshott did in 1934. However, the early Oakeshott’s criticism of 
Barker’s compromising account is mainly launched from the general perspective of the 
shared doctrines of philosophical Idealism,57 not based on his particular views in political 
philosophy. Therefore, we can set Oakeshott aside for the moment until we are in a position 
to consider his objection to corporate personality in On Human Conduct. The significance 
of Barker’s position is that, without understanding the reason which led thinkers such as 
Barker to deny moral personality to corporate groups, Scruton’s argument would still be 
incomplete and in need of further philosophical arguments.58 
 
56 Ibid., 154. 
57 “Professor Barker suggests, further, that legal personality, unlike psychological or moral personality, is a 
construction, not a datum; but that it is not on that account less real. But he would appear to be on dangerous 
ground when he says that psychological and moral personality are ‘an immediate datum of perception and 
consciousness.’ A better line of attack would, perhaps, be to take personality in all its forms as a ‘mental 
construction,’ one form being not less ‘artificial’ than another.” Oakeshott, review of Natural Law and the 
Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, by Otto von Gierke, tr. and intro. Ernest Barker, in Concept of a Philosophical 
Jurisprudence, 99. First published in Cambridge Review 56 (1934): 11-12. 
58 To be sure, Scruton did engage closely with Barker’s two metaphysical arguments against the attribution of 
moral personality to corporate groups. Nevertheless, since these issues, like the early Oakeshott’s criticism of 
Barker, belong to the philosophy of mind, they lie outside our present concern with political philosophy. See 
Scruton, “Corporate Persons,” 247-53. 
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 The reason, Scruton suggested, can be attributed to the “suspicion of the German 
Genossenshaft, with Hegelian and Fichtean overtones. It is a small step, the English liberal 
supposes, from Gierke’s Genossenshaft to the corporate state.”59 Here we begin to deal not 
with the corporate personality of associations in general, but the moral personality of the 
state in particular. It will prove instructive to consider Barker’s critique of Bernard 
Bosanquet’s views in this regard because Bosanquet’s position lies halfway between those 
of Barker and Scruton. For Bosanquet, we may literally talk about a group mind which exists 
in the minds of its members in virtue of a uniting idea; though this group mind cannot exist 
apart from the members of this group, it nevertheless exists over and above the aggregation 
of those individual minds. 60  This position is less extreme than Scruton’s view that a 
corporate person may outlive all of its present members yet, like a natural person whose 
identity persists through time, remain the same person; and it is bolder than Barker’s refusal 
to grant any moral reality to group persons. 
It is noticeable that, of such a philosopher as Bosanquet whose views about corporate 
personality were at best moderate, Barker’s evaluation still focused primarily on the potential 
danger of the State’s immunity to moral criticism, let alone the metaphysically more stronger 
position such as that of Scruton’s: 
 
[Bosanquet] argues, in the first place, that a distinction has to be drawn between the 
acts of the State as such, and the personal acts of its statemen or agents; and he insists 
on the impropriety of applying to acts which belong to the first sphere the moral terms 
which belong to the second. …. It cannot be bound by the system of rights and duties 
which it makes binding on its members …. At most, we can criticize its actions on the 
ground that they embody a low conception of the good, or that they involve means 
inappropriate to realize a true conception; but in such criticism we criticize the State 
 
59 Ibid., 247. 
60 Barker, Political Thought in England, 61. 
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not in relation to any wider good or any more general morality to which it should 
conform, but in regard only to its own good and its own morality.61 
 
In response to this theory of the State, Barker sympathised more with another view which 
gives greater weight to the responsibility of the State. Referring to the French system of 
administrative law before whose court the State may be held accountable for its wrongdoing, 
he argued that “[i]f a citizen can thus treat his own State as legally responsible for damage, 
it is difficult to see why a State, which can undergo legal responsibility, should not also 
undergo moral responsibility, if there is any body of moral opinion to affix responsibility.”62 
Here Scruton may query again whether in attributing moral responsibility to the State Barker 
would inevitably presuppose its moral personality as well, the possibility of which Barker 
had already rejected. Moreover, the early Oakeshott may also reply that Bosanquet’s refusal 
to apply the same moral praise and blame to the State which are applicable to natural persons 
is rooted in his own metaphysical doctrines. Consequently, it is irrelevant to criticise his 
theory of the State on the basis of its possible political ramifications. Just as a critique of the 
account of “self-realisation” in political philosophy has to show its inadequacy as a 
philosophical analysis rather than as a practical aim of individuals, so a critique of 
Bosanquet’s account of the “State” has to demonstrate what is philosophically unsatisfactory 
about understanding our criticism of the State in terms of its own conception of the good 
rather than in ordinary moral terms. 
 More importantly, in Barker’s portrayal of Green, no such problem arises. Green took 
the relation between the State and the groups in society as seriously as that between the State 
and the individuals, and construed the task of the State as the adjustment of rights both 
internal to a group as well as among groups. However, he prevented the apparent finality of 
the adjustments made by the State from being confused with irresponsible government, by 
 
61 Ibid., 64. 
62 Ibid., 65. 
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invoking the idea of universal brotherhood in the discussion about the relation between the 
State and the groups beyond the level of society.63 In other words, the problem concerning 
the unaccountability of the State is solved without the idea of corporate personality playing 
any role in this account. In contrast, Scruton’s approach is diametrically the opposite. Armed 
with a full commitment to the idea of corporate personality, it is precisely the applicability 
of ordinary moral evaluation to the state as a person that makes it accountable to its own 
deeds. With comparisons to Bosanquet in mind, it becomes clear that for Barker the 
introduction of the state’s moral personality brings more problems than it solves, whilst for 
Scruton this introduction is exactly the solution. 
 This difference in attitudes towards the moral personality of the state can be understood 
more clearly by considering the different conceptions of the state and its legitimate activity 
in Barker’s and Scruton’s political philosophy. For Barker, 
 
failure to distinguish State and society may lead to unlimited State regulation of life. It 
is safer to distinguish, as we in England have always distinguished, between society 
(with its ‘social’ atmosphere, its ‘social’ morality, and its ‘social’ institutions) and the 
State (with its political institutions, its laws, and its officials). … But roughly we may 
say that the area of the one is voluntary co-operation, its energy that of good will, its 
method that of elasticity; while the area of the other is rather that of mechanical action, 
its energy force, its method rigidity. If we drew such a distinction—if we thus conceive 
the State as regulating externals by force, then we necessarily adopt a more cautious 
attitude to the State.64 
 
It follows that if we do not conceive the state according to such a mechanical analogy, our 
attitudes towards it would naturally be different. From Scruton’s perspective, the problem is 
 
63 Ibid., 32-33. 
64 Ibid., 54. 
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not that we should not understand the relationship between state and society in this 
dichotomous way, but that the dichotomies thus drawn are too narrow. Not all associations 
in society are voluntary or contractual, and neither does the view that the state is a moral 
person thereby entail that it is “an association of individuals, already united in various groups 
each with its common life, in a further and higher group for a further and more embracing 
common purpose.”65 Rather, 
 
we should distinguish among associations between the voluntary, the involuntary and 
the non-voluntary; between the contractual and the non-contractual, and, within the 
contractual, between those constituted by a contract among their members, and those 
which contract with their members; between those with an independent purpose, those 
with an internal purpose (e.g. the Church), and those with no purpose at all; and, within 
all those, between the personal and the impersonal.66 
 
With the help of these distinctions, extracted from Gierke’s works and further fine-tuned, 
Scruton was able to show that the state, while being a compulsory association, can 
nevertheless both have no purpose at all and be personal. It is the possibility of this 
conjunction of non-purposefulness and moral personality of the state that is neglected in the 
late Oakeshott’s account of societas and universitas.67 The distinctiveness of Scruton’s 
conservatism, therefore, lies in his attempt to theorise these concepts anew to understand the 
 
65 Ibid., 155. 
66 Scruton, “Corporate Persons,” 245. 
67 “Some who, in later times, have been disposed to understand the character of a state as a corporation 
aggregate have thought it proper to theorize it in terms of a ‘real’ personality (a fictitious person could be 
created only by a superior legal authority), or a ‘common’ or even a ‘real’ will. But postulates of this sort are 
not required in order to make it intelligible. The character of a state suggested by the analogy of a corporation 
aggregate is nothing more abstruse than that of a many of intelligent agents become one in the joint pursuit of 
a common substantive purpose and in the enjoyment of the means necessary for undertaking the managerial 
decisions entailed. It is not (or we need not suppose it to be) many persons transformed in one Person. It is a 
many speaking with one voice, not because all the tongues have miraculously become one Tongue, or because 
all the intelligences concerned have become one Mind, or all the wills one Will, but because (unlike socii) they 
are agreed, not merely to speak the same language, but to say the same thing and are equipped with the means 
of committing themselves to or acknowledging such common utterances as their own.” Oakeshott, On Human 
Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 205. 
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imminent political threat of Soviet Communism. 
 In contrast, Barker’s context was more strictly intellectual. The contribution of lawyers 
to the debates over corporate personality was only one among many currents of thought 
defending the rights of groups against the authority of the State. The concerns with guilds in 
socialism, with devolution to national groups in liberalism, and with the Church in 
conservatism, are all contemporary trends in political philosophy at Barker’s time.68 Despite 
his inclination to limit the activity of the State, he responded to these trends by defending 
the legitimate sphere of the State’s action against exaggerated claims on behalf of group 
rights of whatever kind: 
 
It is harder, but it is very necessary, to see that voluntary co-operation is only made 
possible by the State, and, what is more, that the more there is of voluntary co-operation, 
the more need there is of the State. …. One has only to look the facts in the face to see 
that the great extension in modern times of voluntary co-operation, both between master 
and man, and between master and master, also meant a great extension of government. 
Government has had to keep pace with industry: government has had to solve its 
problems by Factory Acts, Company Acts, and Acts innumerable.69 
 
For Scruton, the individual’s social life includes associations such as the family and the 
Church which cannot be understood through the analogy of firms or the model of voluntary 
co-operation in common pursuit of an external purpose. As a result, neither does his view 
about the legitimacy of the state focus on the adjustment of rights and duties in the legal 
framework. Yet, again, purposefulness and personality are not necessarily linked with each 
other. In Scruton’s account, it is not the task of the state to promote morality directly, not 
because we have to side with Green’s contention that “the State proper, the State as such, 
 
68 Barker, Political Thought in England, 222. 
69 Ibid., 101. 
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can only promote morality indirectly, by the removal of obstacles, or, in other words, by the 
guarantee of rights, which are not morality but the conditions of morality.”70 Rather, it is 
because the associations and institutions, through which the individual acquires his own 
moral personality, are also real persons which are the making of the state. It is the failure to 
respect the autonomy of social institutions that transforms the personal state into a thing, 
whose mechanical and irresponsible interference with the social life turns both natural and 
corporate persons into things and is thus rightfully resented by both the individual and the 
groups. 71  Personality requires mutuality, and the state must prepare itself for being 
persuaded by the society it governs, as much as the individual and the groups must be 
prepared to listen to the will of the state. 
To conclude, Scruton’s account of the state’s personality is not only concerned with 
limiting the authority of the state, but also protecting it from the subversion of radical 
ideologies. The example of criminal law was indeed related to the terrorist activities of the 
IRA in the 1980s. In this context, the attribution of moral personality to the state was 
certainly not motivated by the fear of an uncontrollable state. What the state does in restoring 
the moral sense of desert in its institutions of punishment is not primarily to remove the 
obstacles which lie in the way of the individual’s moral development (though this is of course 
important). Rather, it is first and foremost to maintain the state’s identity as a real person: to 
express its will, to convey to the criminal the moral significance of punishment, to stand in 
a human relation to him, and to regard him as equally a rational being who can understand 
the reasons of punishment and can be persuaded, instead of a malfunctioning part of a 
machine to be fixed or “reformed” regardless of his understandings and intentions. In short, 
in place of the Kantian kingdom of ends in liberalism, Scruton provided a “world of 
corporate persons and free association” as the philosophical antithesis of collectivism, and 
as the conservative answer to both the internal and external threats to Britain’s inherited 
 
70 Ibid., 55. 
71 Scruton, “Gierke and the Corporate Person,” in Philosopher on Dover Beach, 71-72. Previously published 
in The World and I, March 1989. 
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 This chapter has provided a characterisation of Scruton’s political philosophy which 
serves as the basis for understanding his conservative ideology. Through the intellectual 
context of Oakeshott, Minogue, and British Idealism and pluralism in the early twentieth 
century, we examined in order Scruton’s “politics of culture,” his account of freedom and 
the individual, and his theory of corporate personality. It is clarified that Scruton’s extension 
of what is politically relevant to the whole culture of a society does not imply the socialist 
politicisation of society, and that this broader conception of “political accessibility” is also 
shared by the early Oakeshott and the late Minogue. The difference between Scruton’s 
account of freedom and Minogue’s, too, is insufficient to pin down the distinctiveness of 
Scruton’s conservatism. For the Hegelian seriousness about the various associations and 
institutions can also be found in some of the British Idealists and pluralists whose ideological 
identities, if such a practical concept can be applied to their philosophies at all, are liberal or 
at least not necessarily conservative. Following this thread of thought, Scruton’s views about 
the moral reality of corporate personality, especially that of the state, are examined in relation 
to these thinkers and found to be the true hallmark of his conservative political philosophy 






Roger Scruton the Intellectual: 




 In Chapter 6 we showed that Minogue’s popularisation of his account of freedom is 
best understood in the context of the late Oakeshott’s political philosophy; but Minogue’s 
growing concern with the moral and cultural problems caused by permissiveness—with the 
preconditions of freedom—goes beyond what Oakeshott’s late political philosophy can 
accommodate. Chapter 7 then noted that Scruton’s theory of freedom is more substantial 
than Minogue’s primarily because Scruton placed more emphasis on the various social 
institutions through which the individual’s ability to exercise freedom is cultivated. This 
Hegelianism can in principle be embedded in the framework of Oakeshott’s early political 
philosophy. However, the genuine hallmark of Scruton’s political thought consists in his 
philosophical doctrine of corporate personality, which even the early Oakeshott’s broader 
political philosophy is reluctant to incorporate. The purpose of these two chapters is to 
illustrate the fruitfulness of our interpretive framework based on Oakeshott’s philosophical 
works. The framework is useful not merely in relation to the similarity other thinkers bear 
to Oakeshott. It is even more so in identifying the distinctiveness of these thinkers. 
 Nevertheless, since the previous chapter is concerned with Scruton’s political 
philosophy only, we are still unable to judge whether corporate personality also characterises 
the peculiarity of his conservative ideology. Therefore, we must consider Scruton’s more 
practical and polemical writings about contemporary political issues. Due to the limitation 
of space and Scruton’s prolific output, I shall examine only his political commentary within 
the field of education policy. This focus is reasonable because almost all his published 
pamphlets during the 1980s and 1990s dealt with the theme of education. This shows how 
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important he took this area of public policy to be. However, in these think-tank publications 
one searches in vain for any application of the idea of corporate personality to education 
politics. As the next chapter will show, this task was instead taken up by the journalist 
Peregrine Worsthorne, whose conservatism is even more traditionalist and more of the old 
world than Scruton’s. In contrast, despite various derisory remarks on the neo-liberal wing 
of Conservatism, Scruton’s views on education actually exhibited a sincere attempt to 
accommodate what is valuable in free market ideology. This is surprising given the 
Hegelianism in his political philosophy. 
The findings of this chapter and the next will enable us to relocate the tensions between 
different branches of the New Right, and further strengthen the usefulness of our interpretive 
framework. Our route from Minogue to Scruton and then to Worsthorne might at first sight 
appear to follow a simplistic one-dimensional spectrum between freedom and authority. The 
disparity between Scruton’s political philosophy and conservative ideology complicates this 
distinction. If we had accepted the conventional characterisation of the New Right in terms 
of the contradictions between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, we would have been 
blind to the nuances which mark the conservatism of these followers of Oakeshott. Similarly, 
had we accepted a particular interpretation of his philosophy (such as that provided by 
Minogue) and regard his influence as primarily liberal, we would not have been able to 
appreciate the wider significance of Oakeshott in post-war conservatism. In this regard, 
while Scruton’s conservative ideology further manifests the limitation of Oakeshott’s 
influence and more generally the limited power of philosophy to guide politics, Worsthorne’s 
conservatism is entitled to claim itself as another reasonable development of Oakeshott’s 
political thought not in spite of, but because of being more traditionalist and less 
philosophical than Scruton’s version. 
 




As E. H. H. Green points out, intellectually speaking, Thatcherism had long existed 
avant la lettre in the 1950s and the 1960s to the extent that at the time the Conservative 
response to the post-war consensus was more of a “pragmatic” acquiescence than a 
“normative” agreement. 1  From a long-term perspective, this kind of intra-party debate 
usually intensified when the Party was out of power or uncertain of its future course of 
policy.2 Educational thought was no exception. It is therefore unsurprising that current 
literature in this field has focused on the uneasy tensions between different groups of 
Conservative intellectuals who had a special interest in education. 
 Just as the reduction in expenditure upon the Welfare State under the premiership of 
Margaret Thatcher draws most attention from commentators, in the area of education the 
Education Reform Act 1988 (henceforth ERA) has also proven to be the most radical and 
controversial piece of legislation since the Education Act 1944. Following Andrew Gamble’s 
general characterisation of the New Right as involving contradictions between the free 
economy and the strong state,3 it has been customary among analysts of education policy to 
argue that similar ideological inconsistencies between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism 
existed in the ERA, among different think-tanks, and even within a single thinker on 
education. For example, at the level of policy, Denis Lawton noted that 
 
The Act [ERA] is interesting because it faces two ways ideologically: the clauses 
dealing with open enrolment, local management of schools, Grant Maintained Schools 
and City Technology Colleges are all concerned with increasing parental choice and 
encouraging schools towards market competition; on the other hand, the sections 
dealing with Higher and Further Education, and the ILEA [Inner London Education 
 
1 E. H. H. Green, “Thatcherism: A Historical Perspective,” in Ideologies of Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 237-38. 
2 Green, introduction to Ideologies of Conservatism, 5. 




Authority] increased central control.4 
 
With regard to the philosophies espoused by groups of Conservative intellectuals, Clyde 
Chitty referred to the division between “neo-liberalism [which] prioritizes freedom of choice, 
the individual, the market, minimal government and laissez-faire” and “neo-conservatism 
which prioritizes notions of social authoritarianism, the disciplined society, hierarchy and 
subordination, the nation and strong government.”5 Finally, at the individual level, Ken 
Jones observed that 
 
these two tendencies are contradictory, and at points their contradictions have 
recognisable effects at the level of policy and action. In reality, however, they generally 
complement each other, even to the extent of inhabiting the mind of the same individual. 
In education, figures for the most part associated with the cultural right, such as 
Baroness Cox … can appear as authors of free market publications, and the models of 
school organization worked out by libertarian think-tanks can swiftly be adopted by 
“cultural” thinkers like Roger Scruton.6 
 
This delineation of the New Right in education became popular in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s,7 and remained the conventional wisdom well into the 2000s.8 Furthermore, in 
their more recently renewed accounts of the history of education in Britain, these 
educationists have persisted in putting forward the same distinction and classifying different 
 
4 Denis Lawton, The Tory Mind on Education 1979-94 (London: Falmer, 1994), 92. 
5 Clyde Chitty, Towards a New Education System: The Victory of the New Right? (Sussex: Falmer, 1989), 212. 
6 Ken Jones, Right Turn: The Conservative Revolution in Education (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989), 38. 
7 See Stephen J. Ball, Politics and Policy Making in Education: Explorations in Policy Sociology (London: 
Routledge, 1990), 34; John Quicke, “The ‘New Right’ and Education,” British Journal of Educational Studies 
36, no. 1 (February 1988): 8; and Keith Crawford, “A History of the Right: The Battle for Control of National 
Curriculum History, 1989-1994,” British Journal of Educational Studies 43, no. 4 (December 1995): 437. 
8 For example, Sally Tomlinson, Education in a Post-Welfare Society, 2nd ed. (Berkshire: Open University 
Press, 2005), 26-27; and Daniel Callaghan, Conservative Party Education Policies 1976-1997: The Influence 
of Politics and Personality (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 10-11. 
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thinkers accordingly.9 As such, it is safe to say that the unravelling of the paradoxes in neo-
liberalism and neo-conservatism has been the leading approach to studying the New Right 
in education during the 1980s and before. 
Unfortunately, even though a few commentators like Jones quoted above noticed that 
their distinction does not neatly classify Conservative intellectuals, they did not explain why 
and how the mutually contradictory tendencies of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism can 
be complementary, or at least taken to be so by some of the Conservative intellectuals. 
Commenting on this shortcoming in analyses of the New Right, Scruton pointed out in an 
editorial of the Salisbury Review (henceforth SR) that 
 
[a]nalysis is rendered especially difficult by the fact that the phenomenon of 
“Thatcherism” has so far defied the impoverished conception resources of its 
commentators. The press experiments with labels—“right-wing,” “authoritarian,” 
“libertarian,”—unmindful of their meaning, and therefore indifferent to the 
contradictions that arise when they are conjoined.10 
 
In other words, it is risky and requires further evidence to characterise an intellectual trend 
in terms which even its protagonists themselves rejected as contradictory and inadequate. To 
make matters worse, it does not even help to construe the tension instead in terms of the 
division between those who took neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism to be compatible with 
each other (e.g. Minogue as we noted previously) and those who were reluctant to do so 
(Scruton are usually listed here).11 Concerning education, if Scruton turns out to defend a 
reconciliation of parental choice and teacher authority in schools but argue against the 
 
9 Chitty, Education Policy in Britain, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 47; Jones, Education 
in Britain: 1944 to the Present, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), 104; and Ball, The Education Debate, 3rd 
ed. (Bristol: Policy, 2017), 81. 
10 Roger Scruton, “Editorial,” The Salisbury Review 4, no. 1 (October 1985): 47. 
11  See Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson, Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributors to the Political 
Thought of the Modern Conservative Party, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 105-20. 
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marketisation of university education, it becomes clear that the problem lies deeper. 
Therefore, we need a more nuanced characterisation of the complexities within the New 
Right which is based on other distinctions than that between neo-liberalism and neo-
conservatism as it is usually defined. 
 This does not mean that there are no intellectuals associated with the New Right who 
did not criticise neo-liberalism or who took it to be incompatible with neo-conservatism. 
Rather, my argument is that it is more important to understand the reasons and underlying 
principles by which New Right thinkers considered marketisation a desirable solution or 
otherwise to a particular problem of public policy. In this regard, Scruton’s conservatism is 
especially interesting because education is the area where he departed from his usual 
contempt for the marketeers and actively advocated similar policies of privatisation.12 
 Before portraying the distinctive characteristics of Scruton’s pamphleteering activities 
during the 1980s, the next section will first outline the historical context in which the 
organisation and standards of education became a political issue in the previous decade or 
so under the intellectual influence of the Black Papers (henceforth BP). We will then be in 
a position to see how thinkers usually taken to be neo-liberals such as Stuart Sexton come 
so close to Scruton and his colleagues at SR. This will finally help us identify Scruton’s 
unique contribution to the New Right in education. 
 
III. The Black Papers, 1969-77 
 
 The Black Papers were a series of five pamphlets edited by C. B. Cox and A. E. Dyson 
from 1969-70 onwards, with Dyson replaced by Rhodes Boyson in the last two volumes 
published in 1975 and 1977. BP were originally part of a journal of literary criticism, The 
 
12 “For many of Mrs. Thatcher’s advisors, it seems, the answer to every social problem is “privatise.” Even if 
this answer is sometimes the right one—as, for instance, in education, where the state monopoly has been the 
opportunity for organised subversion—it is also sometimes the wrong one.” Scruton, “Editorial,” SR 7, no. 4 
(June 1989): 51. 
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Critical Quarterly, and were mostly preoccupied with the ramifications of 1968 student 
revolts in universities. Nevertheless, BP soon gave more attention to primary and secondary 
education, their standards of achievement, and their organisation. The historian of education 
Brian Simon once argued that this shift of focus was an evasion of responsibilities by the 
editors who, as university lecturers, were reluctant to blame themselves for the failure of 
higher education and place the burden instead on the lower levels of education which had 
produced unqualified university students in the first place.13 For our present purposes, we 
can set this issue aside. Our historical account is not concerned with the intentions of BP 
contributors, nor with the question of whether their positions are tenable. The task before us 
is to give an account of what they did or did not claim, and how their ideas were subsequently 
developed by thinkers associated with the Conservative party. 
 BP are important to our historical account because they exerted a strong influence on 
the public debate over education during the 1970s and beyond. This can in part be attributed 
to their successful dissemination. The Conservative intellectual Angus Maude played an 
important role in their circulation both inside and outside the Party, and especially among 
Members of Parliament; but the wide readership of BP also included headteachers and 
teachers in schools, and was further extended ironically through the publicity accorded by 
the hostile Secretary of State for Education Edward Short.14 Moreover, BP’s persuasive 
power was stronger than ordinary pamphlets as well. For, many of their contributors, not 
least the editors themselves, made the journey from the Left to the Right in the course of this 
development of ideas. Finally, some of BP’s late contributors, such as Boyson and Sexton, 
were to wield both intellectual and political influence on the education policy of the Party 
during the 1980s. Therefore, a characterisation of BP is an essential context for 
understanding Conservative education policy, which was highly influenced by the associated 
think-tanks, and identifying Scruton’s peculiar contribution to it. 
 
13 Brian Simon, Education and the Social Order 1940-1990 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991), 396. 
14 Christopher Knight, The Making of Tory Education Policy in Post-War Britain, 1950-1986 (East Sussex: 
Falmer, 1990), 50. 
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However, it is wrong to regard the organisation of BP as a prototype of Conservative 
think-tanks mushrooming from the mid-1970s onwards. For one thing, among its 
contributors there were MPs and parliamentary candidates of the Labour or Liberal Parties 
(not to mention socialist intellectuals such as Iris Murdoch) who also argued against the 
rationalistic imposition of the comprehensive plan,15 or called for safeguards of teachers’ 
standards as a prerequisite of introducing choice and diversity in education.16 
More crucially, concerning the organisation of the education system, the position held 
in BP was quite consistently based upon a notion of equality of opportunity and parity of 
esteem which can be regarded as a continuation of the post-war consensus in education. For 
example, the first post-war Labour Minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson once defended the 
tripartite system established under the Education Act of 1944, albeit in a socialist way where 
all kinds of education, analogous to their corresponding varieties of labour and profession, 
are equally valuable in their contribution to the good of the whole society.17 Academic 
education should not be thought of as the most desirable form, and the meaning of selection 
is to give pupils the opportunity of receiving the kind of education which best suits them 
individually. Against this background the Labour Party’s move towards comprehensive 
education and the ideal of equality of outcome during the 1960s can be regarded as a 
modernising attempt to go beyond the post-war consensus.18 This move made the defence 
of selection and meritocracy in education the unique possession of Conservatives. 
Consequently, it is understandable why Labour’s new education policy left some old socialist 
thinkers like Murdoch puzzled at a reform of education which removed opportunity from 
precisely those working-class pupils whom socialism had been most eager to help in the 
beginning of the Labour movement.19 
 
15 C. S. Hilditch, “‘Prove All Things:’ A Test for Comprehensives,” in Black Paper Three: Goodbye Mr Short, 
ed. C. B. Cox and A. E. Dyson (London: The Critical Quarterly Society, 1970), 41-48. 
16 Renee Soskin, “From a Disillusioned Liberal,” in Black Paper 1977, ed. C. B. Cox and Rhodes Boyson 
(London: Temple Smith, 1977), 21. 
17 Jones, Education in Britain, 22. 
18 Ibid., 55. 
19 “[F]ew things are more agonizing and anxious-making, both in childhood and later, than to feel that one has 
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On the other hand, it is arguable that the real Tory view lurking behind the post-war 
consensus is hostile to the idea of social mobility brought about by equal educational 
opportunity. For instance, the defence of Toryism by the conservative journalist Peregrine 
Worsthorne is not based on a nostalgic attachment to the relatively rigid social hierarchy of 
Victorian times. Rather, in his argument, since democratic socialism favours more 
intervention in the lives of the governed, it is more in need of an authoritative governing 
class than conservatism is.20 Unfortunately, the meritocratic élite’s qualification to make 
political decisions comes solely from the process of selection where carrière est ouverte aux 
talents. This makes meritocracy unable to fulfil such a role of social leadership. The 
formation of such an élite leads its members to think that they deserve what they themselves 
have earned through their own efforts. Consequently, their sense of social responsibility is 
seriously weakened, which, indeed, can only be passed on to the next generation by an 
hereditary class. To make matters worse, the socialist effort to prevent the rich from buying 
a privileged education for their descendants only serves to redirect their consumption 
towards more materialist ends. It is precisely socialism that further diminishes what is left 
of the élite’s political authority.21 Although published in 1971, this conception of the social 
function of education as the transmission of class culture and style, to be lost in modern 
meritocracy, is reminiscent of T. S. Eliot’s defence of class as opposed to élite in 1948.22 In 
other words, from the perspective of conservatism until the end of 1960s, it is the adoption 
instead of the eschewal of equality of educational opportunity that appears “modernising” 
(itself a relative word). Therefore, it is inappropriate to regard the development of ideas in 
BP one from a negative criticism of the radical Left to a positive support for the New Right.23 
 
not had the academic advantages which one deserved. Such agony was felt by many of the original leaders of 
the labour and trade union movement, who fought hard for just selective education: it is indeed bizarre to see 
their successors treating academic schooling as an enemy.” Iris Murdoch, “Socialism and Selection,” in Black 
Paper 1975, ed. Cox and Boyson (London: Dent, 1975), 8. 
20 Peregrine Worsthorne, The Socialist Myth (London: Cassell, 1971), 53-54. 
21 Ibid., 68-69. 
22 T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber & Faber, 1948), ch. 2. 
23 Jones, Right Turn, 42. 
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A significant part of the contributors were not Conservatives in the first place, and it is 
unsurprising that the modernisation of the old Toryism was not their concern and did not 
appear in the pages of BP. 
If BP were mainly a continuation of the post-war consensus on education policy, it is 
similarly misleading to say that “the [education] system that the Black Papers advocated in 
the 1970s comprised only five to eight per cent of the state school population.”24 From the 
very beginning, a contributor to the first BP argued that 
 
It is one of the more grotesque ironies of our times that a Labour Government claiming 
a particular interest in the needs of the poor and lowly as well as a special concern for 
high national standards in work and living should have determined a policy for 
secondary education which will beyond a doubt lead to a decline in standards and a 
reduction in the opportunities open to able children—from whatever social background 
they come.25 
 
From then on, the ideal of equal educational opportunity was revealed as the underlying 
motivation of a variety of their policy recommendations. For example, the psychologists 
Cyril Burt, Richard Lynn, and H. J. Eysenck, frequently demonised in education studies, 
explained that the introduction of intelligence tests to complement the selection by high 
scores in English and arithmetic had been exactly designed to select bright working-class 
children for academic education: their talents might otherwise remain unnoticed under the 
influence of research which claimed that their aptitudes were hereditary. 26  Again, the 
denouncement of progressive methods was not directed at this particular style of instruction 
 
24 Ibid., 4. 
25 R. R. Pedley, “Comprehensive Disaster,” in Fight for Education: A Black Paper, ed. Cox and Dyson 
(London: The Critical Quarterly Society, 1969), 45. 
26 Cyril Burt, “The Mental Differences Between Children,” in Black Paper Two: The Crisis in Education, ed. 
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per se, which may be conducive to the education of abler children. Rather, the criticism was 
about the detrimental effects progressivism may have on the majority of ordinary pupils for 
whom “the discipline, structure, system and purposeful direction of the ‘old-fashioned’ 
formality are preferable.”27 Certainly, this meritocracy is justifiable only if all the forms of 
education given to different groups of pupils are equally valuable and lead to equally 
respectable occupations for them. In this regard, the contributors to the BP also followed the 
post-war consensus about the parity of esteem. Less education may be better for some of the 
young who would benefit more by pursuing careers in business and other occupations 
distinct from the professions;28 and, apart from the standards of a basic minimum, a diversity 
of curricular choices provided by specialist schools (or in different streams of a single school) 
should provide an alternative for the common curriculum advocated by supporters of the 
comprehensive ideal.29 
 It may have become clear that the discussion about different manners of organising 
education was usually linked with a deeper concern with the content of education received 
by pupils. Thus, we should be alert to those accounts which argue that among intellectuals 
of the New Right there were usually different emphases between the “structures” and 
“standards” of education;30 or, that by the end of the 1960s there was a division “between 
the so-called ‘Preservationists,’ who wanted to maintain the grammar schools and some form 
of 11-plus selection, and the so-called ‘Voucher Man,’ who were keen to experiment with 
new and untried ways of organizing education.” 31  To use these terminologies for 
convenience, we have seen that the so-called preservationists complained about 
comprehensive organisation because they believed that the standards of the then existing 
selective system had been superior to what was to replace it. Nevertheless, is it true that the 
advocates of the voucher idea did not agree with this way of thinking? 
 
27 Stuart Froome, “Reading and the School Handicap Score,” in Black Paper 1975, 11. 
28 Cox and Boyson, “Letter to MPs and Parents,” in Black Paper 1975, 5. 
29 Cox and Boyson, “Comprehensive Schools: Background,” in Black Paper 1977, 60. 
30 Callaghan, Conservative Party Education Policies, 28. 
31 Chitty, Education Policy in Britain, 31. 
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 Looking at the historical evidence more carefully, there was rarely the kind of 
uncompromising libertarians who pursued the marketisation of education purely as an end 
in itself, and were indifferent to the change in standards resulting from the introduction of 
parental choice among schools. Early in the first volume of BP, it was clarified that the 
benefit of parental choice extends far beyond those children attending good schools; for the 
standards set by those schools will become a norm to be emulated by others in the fierce 
competition for limited pupils. 32  In other words, had there been no such outstanding 
standards exemplified by any school in the present educational scene, there would have been 
no motivation for introducing any policy devices to make the coordination of educational 
resources imitate the condition of a free market. The editors of the second BP expressed this 
view more manifestly. They emphasised that it is not the concept of liberty which is at issue; 
after all, it is a commonplace that market freedom does not necessarily leads all customers 
to choose what is the best for themselves. Rather, it is only because the standards of 
education are already there that it makes sense at all to advocate parental choice and other 
measures approaching privatisation: 
 
Private schools are a necessary aspect of our liberties, but their positive importance to 
education is our chief concern. This importance is not confined to the pupils who attend 
them, but extends to everyone who benefits from the competition they provide. The 
great public and direct grant grammar schools set a standard of achievement which is 
internationally recognised, and without which the standards of other institutions might 
imperceptibly start to slide.33 
 
Nonetheless, the feasibility of market solutions does not imply that it is also necessary to 
implement them. Therefore, in recommending the marketisation of education, the 
 
32 J. M. Cobban, “The Direct-Grant School,” in Fight for Education, 40. 
33 Cox and Dyson, “Letter to Members of Parliament,” in Black Paper Two, 14. 
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contributors to BP usually based their argument on the deplorable erosion of present 
standards by state schools. For example, Ralph Harris, the head of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs (henceforth IEA) from 1957 to 1988, defended statutory devices such as tax rebate 
which enable parents to contract out of state education and avoid unjustly paying school fees 
twice. The reason is that “in a ‘democracy’ where both parties can cynically disregard the 
preference of 49% of the electorate, and where public officials need be even less sensitive to 
the captive taxpayer,” this is the only effective way to make them responsive to what parents 
actually want.34 Scandals like the notorious William Tyndale affair during 1974-75 further 
gave golden opportunities to the proponents of free market in education who were prepared 
to see such permissive schools “denuded of their pupils.” 35  Consequently, it is an 
exaggeration to say that there was an unbridgeable division between the preservationists and 
the marketeers, or that their different emphasis on the standards or structures of education is 
more significant than what they did share with each other. 
 Similarly, it is misleading to take the introduction of a national curriculum as a neo-
conservative element which is at odds with the neo-liberal notion of laissez-faire and the 
minimal state. If most of the promoters of the privatisation of education were deeply 
motivated by the maintenance of standards, it is unlikely that they would have regarded a 
concern with curriculum and examination as something in tension with their own 
recommendations of parental choice. Their reason for demanding a nation-wide basic 
curriculum and examination had nothing to do with a desire for central control. Instead, it is 
because they believed that in the past there had been “an understood curriculum throughout 
the whole country” that had disappeared “when the liberation of the pupil and the 
development of interests and projects waxed supreme;”36 Consequently, they reluctantly 
suggested that “minimum standards of attainment in language and arithmetic must be 
 
34 Ralph Harris, “The Larger Lessons from Enfield,” in Black Paper Two, 71. 
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nationally set and tested.” 37  Nor does this concern with curriculum and examination 
essentially entail regulation by the government. Boyson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in 
the Department of Education and Science (henceforth DES) 1979-83, talked of examinations 
which “are set on established and recognised syllabi,” but this does not mean that they are 
to be devised by the state bureaucracy.38 Similarly, Sexton, who was also a special adviser 
to the Secretary of State for Education and stepped down together with Keith Joseph in 1986, 
argued for the need of “minimum standards and a minimum curriculum” in a framework 
where “variety and diversity can abound in accordance with the aspirations and abilities of 
children;” for, variety and diversity “do not mean a free-for-all where educational standards 
are forgotten in a desire to be different.”39 
 These talks of “structures” and “standards” of education might give the impression that 
the Black Paperites prioritised the rights of pupils and parents at the expense of the freedom 
of teachers and schools. Certainly, Boyson once welcomed the trend that “[p]opular schools 
would continue and expand and unpopular schools would decline and close.”40 Yet in the 
third BP the editors quoted with approval a newspaper commentary lamenting the inclusion 
of parental choice in a district which had led to good schools becoming better and bad 
schools worse. 41  A closer look reveals that the parental choice under discussion was 
introduced as part of a comprehensive scheme in that area. What was being complained 
about was the rush to ill-thought-out experiment which made the introduction of parental 
choice ineffective. More precisely, marketisation cannot encourage the schools to become 
competitive if parental choice is mixed with the control of schools by the Local Education 
Authority (henceforth LEA). The schools’ freedom of self-management is also essential to 
any pilot schemes of privatisation.42 What the marketeers really expected is that the existing 
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bad schools will also be forced to improve themselves. Without the right to adjust their 
provision of education, unsuccessful schools will certainly become worse in a free market. 
This result was not really desired by the marketeers who were no less deeply concerned with 
the standards of education than the preservationists were. 
 Furthermore, we have seen that the New Right’s talk of freedom involved an emphasis 
on the so-called Victorian virtues. In relation to economic prosperity, these include hard work, 
thrift, self-reliance, and so forth. In the field of education, the contributors to BP were also 
concerned not so much with parental choice per se as with the implied parents’ responsibility 
to educate their own children. Faced with the intractable problem of disruptive behaviour in 
the classroom, the teachers maintained that the “home environment remains the most 
powerful influence in the development of the child, and the responsibility for the growing 
wilfulness and ineducability of modern youth can, in most cases, be laid at the feet of the 
parents.”43 Concerning truancy among older pupils, these contributors also maintained that 
according to the Education Act 1944 the nature of school attendance above the age of fifteen 
was actually voluntary; consequently, “the unwritten ‘school contract’ arose whereby the 
parent undertakes to send his child to school with the right attitude of mind to enable the 
school to fulfil its part of the contract—namely to provide an education.”44 G. H. Bantock, 
a traditionalist Leavisite, lamented even more clearly both the diminution of family rights 
by state education and more importantly the transference of responsibility to educate 
children from their parents to the teachers,45 who had assumed the role of a representative 
of the state instead of an independent professional in loco parentis. 46  Therefore, it is 
inadequate to argue that BP’s advocacy of parental choice and the pupils’ right to receive 
education of high standards neglected the school’s freedom to design its own curriculum and 
the teacher’s professional status. 
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 This consideration of parental responsibility completes our characterisation of BP’s 
position which blurs the usual distinction between neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism. The 
support for improving educational standards through parental choice actually combines two 
kinds of argument. The first puts the pressure from parents on the schools, which are forced 
to improve themselves in order to compete for more pupils and funds. This policy measure 
is feasible only on the condition that the high standards of achievement are already exhibited 
by some schools and can thus serve as the norm for competition. The second is no less 
important for children’s success in education, for the parent “who deliberately chooses to 
send his son to a certain school is more likely to give him the right kind of encouragement.”47 
Ultimately, parental choice is meant to return the responsibility to educate pupils to their 
parents which had been misunderstood to belong to teachers. This complicated argument is 
well summarised by Boyson, whose apparently libertarian outburst noted earlier now gives 
way to a more balanced account: 
 
The very fact that schools were dependent on individual parental choice for their 
continuance would ensure both accountability and variety. Meanwhile the involvement 
of the parents in choosing a school would ensure a family’s close continued contact. 
This continued contact was what the Plowden Report suggested was, next to the innate 
ability of the pupil, the most decisive factor in the success of a pupil’s schooling.48 
 
As we shall see, given the richness of educational thought manifested by BP, Scruton’s views 
on education were for the most part symptomatic rather than innovative. Nonetheless, this 
also means that the minor part where he did stand out will be of paramount significance in 
redrawing the distinction between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. Before considering 
Scruton’s works, it is instructive to give a glance at the Conservative think-tanks and 
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intellectuals in the 1980s to see how BP’s ideas, which began as a continuation of the post-
war consensus on education policy, became more widespread and further developed. With 
this broadened historical context, we will then be able to locate and embed Scruton’s 
thoughts about education more accurately in the complex currents of the New Right. 
 
IV. The Conservative Intellectuals and Think-Tanks in the 1980s 
 
 Certainly, education policies during Thatcher’s premiership such as ERA cannot be 
wholly attributed to the Conservative think-tanks and their associated intellectuals. 49 
Nevertheless, the influence exerted by them, some of whom had also been contributors to 
BP, created a climate in which BP’s ideas could now enjoy wider sympathies.50 We have 
observed that it has been customary to note the division between the preservationists and the 
voucher man from the late 1960s onwards when BP attracted much attention in education 
debate. Similarly, the Conservative intellectuals and think-tanks during the 1980s have also 
been conventionally grouped in either neo-conservatism or neo-liberalism. For example, 
beginning with the marketeers, Lawton referred to the 
 
laissez-faire capitalism with total reliance on market mechanisms to control the relation 
between supply and demand in education. Stuart Sexton and the Institute for Economic 
Affairs, as well as publications of the Adam Smith Institute and other neo-liberal groups, 
have argued along these lines, in more or less extreme versions. But not the Hillgate 
Group, Roger Scruton and the neo-conservatives who see education as too important a 
matter to be left to choice and the market.51 
 
It is the task of this section to examine the extent to which these think-tanks and intellectuals 
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disagreed with each other, and more importantly, how their agreement inherited the legacies 
of BP. 
 It is useful to begin with Sexton. After stepping down from the DES in 1986, he 
established the Education Unit (henceforth EU) under the auspices of IEA, which makes him 
usually identified as a representative of neo-liberalism in education. In the first pamphlet 
published by IEAEU, Sexton made clear the motivation of introducing marketisation to the 
organising of schools immediately at the outset: in order to “produce the quality and choice 
that we expect in education, to improve our schools, we need to change the way that we fund 
and manage them,” and “making the education service fully responsive to parental choice 
and student needs … is the way to better standards.”52 This was in line with BP’s view of 
which he had been a contributor. Even if Sexton is a neo-liberal, he is so not in the sense of 
advocating parental choice for its own sake and being indifferent to what will result 
therefrom. In any case, he was not obsessed with the notion of freedom, and emphasised 
instead that parental choice means “a return of responsibility for education to the individual 
parent and family.”53 
 Again, there is the problem of how it is possible, without the help of central regulation, 
to ensure standards by the freedom of parents to choose what each of them wants for their 
children. As Antony Flew—a philosopher and frequent contributor to CPS’s pamphlets and 
SR among other organs of Conservative think-tanks—also acknowledged, “there can be no 
guarantee that that choice will be made as someone else would have preferred to see it 
made.”54 Flew’s optimistic reply was that, although it is truly Conservative to “protect 
children from the folly or fecklessness of their parents,” we have “absolutely no reason to 
fear that under the voucher any children would become worse off than they are now.”55 
Initially, Sexton was likewise shamelessly confident in stating that the “exercise of parents’ 
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choice in a free market is more likely to be right than the bureaucratic decisions of some 
‘decision makers.’”56 However, in a later IEAEU pamphlet he disclosed his reasons in a 
discussion of the defence by independent schools of separate science subjects (instead of a 
conglomerate one) up to the level of the General Certificate of Secondary Education 
(henceforth GCSE): “Fortunately this part of the Act [the National Curriculum of the ERA] 
does not cover the independent schools, and the independent schools belatedly exercised 
their undoubted authority in such matters and said that three separate sciences did matter.”57 
This point echoes well BP’s position that the interplay of market forces can maintain 
standards only if these standards have already been exemplified by some of the existing 
schools. It is reasons of this kind that led Flew to “believe that, in the real world of Britain 
today and tomorrow, parental choice and parental power would make for a general and 
substantial rise in levels of educational achievement.” 58  Therefore, in terms of both 
components of BP’s argument mentioned earlier, Sexton had so far followed the same track 
faithfully. 
 Sexton began to advance beyond the BP era when he applied this pattern of thought to 
further aspects of education. For instance, the reform of teacher training had already become 
a concern of the BP, where a philosopher of education confessed that his subject is of no 
practical value to teacher students. 59  A decade later Sexton argued further and more 
positively that if “Eton or Winchester can take in a young man or woman with a good degree, 
but no teaching experience, and turn them into some of the best teachers in the land, surely 
the state-maintained schools can do the same.”60 It is noteworthy that this view of teacher 
education was also endorsed by the Hillgate Group (henceforth HG),61 which was composed 
of Scruton and a number of former members of the Education Study Group (henceforth ESG) 
 
56 Sexton, Our Schools: A Radical Policy, 48. 
57 Stuart Sexton, Our Schools: Future Policy (Surrey: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1992), 3. 
58 Flew, Power to the People!, 8; italics mine. 
59 R. T. Allen, “And Madly Teach—to Teach,” in Black Paper 1977, 44-47. 
60 Sexton, Our Schools: Future Policy, 20. 
61 Caroline Cox, Jessica Douglas-Home, John Marks, Lawrence Norcross, and Roger Scruton, Learning to 
Teach (London: The Hillgate Group, 1989), 8. 
242 
 
at CPS. HG is usually deemed a think-tank on the far Right in the neo-conservative direction 
partly because CPS regarded its pamphlets as going out of control and refused their 
publication. 62  Therefore, this agreement concerning teacher education again seriously 
qualifies the usually definition of the tensions within the New Right. 
 More importantly, some of Sexton’s argument in favour of market forces amounts to a 
reinforcement of state authority in the manner of Scruton’s conservatism. This is where the 
Conservative think-tanks and intellectuals went substantially beyond BP’s aversion to the 
abuse of power by the education establishment. Explaining the advantages of the 
privatisation of national examinations, Sexton argued that 
 
Whether or not GCSE is a good thing, much of the [teacher’s] union opposition to it 
has not really been to it at all but has been a convenient stick with which to beat the 
government, given that it is the ‘government’ which is introducing it. Had the change 
been seen to be made by the examining boards themselves, then any opposition to it 
would have been directed to those boards and not to the government, and had there been 
opposition it would have been genuine opposition based upon the merits or otherwise 
of the GCSE, and nothing else.63 
 
This view of government had long been defended by Scruton in his conservative political 
doctrine: 
 
The state has the authority, the responsibility, and the despotism of parenthood. If it 
loses those ties, then it must perish, and society along with it. The state must therefore 
withdraw from every economic arrangement which puts it at the absolute mercy of 
individual citizens. This counsel has been many times ignored, and never more blatantly 
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than in modern times. Through the vast and rampant civil service, through local 
government, through nationalized industry, through all the advisory bodies and 
meddlesome councils that surround it, the government disperses its power among 
ignorant multitudes. If it cannot coerce them, then it is at the mercy of any force (a 
union, for example) which can.64 
 
Consequently, such acts of non-intervention as the devolution of the design of education 
recommended by Sexton must, according to Scruton, “be represented, not as a confession of 
powerlessness, but as an exercise of power.”65 That the “neo-liberal” Sexton should embrace 
this “neo-conservative” argument illustrates again that the usual definition of this division 
are of little utility in understanding the nature of the New Right in education. This is also the 
place where the educational thought of the 1980s surpassed the legacy of BP (which was not 
purely a part of party politics) and became distinctively Conservative. 
 However, it might be wondered whether we could still preserve the distinction between 
neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism; whether we could classify both Sexton and Scruton 
into those who took these ideologies to be compatible with each other, as opposed to those 
who disagreed with this compatibility, such as the more purely libertarian Adam Smith 
Institute (henceforth ASI) and the No Turning Back Group of Conservative MPs (henceforth 
NTBG) associated with ASI. Due to the limitation of space, here we can only note that their 
formulation of the marketisation position does seem to exhibit an indifference to the variety 
and diversity of schools and curricula resulting from parental choice. They were even 
prepared to allow parents “to choose whether they want their children to become proficient 
in ‘anti-racism’ and ‘anti-sexism,’ or taught skills which can help them to find jobs and derive 
fulfilment from life.”66 Nevertheless, it is difficult not to sense a contempt beneath their 
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apparently neutral reference to the “peace studies” and “world studies”67 which Scruton had 
been combating ferociously in other think-tanks specialising in national defence.68 It is also 
evident that their conception of the “standards” of education is defined by the populist belief 
that “all parents want their children to receive a good education that will qualify them for 
good jobs,”69 which certainly has nothing to do with those courses which tend to produce 
radical ideologues unemployable in any ordinary occupation. In any case, for our present 
purpose of challenging the customary interpretation of the paradoxes within the New Right, 
it is enough to show that the division between neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism is 
inapplicable in certain cases. What remains to do is to demonstrate further that there is not 
even a question of reconciling these two wings of the division in the educational thought of 
Sexton and Scruton, so that it is misleading at the outset to query whether they take them to 
be compatible or not. To show this point, and to explore more deeply the places where 
Conservative educational thought went beyond the inheritance of BP, we must consider a 
“neo-conservative” representative of the think-tanks during the 1980s—HG, mentioned at 
the beginning of this section in the quotation from Lawton. 
 Fortunately, another towering figure in the sociology of education policy, Stephen J. 
Ball, also conducted a comparative analysis of Sexton’s IEAEU writings and the pamphlets 
of the HG in more detail than Lawton’s brief account. In this comparison, Ball acknowledged 
that the “Hillgate Group concur with virtually all of this [i.e. Sexton’s] neo-liberal theology.” 
However, to underscore HG’s neo-conservatism as opposed to neo-liberalism, he added that 
HG’s intellectuals “are not content just to prescribe a form of market control based on 
parental choice; they also wish to shape and constrain choice by the proscription of certain 
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aspects of the school curriculum and the prescription of others.”70 Therefore, the resulted 
national examination “can be seen as a way of imposing uniformity on schools, when the 
neo-liberals value diversity.”71 Summarising these tensions within the New Right, Ball 
concluded that the HG’s intellectuals 
 
are clearly caught somewhere between a minimalist and strong state position; between 
parental choice and ‘the duty of the state;’ between free market diversity and rigid 
adherence to the absolute verities of ‘true’ knowledge; between trust and distrust of 
autonomous teachers and trust and distrust of parents/consumers.72 
 
Let us examine these four points one after another by reference to the details in HG’s 
publications. 
Concerning the division between the minimal state and central control (the first point), 
between variety and uniformity (the third point), this apparent inconsistency usually results 
from an ignorance of what diversity means in this context, and from the socialist assumption 
that the only method to achieve a desirable social end is direct government intervention. 
Though a national curriculum was a central concern of HG’s intellectuals, their starting point 
is the BP doctrine about the parity of esteem: “schools should be encouraged to return to a 
system of differentiated education, with separate classes, and if necessary separate 
institutions, to cater for the many and diverse gifts of the nation’s children.”73 As Sexton 
also clarified, the standard of “high quality” means “not that of the politicians, nor Cabinet 
Ministers, not even the Prime Minister,” but “what all of us, society, acting individually and 
collectively expect for our children, and perceive as being of a standard and depth 
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appropriate for the individual child.”74 Consequently, though diversity presupposes the 
educational worth of different subjects instead of a relativism of “anything goes,”75 this does 
not entail that the state must impose a uniform curriculum from above. In the words of HG, 
 
the best way to guarantee the continuance of a sound curriculum is not—or at least not 
initially—through state control. We must first open schools to the demand of their 
product, allowing their teaching to be influenced by the entrance requirements of 
universities; by the possibilities of employment; by the wishes of parents and the natural 
interests of the child. Until this is done, and until a stable consensus emerges, the 
attempt to impose a national curriculum by law will be construed as yet another exercise 
in arbitrary state control.76 
 
This explains why, during the Government’s introduction of the Education Reform Bill (the 
precursor of ERA; henceforth ERB) into public discussion, HG hoped that “the present 
proposals for a national curriculum will be given provisional status, to obtain only so long 
as the GCSE is not reformed into a genuinely objective examination, capable of imposing 
the right measure of national conformity.”77 It should be clear now that this “conformity” is 
not something imposed from above, but the consequence of “the privatisation of 
examinations, with employers, universities, and other interested bodies, getting together to 
set the examinations that they would wish students to pass.”78 Here Sexton is usually taken 
as an opponent of the uniformity in the “neo-conservative” conception of national 
curriculum and examination. But even in the interview which Ball conducted with Sexton 
and quoted in his own research, Sexton said that 
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in fact if you look at the independent schools there is a remarkable similarity between 
the curriculum of the various independent schools because that is what the customers 
want. Dictated by exams, dictated by companies, by whatever you like. But they 
provide what the customers are looking for.79 
 
Therefore, it is misguided to take the attitudes towards national curriculum and examination 
as a point of divergence between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. After all, the 
agreement between Sexton’s and HG’s arguments is part of the early consensus during the 
BP years when the demise of the quality of secondary education, for example, had been 
attributed to the failure not of the state, but of the leading universities to set the standards of 
examination high enough.80 
 This misleading interpretation of the tensions within the New Right in terms of the 
attitudes towards a national curriculum may be caused by the mistaken view that, since the 
marketisation part of ERA was highly influenced by neo-liberals of Sexton’s sort, the 
curricular part must have been the product of neo-conservatism. However, at least some 
commentators within the education establishment are also aware that the New Right actually 
involved a third movement, the Conservative modernisers, who include the then Secretary 
of State for Education, Kenneth Baker, and who were opposed by both the neo-liberals and 
neo-conservatives.81 In fact, the centralising part of ERA primarily resulted from Baker’s 
invitation of the very experts and advisers to enter “through the front door of the DES” to 
devise the programmes of study and their corresponding assessment whom both Scruton and 
his colleagues had been attacking since the early 1980s. 82  In other words, the 
implementation of the National Curriculum and its subversion by political opponents was 
actually a realisation of the nightmare long feared by the “neo-conservatives” rather than a 
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dream of theirs coming true.83 Therefore, the attribution of responsibility for the centralised 
curriculum to HG and Scruton instead of Sexton and IEAEU, is more probably intended as 
an ideological criticism of the internal contradictions of the New Right than a scholarly 
attempt to understand the nature of this intellectual movement. 
It is noteworthy that the misattribution of responsibility for educational reform occurred 
in higher education as well. The managerialism of this sector is often attributed to the New 
Right, but the fact that contributors to SR also denigrated this trend should prompt us to look 
for its origins.84 Indeed, long ago in the first volume of BP, it had been warned that an often 
ignored effect of militant student revolts is the erosion of academic autonomy. Without the 
protection provided by academic freedom, the students’ demand of relevant education would, 
in an age of state finance, easily lead to the state becoming the “real consumer,” with the 
students themselves turned into “the goods to be delivered.”85 The ramifications became 
more apparent during the 1970s. Consequently, in the fourth BP, it is the radical Left instead 
of the modernisers of the New Right that was accused of giving rise to the bureaucratic 
ethos.86 The irony is that the Left’s complaint about the “useless” academic curriculum in 
the universities should be answered, and their needs for “relevance” catered for, by the 
modernising branch of the New Right. 
Here it is pointless to criticise the internal incoherence of the Conservative doctrine. 
Consistency is deemed a relevant criterion only by anti-political ideologies which demands 
quasi-religious truth or a guaranteed “final solution” in politics. For example, the critique 
that parental choice does not ensure higher standards is an attack on a strawman. After all, 
no sensible person would imagine that there is any policy device which is sufficient to 
guarantee a uniformly high standard in educational achievement. If sufficient educational 
resources could necessitate higher achievement, how should we explain the fact so many 
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pupils from the upper classes performed poorly? As a doctrine of a political party concerned 
with realistic decision and action, it is unsurprising that Conservatism resorted to different 
expedient policies in view of different understandings of current circumstances. 
 This is where HG, like Sexton discussed above, transcended BP by elucidating the 
different conditions under which the government should devolve or assume political power 
in education. BP complained simply about the Secretary of State’s lack of control over 
curricula, which permitted its abuse by the educational establishment without consultation 
with parents.87 In contrast, HG argued further that “the responsibility for what is taught in a 
school must be removed from LEAs and from their bodies of self-appointed ‘experts’ and 
returned to those to whom it naturally belongs—to the heads, and, through the heads, to the 
teachers.”88 This recommendation involves a complication because the concentration of 
powers in the Secretary of State for Education was advocated merely as a temporary means 
to give away these powers again when those directly responsible for the tasks of education 
become “genuinely answerable for their exercise, and genuinely concerned to enforce 
them.”89 Consequently, there is no question of an exclusive choice between concentration 
or devolution imagined by critics of the New Right, but only that of timing and expedience. 
In HG’s words: 
 
Critics will also represent the Government’s proposals as involving increased 
centralisation, since they undermine the power of local authorities. Such criticism, in 
our view, is wholly misguided. Abuses of power can be rectified only by the exercise 
of a higher power. Parliament must therefore take the initiative in recovering the powers 
of wrongly constituted or abusive bodies. Once recovered, however, power may be 
devolved. And the aim of the Government’s proposals is to devolve power as far as 
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possible, so that it vests ultimately in parents.90 
 
Similarly, in his criticism of the unnecessary statutory powers given to the Secretary of State 
in ERB, Sexton noted that the 
 
Secretary of State should be prepared to devolve management, not to apply lots of rules 
and regulations, not to apply lots of conditions and take powers for more conditions, 
but merely to keep just one reserved power, namely that of withdrawing such devolved 
management if the governors make a mess of it.91 
 
However, careful readers may have noticed that in these passages it is still unclear whether 
ultimately the power and responsibility for education should lie in the hands of 
(head-)teachers or parents. This is the second and the fourth (the last) items in Ball’s 
accusation of HG’s internal tensions, and brings us to the questions concerning the meaning 
of teacher’s profession, the exact source(s) of his authority, and the place of the responsibility 
for educating children. As we shall see immediately, it is in the attempt to answer these 
questions that Scruton’s educational thought made a distinct contribution to the New Right 
during the 1980s. 
 
V. The Distinctiveness of Scruton’s Defence of Private Education 
 
 We are finally in a position to evaluate Scruton’s contribution to the education debate 
during the 1980s. Based on our previous discussion, for the most part Scruton’s views about 
education clearly belonged to the current of thought exemplified by both BP and later the 
various Conservative think-tanks. He maintained the inequality of educational outcome,92 
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and defended selective education, noting the importance of parity of esteem both in 
education (for the individual pupils) and in occupation (for the society as a whole).93 
Concerning the market in education, he also stressed that the provision of a norm of 
achievement “is the most important reason for defending private education,”94 and urged 
readers of SR to appreciate “the good sense issuing from the IEA’s education unit.”95 This 
seems to imply that the contributors to SR held some opinions about education different from 
the “neo-liberal” think-tanks such that it requires an insider to encourage his colleagues to 
appreciate what is valuable in  thinkers belonging to another intellectual camp. As we have 
just noted, these neo-liberal intellectuals, such as Sexton, shares with Scruton a Conservative 
conception of the free market in education as ultimately an exercise of state power. Therefore, 
to understand what is distinctive about Scruton, it may be illuminating to consider him in an 
additional context—SG. 
In an editorial protesting against the censorship by opponents which forced SR to search 
for a more tolerant publisher, Scruton reminded its readers of the two purposes of his and his 
colleagues’ continued efforts in sustaining this controversial journal. First, to explore the 
complicated social issues which had proved more interesting to the radicals than to those 
who were more constitutionally-minded; and second, to define a conservative answer to 
these issues in terms of concepts which transcend their liberal counterparts.96 It is with the 
first purpose in mind that Scruton composed so many pamphlets defending a conservative 
doctrine about education, an area of policy which he took to be second only to national 
defence in its importance to a country.97 As to the second aim, it requires a more meticulous 
reading of his works to identify the peculiarly conservative aspects of his educational thought. 
 In the conventional strategy of distinguishing neo-liberalism from neo-conservatism, 
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while the former gives precedence to the concepts of freedom and choice, for the latter it is 
responsibility and authority that are conceptually prior to other considerations. We have seen 
that this approach does not work well. Since as early as BP, parental choice and parental 
responsibility have gone hand in hand. Consequently, in reminding us that the education of 
children is their parents’ own responsibility rather than that of the teacher or the state, 
Scruton was claiming a position which is not distinctively Conservative, let alone distinctly 
Scrutonian.98 Of course, he did use this claim to explain further the attraction of progressive 
methods from the perspective of the teachers in an age when the parents’ responsibilities 
were transferred by the state onto their shoulders, which made these responsibilities “easier 
to discharge.”99 Nevertheless, even this more profound development of the idea surrounding 
parental choice and responsibility had already been anticipated by BP. There it had already 
been argued that the most suitable environment for letting the pupils just be active and self-
expressive is not the school but “their own home.”100 The implication is that only when the 
family fail their children in this aspect are the teachers required to compensate for this 
deficiency. 
 If responsibility is not the peculiar concept in Scruton’s conservatism about education, 
authority may be another useful clue. Certainly, this does not refer to the “authoritarian” 
imposition of a national curriculum and examination which, we have noted, has never been 
advocated by the New Right in the form formulated by its critics. Rather, Lawton once 
noticed that for Scruton one of the problems of state education is its negative effects on the 
nature of teacher authority. Regrettably, probably because “‘parental choice’ has become a 
central plank of Conservative education policy, not necessarily for Scruton’s reason but also 
because the Conservatives became increasingly captivated by the ideology of ‘the market,’” 
Lawton did not delve deeper into this neglected gem in educational thought, but focused his 
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analysis on what did leave its influence on education policy instead. 101  Scruton’s 
formulation of this problem is so important that it is worthwhile to quote it in full length: 
 
One of the undesirable consequences of making education compulsory at law is that it 
becomes impossible to construe the teacher’s authority as acquired by parental 
delegation, so that the two institutions of home and school do not so readily call upon 
the same fund of natural deference. The teacher’s authority is seen as arising 
independently, and if it can rely on no agreed ‘fiction’ for its validity other than the 
inherent right of the state to command obedience, then the institution of school is in 
danger of losing its autonomy, and becoming prone to whatever disaffection may attend 
to authority of the state.102 
 
It is with this reference to parental delegation of authority to teacher that Scruton’s 
educational thought begins to set foot in untrodden territories. 
 This point becomes more obvious when we juxtapose BP with Scruton. In the last BP, 
the editors argued briefly that the teacher’s qualification in a subject constitutes only the 
authority to transmit to his pupils the knowledge about the world in relation to that subject; 
but his authority to teach must further depend on “his assumption of responsibility for that 
world.”103 This distinction can be understood by distinguishing between the corresponding 
willingness on the part of the pupil to believe as true what his teacher particularly professes 
about that subject, and his willingness to learn anything from his teacher at all in the first 
place. In terms of this distinction, Scruton’s primary concern is the latter kind of teacher 
authority. Nevertheless, unlike BP, he perceived more acutely that in private education the 
teacher’s authority is constituted in a more complicated manner and enhanced through the 
parents’ authorisation to initiate the pupil into the specific part of the intellectual world in 
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which the teacher specialises. The teacher’s passion about his subject alone is not quite 
enough to persuade the pupil to begin to learn. In the words of one of a Scruton’s colleagues 
in SR, it is “one thing for a teacher to impose the discipline of a subject on a student who 
wants to learn that subject,” it is “quite another to force them to study a subject that they 
have no wish to study,” for this “second kind of discipline belongs to parents.”104 
This doctrine constitutes a more profound reason for introducing market forces into 
education and ensuring parental choice and responsibility. In linking the maintenance of 
standards with the effects of parental delegation of authority to the teacher—namely the 
maintenance of order in the classroom and the pupil’s readiness to learn—Scruton’s 
argument illustrates an additional way of improving standards by the privatisation of 
education which is more internal, direct, and different than the elimination of bad schools 
via the market mechanism usually favoured by the neo-liberals. This is point is also 
recognised by the ill-famed headmaster Ray Honeyford. Combatting the encroachment by 
the Race Relations industry upon the organisation of schools, whose demographic 
composition was urged to reflect the racial proportions in the whole population, Honeyford 
observed that such “institutions are widely regarded, even by many ‘immigrant’ parents, as 
ghetto schools,” and applauded “those concerned West Indian parents who have set up their 
own Saturday schools, institutions which teach the basic skills formally within a context of 
respect for authority—a concept correctly understood by the vast majority of West Indian 
parents as being central to the process of real education.”105 
 Certainly, we have seen previously that early in 1975 Boyson had already been aware 
of the importance of a closer partnership between schools and parents in improving the 
standards of pupils’ achievement. He further argued that such parental participation occurs 
not only in the choice exercised by parents to send their children to independent schools, but 
also “when pupils are successful in the 11-plus grammar school selection examination and 
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parents are given a choice of school,” but not “when pupils are directed to a neighbourhood 
comprehensive school which parents dislike.”106 However, his analysis did not touch upon 
the specific question of teacher authority. Consequently, in worrying about the possibility 
that “progressive parents are directed to send their son to a traditional neighbourhood 
primary school,” or with “the more frequent cases when traditional parents are directed to 
send their son to the progressive neighbourhood primary school,”107 Boyson was insensitive 
to, and lacked the intellectual resources to deal with, more serious situations in which the 
parents are indifferent to the responsibility of educating their children in the first place, and, 
“when their children are given bad marks, abuse the teacher instead of disciplining the 
child.”108 What Scruton and his colleagues warned is precisely that we should not idealise 
parental choice if the parents fail to understand that the point of exercising their freedom of 
choice is to delegate their authority of educating their own children to the teacher.109 To 
make matters more intractable, this part of the teacher’s authority cannot be easily substituted 
or compensated for by his qualification in a specialism, nor even by his commitment to the 
transmission and continued renewal of this particular part of knowledge and culture, let alone 
by a degree in education studies. One need only “think of the respect and authority which 
teachers—perfectly ordinary teachers in perfectly ordinary village schools used to command, 
and compare it with their present low standing” to see this point.110 
Nevertheless, whilst strengthening the teacher’s authority in the classroom, Scruton’s 
account also seems to limit its scope to what lies within the parent’s authorisation. This can 
be seen in his attack on some teachers’ propagation of questionable subjects such as “Peace 
Studies” and “World Studies” which “are exceeding the limited authority conferred on them 
by virtue of the fact that they act in no higher capacity than in loco parentis.”111 Again, this 
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point was later elaborated by contributors to SR that the “law, by requiring all parents to send 
their children to school, makes the teachers surrogates of government, arrogating to 
themselves the right, duty and power which belong to parents, and thus behaving 
immorally.”112 It appears to follow that it is parents who trump all other roles on the 
educational stage in determining what kind of education their children should receive. 
Here we are finally led to the question concerning the professional status of teacher. In 
the previous section, we have noticed that it is unclear whether in the New Right’s reform of 
the organisation of education it is the teachers or the parents who ultimately possess the 
power of decision-making. For instance, Flew contended that teachers will “become, or 
become again, like other traditional professionals” only if they are “directly employed by, 
and hence accountable to, their true clients: not, that is, the central state; nor yet the LEA’s; 
but the parents.”113 In contrast, in the second BP, Bantock insisted that the school is “a quite 
separate institution with a specially trained personnel to run it,” and that “teacher is not 
simply a substitute mum or dad.”114 Where does Scruton’s account of teacher authority stand 
in this divergence of opinions? 
Scruton believed that ideally “the teacher would receive a salary commensurate with 
the other professions and a social status equal to theirs,” and added that for this to realise 
“the teacher would not be a servant of the state.”115 However, it is a pity that he did not 
develop his educational thought further. Unfortunately, without a detailed account of the 
teacher’s professional status, Scruton’s views about the source of teacher authority alone 
inevitably make his position nearer to neoliberalism. This result is surprising considering his 
political philosophy which “favour voluntary associations, churches, charitable societies, 
clubs and private schools—institutions whose goals, funds and membership depend only on 
themselves, and not on the state.”116 The autonomy of these institutions is precisely what 
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his philosophical doctrine of corporate personality is meant to highlight and substantiate. By 
implication, if the norm of educational standards provided by the teacher should be 
independent of the political interference from the state, it should also remain intact in the 
face of the arbitrary influences of market forces. 
This unfinished theoretical task was taken up by Scruton’s colleagues at SR. Developing 
this line of argument further, the long-serving literary editor of SR, Ian Crowther, argued in 
a clearly anti-libertarian fashion that 
 
to regard professionals as purely suppliers of services to the sovereign consumer is 
necessarily to undermine what it should be in the conservative interest to uphold, 
namely, the authoritative guidance which professional institutions provide, alike to 
those who serve in them and to those who are served by them. It is because the 
“consumer” does not always know best what is good for him, for example, as litigant, 
patient or student, that lawyers, doctors and teachers (among other professionals) are 
made answerable to traditional standards and practices.117 
 
In other words, without a resilient tradition of institution building, the teaching profession in 
a society would easily succumb to the control exercised by the state or the dictates coming 
from the market. From the viewpoint of intellectual history, this is where the tensions of the 
New Right are really located. In the area of education policy, they are exemplified in the 
differing emphases Conservative intellectuals place on the various forms and sources of 
authority which the teacher may assume: from the parents as customers, or from the teaching 
profession itself. As Scruton once confessed, no one “has ever imagined that it is easy to 
reconcile a free economy with custom, tradition and institution building,” but “conservatives 
have refused to regard the first as enemy of the second” because “the centralised economy 
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is a far greater threat to the fabric of social life than any number of entrepreneurs.”118 
Therefore, Scruton’s advocacy of teacher authority in terms of the delegation parents give in 
exercising their freedom of choice, may be regarded as primarily a means to release the 
teacher’s professional status from that of civil servants. For, only after the teacher is no 
longer bound by the state is the possibility of an independent profession left open. How this 
profession could insist on its own standards and norms under the pressure of market 
mechanisms is a question which Scruton did not consider despite his powerful doctrine of 
corporate personality. 
 If we follow Crowther’s footsteps in completing this theoretical puzzle, our position 
will become increasingly traditionalist and thereby less compatible with the neoliberal 
elements of the New Right. For example, Robert Grant, another contributor to SR, provided 
an account of the structure of a professional relationship with which to make the profession’s 
independence possible: 
 
I need your skills as a lawyer (doctor, priest). In asking you to act for me, I ask you to 
set aside the normal motives to which I might appeal if I required something simpler or 
more material (meat, bread, candlesticks). I ask you to consult not your interests, but 
mine. To enable you to do so without thereby imperilling your interests and those of 
your dependants, I and your other clients propose to take those immediate 
considerations off your hands and to see that you are supported at a level sufficient to 
make economic ambition superfluous. You will then be free to devote yourself to what 
we ask of you, and we understand, indeed, that in setting yourself up as a professional 
governed not by straightforward financial considerations, but by an ethic enforced by 
the corporation to which you belong, this is precisely what you undertake to do. What 





independence on you so that you may, so to speak, provide your services gratis.119 
 
The generalisation of this argument will lead us finally to Worsthorne’s defence of hereditary 
aristocracy and its traditional spirit of public service which, the next chapter will show, is 
contemptuous of the neoliberal talks of freedom and market. In education specifically, it is 
also Worsthorne who explicitly applied the doctrine of corporate personality to argue against 
equality of educational opportunity. For this liberal notion of equality is confined in its vision 
to the rights of the individual, and forget that “institutions also have legitimate interests, not 
to say rights, to which individual interests and rights have to be subordinated to some 
degree.”120 More importantly, one of these overriding rights of institutions is the “need to 
maintain a corporate character capable of arousing love and loyalty.”121 Consequently, it is 
not outrightly unjust for an admissions panel to accept a pupil, not on the grounds that his 
educational achievement is superior to other candidates, but because his parents are prepared 
to donate a new library building to the school. From the corporate perspective, having some 
members whose long-standing attachment to this institution has been cultivated from youth 
onwards makes the loss of another merely bright pupil a small price to pay. Scruton did not 
go this far not because he found a way to reconcile the tension between the parental 
delegation of authority and the professional autonomy of teachers. Rather, it is because he 
also had a plethora of other political problems to deal with and thus spent insufficient efforts 
on educational thought that he eventually did not make explicit the profound implications of 
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 This chapter has provided an analysis of Scruton’s ideological writings on education in 
the context of BP and the Conservative think-tanks and intellectuals during the 1980s. We 
found that in terms of education policy the “preservationists” and the “marketeers” actually 
shared many arguments to the extent that the conventional distinction between 
neoconservatism and neoliberalism must be revised to accommodate recalcitrant historical 
materials. This revision began with Scruton’s advocacy of teacher authority on the basis of 
parental delegation. Without a theory of the status of professional institutions following from 
his philosophical doctrine of corporate personality, Scruton’s account tends to make the 
provision of education at the ultimate disposal of parents instead of teachers. On the other 
hand, subsequent completion of this theoretical puzzle by his colleagues at SR makes 
Scruton’s position less tolerant of the neo-liberal faith in the free market. Paradoxically, it is 
Worsthorne who made explicit what corporate personality means to education; but it is also 
he who claimed to owe much of his political opinions to Oakeshott—a thinker, we have seen, 
quite suspicious of the idea of corporate personality. To understand both Oakeshott and the 
development of post-war conservative ideologies more thoroughly, the next chapter turns to 
Worsthorne’s journalism and its relationship with Oakeshott’s middle works published 






An Alternative Interpretation of Oakeshott’s Political Philosophy: 




Peregrine Worsthorne was born in 1923 in an upper-class family. His father General 
Alexander Koch de Gooreynd was of Belgian origin, while his mother Priscilla Reyntiens 
was the granddaughter of the 12th Earl of Abingdon. Worsthorne's mother was more widely 
known as Lady Norman. She divorced Worsthorne’s father when Worsthorne was still a child 
and soon married Sir Montagu Norman, then the Governor of the Bank of England. Because 
of this split and his parents’ total devotion to public life, it was the butler of this family who 
in effect brought up Worsthorne for several years. This background significantly influenced 
Worsthorne’s views about various aspects of the way of life as members of the ruling class 
led it. 
 Worsthorne began his career in journalism as a sub-editor on The Glasgow Herald in 
1946, and later worked for The Times after 1948, serving as a correspondent in Washington 
between 1950 and 1952. He joined The Sunday Telegraph and became one of the principal 
columnists from its launch in 1961, working there for nearly three decades and assuming its 
editorship in 1986. Worsthorne’s influence over political opinions was mainly wielded by 
his commentaries in newspapers, thus it is solely based on his own professional credentials 
as a columnist. This makes him quite different from thinkers such as Minogue and Scruton, 
who contributed to public debate through the authority lent by their academic positions (a 
Professor at LSE in the case of Minogue) or eminent qualifications (a Cambridge 
philosopher in the case of Scruton). 
This chapter considers the nature and source of Worsthorne’s political thought. First, 
integral to his journalism is the advocacy of inconsistent but apposite views at different times. 
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Is Worsthorne thereby precluded from expressing a coherent conservative viewpoint? 
Second, his works provide a highly creative interpretation of Michael Oakeshott’s political 
thought. Is Worsthorne’s position more a result of Oakeshott’s formal teaching and personal 
inspiration in Cambridge and before that in the war, or more informally rooted in his own 
experience of the aristocratic life? 
 In the introduction to this thesis, it was emphasised that existing secondary literature 
has underplayed the role of Oakeshott in the development of post-war conservatism, 
especially as exemplified by more political and less academic figures preoccupied with 
current affairs daily. This chapter will strengthen this point. Worsthorne’s understanding of 
Oakeshott constituted the foundation of his multi-faceted critique of Thatcher and her 
followers, just as much as Minogue used what he learnt from Oakeshott to buttress 
Thatcherism. Although some of Worsthorne’s later expositions of English aristocracy as the 
true embodiment of the moral life of the individual go beyond what a generous interpretation 
of Oakeshott’s political philosophy could allow, this case study interestingly illustrates 
different translations of Oakeshott’s philosophical works into practical politics. 
 
II. The Peculiarity of Being a Columnist 
 
 In their portrayal of the thinkers associated with the Conservative Party, Mark Garnett 
and Kevin Hickson say of Worsthorne that “by his own admission, his journalism often 
expressed contradictory and inconsistent viewpoints, making him seem more of a dilettante 
than a serious political thinker.”1 However, it is important not to take Worsthorne’s self-
evaluation too seriously. Whatever contradictions and inconsistencies his journalistic 
writings may contain, Worsthorne did emphasise that “[w]riting a political book is a different 
matter” because in a monograph “one tries to argue a thesis, as [he] did in The Socialist 
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Myth.”2 Consequently, even if his journalism was theoretically messier, this in no way 
means that there cannot be found a central tenet in his more neatly argued books such as the 
one he mentioned, or his latest In Defence of Aristocracy (2004), to be discussed in the next 
section. 
Furthermore, the reasons Worsthorne gave for frequently setting aside the 
considerations of coherence in his journalistic production may reveal the actual nature of the 
contradictions and inconsistencies he attributed to his own columns. One of these reasons is 
the limitation of time and the concomitant pressure to overcome the lack of new ideas.3 A 
more important one is what the professional necessity of being a columnist forced him to do. 
As Worsthorne said: 
 
My primary responsibility as a journalist is to find something worthwhile to say that 
has not been said a hundred times already. If there is a fresh pro-trade union point to be 
made, which seems to me to have some merit, then I am delighted to make it.4 
 
In other words, while the task of a leader writer or a committed political commentator is to 
defend the official position of the newspaper for which he works, in Worsthorne’s view his 
job as a columnist was rather to enlighten public debate, or less pretentiously, simply to make 
a stir in the current intellectual climate. Certainly, at times even this kind of columns may 
consistently reflect some of his deep-seated beliefs, such as the insistence on the importance 
of inherited class stratifications. In relation to the trade union issue mentioned above, 
Worsthorne emphasised that an hereditary element is no less important in the working class 
than in Parliament, and noted that Arthur Scargill complained against Ian McGregor because 
the latter “does not understand the traditions of the British coal industry; lacks the knowledge 
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or the imagination to feel in his bones what can and cannot be decently done.”5 Nevertheless, 
generally speaking it is inadequate and careless to regard every Worsthorne’s column as 
representative of his own political thought. 
 Still another reason underlying the apparent incoherence of his journalism concerns the 
professional requirement to write comments which are appropriate both to the contemporary 
circumstances and to the integrity of being a columnist. For instance, concerning 
Thatcherism, Worsthorne confessed interestingly that 
 
At a time when Mrs Thatcher is riding unduly high, a columnist should see his job to 
cut her down to size; at another time, when her reputation has unduly slumped, the 
proper thing to do may be to build her up.6 
 
In fact, Worsthorne’s dismissal of Thatcher and her ideological followers appeared more 
frequently than his defence of them against their critics. This disproportion may again 
implicitly disclose his true attitude in this respect. Nevertheless, what is intriguing about 
Worsthorne’s apparently incoherent journalism here is that his attempt to “build her up,” 
while sincere in supporting Thatcher’s government, was no less critical than his criticism of 
the Thatcherites. Therefore, a close attention to this issue will clear the way to a deeper 
inquiry into Worsthorne’s political thought about aristocracy. 
 Concerning his criticism of Thatcherism, in the introductory chapter of his first 
collection of columnist writings Peregrinations (1980), Worsthorne observed that the main 
tension within the Conservative party consisted in the conflict between its social and 
economic ideals, between the Tory paternalists and disciples of the free market. The former 
was aware that the privileges enjoyed by a ruling class is justifiable only if it is prepared to 
shoulder the responsibility of public welfare. However, it was precisely the laissez-faire 
 
5 Worsthorne, By the Right, 48. 
6 Ibid., 9. 
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ideas advocated by the marketeers that transfer the fate of the bottom class to the invisible 
and impersonal forces of the economic system. Since the willingness and ability to protect 
the unsuccessful “is precisely what the Thatcherites boast about not having,” from 
Worsthorne’s perspective the New Right may prove more detrimental to the traditional order, 
“more dangerously radical, than the old Labour Party.”7 
 Being himself a member of the English aristocracy, it is unsurprising that Worsthorne 
referred to the neoliberal conception of what government should and can feasibly do as a 
defeatist “scepticism about the potentiality of the State for getting anything right as to rule 
out imaginative statecraft altogether.”8  Similar to the axiom in Scruton’s conservatism 
which gives priority to “appearance,” Worsthorne thought it vitally important for 
Conservatives to recognise that the “nanny state” so frequently derided by the neoliberals is 
a necessary myth shared especially among the younger generation. Any government which 
fails to take into account what is genuinely believed by the governed will not be able either 
to win their hearts or to understand practical politics, regardless of what really is or should 
be the case. Worsthorne took this point so seriously that he even conceived the myth of the 
welfare state as equivalent to “what the imperial mission was for a short time in the 
nineteenth century.”9 Like Scruton, for Worsthorne it is essential to present the libertarian 
experiment of allowing the free market to determine economic coordination as a “more 
effective protection” of the working class and the creation of “the necessary surplus wealth 
to cushion the pains of change” in the structure of the industries.10 
However, unlike Scruton, Worsthorne further thought that any theory of government 
must incorporate wholeheartedly the new sensibilities which give so high a priority to doing 
good to the weak, and to put these sensibilities to good use.11 This was not simply because 
most people’s “loyalty to the state, pride in Britain, emotional commitment to the idea of 
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being British, are all vastly affected by the success or failure of society in giving effect to 
these feelings of social concern.”12 More importantly, Worsthorne believed that this was 
what the old ruling class had succeeded in doing and could be replicated in the planned 
society of the future, and confessed that the traditional aristocracy was “more an ally of 
socialism than of capitalism.”13 This comment and Worsthorne’s much later ridicule of 
Thatcherites 14  can be judged to reveal more truly his position within the conservative 
spectrum. Indeed, that he still adhered to this position in his own memoir at a time when he 
thought “Party politics now seem unworthy of notice” suggests that the motivation merely 
to shed fresh light on public debate was no longer present.15 The same is true of his In 
Defence of Aristocracy, composed long after his retirement and the end of Thachter’s 
premiership. 
 Matters become more complicated if we turn to Worsthorne’s support of Thatcherism. 
If the conservation of what is valuable in the old ruling order is the sole criterion to judge 
the performance of Thatcher’s government, then Worsthorne did not contradict his own 
criticism of Thatcherite economic policies in applauding the government when its conduct 
conformed to this ideal of hereditary aristocracy. The Falklands war is a case in point. Here 
Worsthorne expressed approval consistently because the reason for embarking on it had 
nothing to do with “utilitarianism or the pursuit of happiness” and everything to do with “a 
wholly different tradition of sacrifice and obligation,” of duty and honour.16 
 On the other hand, if we set aside the questions about the ruling class and focus on 
economic issues instead, Worsthorne, as Garnett and Hickson argue, appeared to be always 
against the fashion, now critical of politicians in the One Nation tradition and now of the 
Thatcherites.17 Consequently, it seems difficult to identify his true attitude in this regard. It 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Worsthorne, Tricks of Memory: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), 229. 
14 Worsthorne, In Defence of Aristocracy (London: Harper Collins, 2004), 103-4. 
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is indeed arguable that Worsthorne praised the Conservative party’s internal ideological 
conflict instead, and concurred now with the doctrines of One Nation, now with Thatcherism. 
He conceived this tension as the party’s priceless asset without which its economic policies 
could not have been so flexible as to cater to the different needs of different epochs. Referring 
to the post-war consensus of the Welfare State, Worsthorne said that 
 
Such an attitude was absolutely right in the 1950s, and by associating Conservatism 
with it Mr Macmillan helped to ensure his Party thirteen years in office. Twenty-five 
years later, however, it had become equally clear that national affluence and ease had 
ceased to have any connection with past efforts; that is to say, were no longer deserved, 
could no longer be morally justified, and it is by associating Conservatism with this 
very different but no less valid realisation that Mrs Thatcher stands fair to ensure her 
Party another long period of office. Not being cursed with an ideology, the Conservative 
Party can always adjust to changing circumstances.18 
 
In other words, passages like this do not clearly illustrate whether Worsthorne’s support of 
Thatcherism is inconsistent with his criticism of neo-liberal economics. Therefore, it is better 
to examine more illuminating cases where Worsthorne defended Thatcher’s attack on 
socialism because in doing so she ensured that the poor are protected more than they would 
have been under welfarist policies; for his reasons are interestingly similar to, though more 
general than, his criticism of neoliberal economics. 
Worsthorne pointed out that critics of Thatcher mistook her source of appeal if they 
thought that her public support mainly came from the haves and the privileged. On the 
contrary, it was largely because “she has succeeded in discrediting egalitarianism by 





up to her.19 He went on to explain that many of the policy reforms favoured by the Labour 
Party did not really help those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Progressive education, 
for example, benefits more the children from families of sophisticated intellectual 
background than those growing up in poverty, “who desperately need old-fashioned 
instruction [and] strict discipline.”20 In any case, whether it benefits the descendants of the 
upper class makes no difference to their future, which is assured in some family firm or the 
like. Similarly, feminism, “easy divorce, free love, [and] sexual permissiveness” made more 
sense for middle-class women, and “the same can be said of most of the fashionable notions 
of the Fifties and Sixties.”21 
It is this aspect of Thatcherism that Worsthorne contrasted with the untenable 
assumption held by the Conservative governments before her “that the only way to defend 
wealth and privilege was to bribe the masses into passivity, by paying out more and more 
danegeld.”22 What the post-war Conservative party failed to grasp is that “ordinary people 
accept wealth and privilege far more readily than they accept, say, coloured immigration, 
because wealth and privilege are part of the British heritage in a way that coloured 
immigrants are not. …. In each case, it is simply a question of liking the familiar and 
disliking the unfamiliar.”23 The degree to which Thatcher’s political support really came in 
this way is irrelevant. Nonetheless, given that Worsthorne’s defence of the merits of 
Thatcherism in this instance corresponds very neatly to his critique of its inadequate political 
language of freedom and choice in 1978 before she came to power, his rebuttal of her critics 
may appear as much an expectation of what her government ideally should live up to as a 
clear endorsement. 
 This critique appeared in the important collection Conservative Essays edited by 
Maurice Cowling, entitled “Too Much Freedom.” Superficially, the title is easy to understand. 
 
19 Worsthorne, By the Right, 32. 
20 Ibid., 52. 
21 Ibid. 




However, its content cannot be simplified into a call to restore the authoritative leadership 
exercised by the traditional ruling class and to denigrate the value of individual freedom. 
First, Worsthorne admitted that there is nothing wrong in setting the wealth producers free, 
promoting choice in education and health, or resisting Labour legislation which was an 
affront to individual liberty.24 Second, again like Scruton, Worsthorne was nevertheless 
more concerned with the effective strategy of winning electoral support, apart from the 
exposition of a political philosophy. In Scruton’s view, “rolling back the frontiers of the state” 
cannot appeal to the powerless since they would rather believe that the impersonal state will 
give them more advantages than believe in a slogan which appears to benefit the powerful 
most. Thus, it was more important to preserve the personality of the State in the face of the 
encroachment of socialism. Similarly, for Worsthorne, 
 
Mrs Thatcher is confusing the experience of a crucially important minority of the 
British people, who really have suffered a diminution of freedom, with that of the great 
body of the nation, who have done the opposite. Indeed, if one were to probe into the 
hearts of many potential and actual Tory supporters—and others besides—one might 
well discover that what worried them most about contemporary Britain was not so much 
the lack of freedom as its excessive abundance; not so much the threat of dictatorship 
as the reality of something unpleasantly close to chaos.25 
 
Consequently, at least in terms of political rhetoric, Thatcher and her Shadow Cabinet should 
focus on what really concerns the weak, who are the majority: the need for a strong 
government instead of one which knows nothing other than to encourage them to say 
“laissez-nous faire!” 
 What makes the title of Worsthorne’s essay misleading is the fact that towards the end 
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he emphasised the underlying value of such authoritative exercise of strong leadership: 
individual freedom. Here, he drew a sharp boundary between socialism and his own position, 
maintaining that socialism confuses the task of helping the poor with infecting the whole 
society by their values of dependence and passivity. Worsthorne did not deny that the strong 
ought to help the weak. However, 
 
[n]o healthy society should allow itself to see the world through the eyes of the 
unfortunate who have no great interest in perceiving, let alone exploiting, the highest 
value of civilization: individual freedom. Indeed, being for the most part those who 
have failed to make use of freedom, either because of fate or circumstance, they are 
likely to be the part of society least enamoured of that supremely challenging ideal and 
most susceptible to all the temptations to undermine it.26 
 
If the central concept of Worsthorne’s political thought is, like Minogue’s, individual 
freedom, then why did he, unlike Minogue, express so much contempt towards those whose 
catch phrases were liberty, choice, market, and laissez-faire? Moreover, if Worsthorne’s 
inspiration also came from Oakeshott’s account of the moral life of the individual and the 
individual manqué (transformed into the anti-individual in modernity) as much as Minogue’s 
ludic conception of freedom owes to Oakeshott’s understanding of the playful nature of civil 
association, then why did their evaluations of Thatcherism differ so much? To answer these 
questions, we must leave Worsthorne’s journalistic writings and turn to his monographs and 
autobiography. This will further clarify his distinctive understanding of Oakeshott’s political 
philosophy. 
 
III. The Moral Life of the Individual as the Ruling Class’s Value 
 




 Worsthorne’s first book-length exposition of his own political position, The Socialist 
Myth (1971), contains various themes to which many of his later writings return continuously. 
The central tenet is that a Labour government, by its very nature, is destined to assume office 
against “a background of widespread anti-Establishment feeling, of distrust of State authority, 
of doubts about existing institutions,” which is fostered by its own efforts in the earlier 
electoral battle.27 However, once in power, the success of its collectivist policies depends 
more heavily on a context of respect for official authority and a voluntary acceptance of 
governmental orders than the Conservative party does. Whilst in capitalism the welfare of 
the people is largely determined by market mechanisms, in socialism a public servant “is 
much more like God” in deciding who are to receive the resources which have significant 
roles to play in the crucial areas of their lives.28 For these important decisions to be willingly 
obeyed, those in power have to be “a rather special kind of person, somebody with just that 
bit of extra character, a leader of men.” 29 Consequently, the problem facing a Labour 
government working under the existing constitutional framework is not that of freedom, but 
of nurturing a ruling class capable of commanding consent.30 Clearly, this argument about 
the presupposition of democratic socialism is the precursor of Worsthorne’s later critique of 
Thatcherism discussed in the previous section. 
 Unfortunately, argued Worsthorne, socialism is prevented from fulfilling this task of 
integrating the old aristocracy into its new ruling class by its internal contradictions. For 
socialism is not only concerned with implementing welfarist policies. The other side of this 
coin is an egalitarian ideal which finds it difficult to tolerate unearned privileges or rights 
that are not shared by all people. Yet, “if socialism means equality, or even only equality of 
opportunity, then the more socialist a society becomes, the less necessary it is for those on 
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top to feel any personal responsibility for those below.”31 In other words, not only does its 
egalitarianism pose an obstacle to the continuation of the traditional hereditary aristocracy. 
Its successful implementation will also bring about a new ruling class lacking the sense of 
public service and the motivation to repay their debt by helping the poor. Nevertheless, this 
is precisely the source of their authority to rule which the Labour government desperately 
needs. 
 Furthermore, Worsthorne claimed that it was well known during the 1950s and the 
1960s that socialist intellectuals repeatedly expressed contempt for the rich and especially 
their consumerist lifestyle, apart from the various forms of media through which this 
capitalist evil was spread downwards to the working class.32 However, at the same time, 
“the rich are seen by the Labour Party as economic agents only—people who have to be 
allowed wealth so as to be able to produce it,” with their social role purposefully frustrated 
via the attempt to stop them from using their money to accumulate cultural and social 
advantages.33 Consequently, it is unsurprising that their lives become plutocratic instead of 
aristocratic when they are not allowed to buy private education for their children, or to 
bequeath their wealth to the next generation so that it can devote itself wholly to community 
leadership without worrying about the urgency to earn any money. Again, it is precisely a 
ruling class embodying the aristocratic values that the Labour government immediately 
requires for its welfarist policies to work effectively. 
 What is noteworthy in Worsthorne’s argument is that the language, and the examples 
he used, both contain implicit allusions to T. S. Eliot’s Notes Towards a Definition of Culture 
and explicit references to Oakeshott’s essays in Rationalism in Politics. The feasibility of 
this intellectual marriage is not obvious at first sight. With regard to Eliot, the allusion is 
obvious from Worsthorne’s discussions of first, the “moneyed élites” resulting from the 
Labour government’s different attitudes towards the economic and the social roles played by 
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the rich;34 and secondly, the “old educated class” who were “deeply shaped by other non-
intellectual traditions … which in many respects were in conflict with prevailing progressive 
ideology.”35 This allusion to Eliot is more evident when Worsthorne contrasted élite and 
class with each other. In favour of class, he claimed that “a class structure has, as against an 
élite structure, certain virtues which a liberal society would be foolish to discard.”36 In 
addition, the example he provides about the members of a committee who meet solely for a 
particular purpose and does not really meet each other in a wider holistic and cultural sense, 
was borrowed directly from Eliot’s social criticism. 37  In his final book, Worsthorne 
eventually acknowledged this debt to Eliot and the importance of the allusion in his own 
political thought.38 
 The influence from Oakeshott is very different, which Worsthorne publicly confirmed 
in his early career. For example, in discussing Sir Thomas More, Worsthorne referred to 
Oakeshott’s “Rationalism in Politics” and explained the sense in which More “was an 
educated gentleman, whose roots lay in a social background that helped to induce an 
instinctive understanding of the art of politics. The difficulties inherent in the exercise of 
power, in governance, were something that he understood, not from books, but from life.”39 
Worsthorne continued by commenting on the events at Pinkville during the Vietnam War, 
and was confident that had Lieutenant Calley been a British officer and gentleman, he would 
not have committed such outrageous deeds as was alleged. In justifying this claim, 
Worsthorne alluded to what Oakeshott thought lies beyond the capability of a civilian officer 
having undergone just a few years of military training: “the habit of authority engendered 
over generations, a professional pride and ingrained self-discipline, a tradition of leadership 
which only an officer class is likely to be able to nurture.”40 For such an English officer 
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misconduct on the battlefield is unimaginable, not necessarily because he possesses superior 
moral virtue, but “because of something much simpler, something, if you like, laughable; 
because that kind of behaviour simply is not done, simply is not cricket.”41 Finally, in his 
autobiography, Worsthorne said of that essay of Oakeshott that “[n]o other piece of political 
writing has influenced me more.”42 
 Nevertheless, what Worsthorne took from Eliot and the middle Oakeshott appears to be 
in uneasy tension with what the late Oakeshott is generally taken to maintain. According to 
Worsthorne, the value of class stratification consists in the rootedness it gives to its members, 
in the development of “distinctive styles of living in which they feel naturally at home.”43 
With regard to the upper class in particular, the aristocratic virtues embodied in their 
understanding of the conduct of life “are designed for societies with a rather grander idea of 
the purpose of politics.”44 By contrast, the moral life of the individual as delineated by the 
late Oakeshott is precisely exemplified by the type of people who are released from the 
existing social role and regard the journey of life as an adventure without eternal or fixed 
points of anchorage. Similarly, from Oakeshott’s perspective, the kind of government which 
corresponds to people with this temperament is one whose end is rather bland; it is an umpire 
supervising the adherence to and infringement of procedural rules, without having a political 
objective of his own to impose from above. 
 It would be too easy to resolve this tension by maintaining that the late Oakeshott 
discarded many of the beliefs he had held when he wrote the post-war essays during the 
1940s and the 1950s; or that Worsthorne’s understanding of Oakeshott’s political philosophy 
was misguided so that there is no reason to regard Oakeshott as a conservative simply 
because Worsthorne took him to be an orthodox representative thereof. If one looks deeper 
into Worsthorne’s writings, it becomes evident that, in translating Oakeshott’s political 
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philosophy into practical politics, he did not take the moral life of the individual as the value 
which is embodied (or should be embodied) by most people in a society, be they bourgeois 
or working-class. It is this move that is distinctive of Worsthorne’s political thought. 
Therefore, the remaining task of this section is to evaluate the extent to which Worsthorne’s 
writings contribute to a fresh but reasonable interpretation of Oakeshott. 
 Earlier we noted that Worsthorne’s major complaint about Thatcherism is its ignorance 
about the ramifications of its neoliberal policies, especially with regard to the poor. These 
ramifications are not primarily material, and the changes to life thus brought about are not 
confined to the working class. What makes Worsthorne particularly concerned with the weak 
is his belief that the privileges of the strong can be justified only if they can discharge their 
responsibility of protecting the lower class. More crucially, when the rootedness of class 
stratifications and its historical continuities are weakened by political reform, “everybody 
gets cut adrift, the poor even more than the rich, the underprivileged even more than the 
privileged, since it is always the weak and stupid who are least able to adapt to new ways or 
abandon old habits.”45 To generalise this argument, Worsthorne contended that the “same 
goes for the monarchy and all the other ancient institutions without which ordinary people 
would feel cut off from their roots.”46 
 Described in this way, the weak in Worsthorne’s political thought seem to be the 
counterpart of the individual manqué in Oakeshott’s. Nevertheless, contrary to Oakeshott’s 
and Minogue’s ambivalence towards the values of dependence, passivity, and rootedness 
exhibited by the lower class, Worsthorne thought that there is no need to change their 
lifestyle but every need to respect them as they are. The inability of both the New Right and 
the New Left to appreciate the lives of the poor for themselves, he argued, should be 
attributed to the decadence of religious belief. Rather than understanding poverty as a 
misfortune or lack of luck, which is preordained by God and should be humbly accepted by 
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mortal beings as such, members of the lower classes are regarded as “objects whose lives 
must be radically changed either by moral regeneration through exhortation and challenge 
(Thatcherism) or through egalitarian social engineering (socialism).” 47  Consequently, 
although Worsthorne also recognised the moral depth involved in individual freedom and 
choice (which we have seen Minogue expound in detail), he did not think that this liberty is 
what the weak must learn to exercise. In his words, “Conservatism is, of course, about much 
more than capitalism; about much more than economics. And even its economic aspects have 
a moral aspect, since the area of choice made possible by capitalist affluence allows the 
individual to make good—or bad—in all senses.”48 However, 
 
If it is meaningful at all to talk about a Tory ideology, it is simply this: a recognition of 
the inevitability of authority and hierarchy, and a determination to guarantee the 
availability of enough men and women who can meet this requirement, and enough 
popular support for them to be able to get on with the job of governing. It sees its 
function, in short, as twofold: to promote policies designed to nurture habits of 
command and habits of deference; to produce a relationship which allows the leaders 
to lead and the led to be led in such a way as to result in mutual satisfaction.49 
 
Clearly, what is missing from this picture is the status of the bourgeoisie. The reason is 
readily understandable: as in the case of the lower class, Worsthorne did not think that the 
moral life of the individual is exemplified by, or is really suitable to, the middle class. That 
vision of life is quite “beyond the range of the bourgeois or proletarian imagination;” for an 
aristocratic class is not “frightened into public life by fear of socialism, or driven into it on 
behalf of the worker,” but born to govern the state by their values of action, struggle, 
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creativity and progress.50 
 What makes Worsthorne’s position intriguing is that he claimed to owe the account of 
the moral life of the individual and the individual manqué to Oakeshott. This is a rather polite 
way of expressing gratitude to the discussions he enjoyed with Oakeshott. Referring to 
Oakeshott’s “The Masses in Representative Democracy” published much later after the war, 
Worsthorne boldly claimed “to have had a hand in its composition” because during the war 
they “spent many jolly evenings developing this abridgement … offering [other socialist 
officers] an alternative interpretation of modern history.”51 In Worsthorne’s view, it is the 
English aristocracy which resolves “that conflict in favour of the instruments of 
parliamentary government—the instruments appropriate to individuality—and, what is more, 
resolving the conflict so decisively that, so far, there has been no serious attempt to reopen 
it.”52 In other words, if we confine our attention to English history only and translate the 
abridgement of different moral lives into this concrete setting, “in England it was a group of 
aristocratic individuals, rather than a group of bourgeois individuals, or a group of 
proletarian individuals, who, with miraculous bloodlessness, carried out the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688.” 53  However, the question is whether Oakeshott did approve of 
Worsthorne’s way of using this account of two conflicting moralities in modernity. 
 One may have reason to doubt that Worsthorne here is relying more on his own personal 
experience than on Oakeshott’s philosophical account of the moral life of the individual. 
Reading through his autobiography, one cannot help but suspect that many of the political 
claims Worsthorne made elsewhere were more an abstraction of what he had really felt and 
undergone in his life. For instance, the proposition that nobility is associated with an active 
life of “struggle and exertion” rather than a passive one of “ease and indulgence,”54 reflects 
Worsthorne’s childhood memories of his mother’s disapproval of his father’s idle lifestyle 
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and her admiration of his step-father’s embodiment of the ideal of public service.55 That 
domestic service need not imply subservience and, under an aristocratic culture, can carry 
with it a dignity, honour and job-satisfaction transcending material reward,56 is also based 
on his personal contact with the butler of his family, whose confrontation with Winston 
Churchill due to the latter’s bad table manners was never forgotten by Worsthorne.57 Again, 
the demoralising effects on the hereditary system, caused by the proposed fiscal measures 
which preserved the wealth and privilege of the upper class but prevented it from passing 
them on to the next generation,58 is what Worsthorne understood through the reactions of 
his upper class comrades towards the end of the war when the Attlee government won the 
election.59 Finally, unlike Minogue whose understanding of reason of state largely came 
from reading Machiavelli, Worsthorne, when working for the Times, had the opportunity to 
attend regular meetings with government officials which were meant “to give the Times man 
an insight into the real reasons behind British foreign policy; reasons which were quite often 
different from those ministers were giving in the House of Commons.”60 
 These personal experiences constitute the basis on which Worsthorne substantiated his 
account of aristocracy. In relation to reason of state, Worsthorne recognised that before the 
war “the appeasers were not acting out of cowardice but out of a kind of sober courage, by 
comparison with which Churchill’s eagerness to embrace war begins to seem almost 
irresponsibly vainglorious.”61 In more general terms, Worsthorne saw the members of the 
traditional aristocracy as individuals who were able to “do the nation’s dirty work,” “to 
authorize difficult and sometimes cruel actions for the common good,” “to resist giving way 
not only to every grievance but also to manifestly worthy causes as well,” and “to rub 
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society’s nose in the painful realities of keeping a great nation on course.”62 In light of this 
moral character the ordinary bourgeois politicians almost fail to show any independence and 
creativity, with their careers wholly depending on retaining, and more usually conforming 
to, popular favour. Certainly, here Worsthorne was talking about the aristocratic ideal. That 
Churchill’s family in fact had a prominent lineage and Neville Chamberlain, the arch-
appeaser, was actually from the middle class only strengthens the fact that family education 
does not absolutely determine the character of the next generation. In any case, it is more 
likely that Worsthorne’s attribution of the moral values of the individual to the upper class 
came from what he learnt in his life experience rather than the theoretical discussions he had 
with Oakeshott. After all, it is unrealistic to expect a journalist who admitted his “inability 
to master complex theories” to take into account Oakeshott’s late political philosophy, which 
are much more abstract in language than his post-war essays on which Worsthorne primarily 
depended in his defence of aristocracy.63 
 The difference between Worsthorne’s style of political thought and the nature of 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy sheds further light on the incompatibility of their doctrines, 
in spite of their shared understanding of what the contrast between the individual and the 
individual manqué theoretically amounts to. For Worsthorne, 
 
[a]ll supposedly opposite ideas are in reality only different sides of the same coin, the 
value of which depends on neither being defaced. A proper understanding of ideas, 
therefore, requires a willingness to search for affinities, not conflicts. In terms of 
practical politics it may be desirable to mobilize ideas into conflicting armies. But in 
terms of discovering the truth, it is necessary to do precisely the opposite.64 
 
The example he used was the conflict between the concepts of equality and individual 
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freedom, which is the most central contestation between ideas after the war. By contrast, 
from the Oakeshott’s philosophical viewpoint, conceptual conflicts take an opposite course. 
In terms of theoretical exposition, the philosopher’s task is to pursue an idea until its logical 
limit manifests itself. Throughout his life, Oakeshott was averse to the idea of compromise 
and regarded any rapprochement as a sign of philosophical weakness. He maintained that it 
is only in practical politics that opposing ideas must live together in order to get anything 
done in practice. From Worsthorne’s perspective, however, this cohabitation of opposing 
ideas is on the contrary suitable for the pursuit of objective truth instead of practical politics. 
 Therefore, we can see why Worsthorne was eager to respect the existing lifestyle and 
values of the weak as much as he was anxious to defend those of the strong. For him, 
conservatism means the achievement of a mutuality between them where both the deference 
of the one and the leadership of the other are essential ingredients of a healthy society. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that Oakeshott would be concerned to philosophise not only the 
moral life of the individual, which he actually did in OHC, but also that of the individual 
manqué. In his late conception of the nature of political philosophy, there is no longer the 
dialectical impulse to arrive at the State or to transcend the contradiction between the 
individual and the individual manqué. As such, it is Worsthorne’s journalistic work, not 
Oakeshott’s late political theory, that accidentally achieved the philosophical task which the 




 Although Worsthorne is the least systematic conservative thinker considered in the 
second part of this thesis, his journalism provides a corrective to dominant interpretations of 
Oakeshott. Had we been confined to Minogue’s understanding of Oakeshott’s practical 
significance, we would have regarded Oakeshott’s late works as primarily neoliberal in 
implication. Again, if we had not gone beyond Scruton’s political theory and analysed his 
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ideological pamphlets, we would not have had the opportunity to find that a neoconservative 
emphasis on morality, authority, and corporate personality, though not wholly compatible 
with Oakeshott’s early political philosophy, may be inspired by his post-war essays. Thus, 
the analysis of Worsthorne completes our portrayal of Oakeshott’s place in the history of 





Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
 The first half of this thesis has provided an intellectual portrait of Michael Oakeshott’s 
political and general philosophy which focuses more on its internal context to explore his 
underlying motivation for the theoretical modifications he continually made to his works. In 
this account, it becomes inadequate to attach a specific ideological label, either liberal or 
conservative, to Oakeshott even if we consider only a particular stage in the long 
development of his thought. Rather, his emphasis on the moral and political significance of 
individualism in our modern social life was expressed in his own peculiarly academic, 
philosophical manner. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Oakeshott had no role to play in the history of 
British conservatism. A complete picture of his works constitutes a useful framework for 
understanding the traditionalists associated with the Conservative Party via various think-
tanks and media, examined in the latter half of this thesis. Because of the comprehensiveness 
of this framework, we are able to discern where these thinkers were strongly influenced by 
Oakeshott and where they went beyond his influence. Roger Scruton is a case in point. 
Without the framework of Oakeshott, we would not have been able to judge that Scruton’s 
Hegelian account of freedom can be embedded in Oakeshott’s early political philosophy, and 
therefore that the distinctiveness of Scruton’s conservative thought consists in the idea of 
corporate personality which even the early Oakeshott found reluctant to incorporate into his 
own works. 
More importantly, we are enabled by the neutrality of this framework to observe how 
both Kenneth Minogue and Peregrine Worsthorne were inspired by Oakeshott’s defence of 
the moral life of the individual, but put it to divergent uses. This finding breaks the simplistic 
continuum between the two extremes of liberty and authority, which has been employed by 
commentators to distinguish the neoliberal New Right from its neoconservative wing. 
Although Minogue’s and Worsthorne’s versions of conservatism are incompatible with each 
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other, in different ways their thought illustrates that the apparent tensions between freedom 
and authority are but two sides of the same coin. For Minogue, authority and other moral 
foundations are what makes the exercise of freedom possible in the first place. For 
Worsthorne, it is the aristocratic class’s ability of exercise freedom that justifies its 
enjoyment of the authority to rule. Our consideration of more practical writings by Scruton 
and other think-tank intellectuals in education politics further offers a more nuanced and 
objective understanding of the complicated development of different branches of 
conservatism. 
 It is regrettable that due to the limitation of space and time this thesis is unable to deal 
with more conservative thinkers to exhibit the richness of twentieth century conservative 
political thought. In particular, Shirley Robin Letwin is also an important figure. Repeatedly 
referred to by both Minogue and Worsthorne in relation to her defence of Thatcherism and 
the ideal of the gentleman, respectively, the character of her conservatism may provide 
further clues to the contrast between Minogue and Worsthorne. Moreover, Maurice 
Cowling’s call to widen conservatism’s source of inspiration is mentioned several times in 
this thesis in introducing the various traditionalists. Indeed, his own thorough investigation 
of the public doctrines in modern England is perhaps another important text besides his 1978 
essay with which to understand Scruton, who once studied at Peterhouse, Cambridge under 
Cowling’s mentorship. Finally, earlier thinkers such as F. R. Leavis and T. S. Eliot are also 
essential to understand the history of conservative thought; they are not necessarily or 
unambiguously conservative but their thought is nevertheless frequently borrowed by more 
recent conservative thinkers examined in this thesis. It is hoped that future research will 
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